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ABSTRACT
A History of the Development of Charter School Legislation in Utah
by
Marlies Burns, Doctor of Education
Utah State University, 2012
Major Professor: Dr. Sylvia Read
Department: Education
The Utah Legislature enacted charter school legislation in 1998 in order to offer
the state’s first school-choice option. The legislation came following a task force
discussion about the pros and cons of school choice and what school choice should look
like in Utah. There was not agreement among task force constituents about what should
be contained in the legislation, nor which entity should be responsible for the monitoring
or oversight of the eight pilot charter schools.
Since enactment, Utah charter school legislation has changed during most
legislative sessions with some establishing stronger charter school laws and some
establishing weaker ones. Strong charter school laws are designed to provide for the
establishment of high-quality charter schools. In contrast, weak charter school laws
would not provide for the establishment (or accountability) of high-quality charter
schools. Despite the legislative changes, 81 charter schools are now in operation, serving
nearly 44,900 students and seven more charter schools are in queue to open in fall 2012.
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Literature, interviewees, and the researcher all offered recommendations to strengthen the
charter school environment in Utah that focused around topics such as flexibility from
laws, changes in school funding, strengthening the authorizer environment, and working
to create legitimate school choice options for all students.
(187 pages)
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT
A History of the Development of Charter School Legislation in Utah
by
Marlies Burns, Doctor of Education
Utah State University, 2012
School choice is a continual hot topic of discussion among educators and the
public alike. Utah, the 34th state to join the charter school movement, was a late comer to
the game in 1998. This dissertation explores the history of the development of Utah’s
charter school legislation. Marlies Burns, researcher, identified events both in Utah and
outside Utah that led to the introduction of charter school legislation, including divisions
occurred among stakeholders concerning legislation.
In 1998, the legislature discussed and passed Utah’s Charter School Act. Prior to
passage, the legislature considered several proposals and modified the bill language
significantly. Since 1998, charter school laws have been changed every year to strengthen
the law. Strong charter school laws are designed to provide for the establishment of highquality charter schools. Despite the legislative changes, 81 charter schools are now in
operation, serving nearly 44,900 students and seven more charter schools are in queue to
open in fall 2012.
The conclusion offers recommendations to strengthen the charter school
environment in Utah on topics such as flexibility from laws, changes in school funding,
strengthening the authorizer environment, and working to create legitimate school choice
options for all students.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
History of the Development of Charter School Legislation in Utah
The development of formal education in the United States differed from that of
other Western societies in that ours had confidence in education as a principal means to
achieve individual and social goals, provided more years of schooling for a larger
percentage of children, and implemented mass schooling through a largely decentralized
organization (Conley, 2003). American education, unlike the nationally directed and
financed educational systems of other countries, became mainly the responsibility of the
state and local governments; the word education does not even appear in the United
States Constitution.
Educational reformers in the early 19th century, such as Horace Mann, became
increasingly troubled by the absence of any system in American public schools (Graves,
1912). Mann advocated for systematic elementary education, arguing that, “A nation
cannot long remain ignorant and free. No political structure, however artfully devised,
can inherently guarantee the rights and liberties of citizens, for freedom can be secure
only as knowledge is widely distributed among the populace” (Taba, 1962, p. 12).
Repeatedly, reformers contended that elementary education should be available and free
to all, financed by public funds, and accountable to state governments. By the end of the
century, reformers achieved their goal. Beginning with Massachusetts (1852) and New
York (1853), all states passed compulsory school attendance laws by 1918 (Katz, 1976).
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Public education became fundamentally a state responsibility, because the Tenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution reserved to the states all powers not
specifically delegated to the national government. Although final authority for public
education resided with the state governments, the dominant tradition in the United States
was one of decentralized administration. The most significant unit of educational
authority was the local school district, the boundaries of which usually coincided with
those of a county or town. Therefore, schools were designed to reflect the educational
values and financial capacities of the communities in which they were located (Powe,
1993).
Since the start of public education in the United States, educators and policy
makers have struggled to find the one best system for organizing schools and educating
children. Early 20th-century reformers believed that centralized districts and schools
would offer educational services more efficiently than would small, scattered, or
disorganized schools (Tyack, 1974). The result was unified districts, larger schools, and
increased distance between those setting policies and those carrying them out (Brown,
Henig, Lacireno-Paquet, & Holyoke, 2004). Critics argued these well-meaning reforms
brought about numerous, unintended negative consequences, such as districts laden with
layers of bureaucracy, individual schools with countless rules and regulations, a structure
that empowered administrators far removed from the classroom, and constraints on the
empowerment of those who were in close contact with students, families, and
communities (Brown et al., 2004; Elmore & McLaughlin, 1983; Hill, Pierce, & Guthrie,
1997).
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The public, when dissatisfied with the state of education, has demanded more
effective classroom instruction and higher student achievement from schools. In
response, educators, civic leaders, and policy makers have often turned outside the field
of education for new governance and management models to enhance organizational
capacity (Wohlstetter, Malloy, Smith, & Hentschke, 2004). A Nation at Risk (National
Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983), published while Ronald Reagan was in
the White House, sounded an alarm regarding the status of public education and opened
the door for “competition” through the application of business principles. Two decades
later, the No Child Left Behind initiative created new policies that intended to provide
schools and educators with incentives to innovate. Although researchers correctly
disputed the actual need for such alarm (Berliner & Biddle, 1996), states adopted
legislation that allowed for school choice, including charter schools, and at an
unprecedented rate (Renzulli & Roscigno, 2005).
Two historically significant moments demarcated the shift toward the creation of
charter schools and the legislation upon which they were based (Renzulli & Roscigno,
2005). The first was the use of the term “charter” by Ray Budde, a University of
Massachusetts education professor and education reformer, who, in a conference paper
presented in 1974 and later published in 1988, called for school districts to create new
kinds of schools by granting a charter to teachers to explore new pedagogical, curricular,
and assessment approaches (Budde, 1989). In Budde’s (1996) system of education, no
one would stand between the school board and the teachers when it came to matters in
instruction, including the superintendent or principal. Educational reformers initially

4
resisted the idea and instead proposed and implemented other, less politically loaded,
school-choice programs, such as distinctive, alternative, and magnet schools (Renzulli &
Roscigno, 2005). It was the late Albert Shanker, President of the American Federation of
Teachers (AFT), who embraced the charter idea 14 years after the initial suggestion, as an
innovative and effective education reform movement at the individual teacher level and
put charter schools on the national policy agenda with a speech at the national Press Club
and a subsequent editorial on the topic (Shanker, 1988). Shanker explained charter
schools created the opportunity for trying new approaches as a permanent feature of each
and every school. He said this did not mean giving every teacher and administrator a
license to “do their own thing” without supervision or accountability. It did mean,
however, giving every teacher and administrator the opportunity to analyze policies and
practices, to abandon practices that didn’t work, and to create a structure that more
closely reflected what teachers knew about how students engaged in the learning process
(Shanker, 1988). His strategy was to promote teacher professionalism as a reaction to
what he saw as a looming gauntlet of state assessment and accountability that would
force teachers to “march in lockstep.”
The second historical development was a legislative initiative in Minnesota that
eventually led to the passage of the first charter school law. Minnesota policy
entrepreneurs, such as State Senator, Ember Reichgott-Junge, nonpartisan policy analyst,
Ted Kolderie, education reformer, Joe Nathan, and others, developed a charter strategy
that allowed multiple organizations to enter into a charter agreement, permitted converted
schools to be public and non-sectarian, and provided accountability for student
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achievement. In addition, this strategy waived many state rules and regulations, allowed
for schools of choice to be discreet entities, provided comparable per pupil allocation of
state funds, and allowed movement of teachers between district schools and the newlycreated charter schools (Nathan & Power, 1996). Policy entrepreneurs (political actors
who make major investments of political capital in a specific issue in the expectation that
the issue can be used to political advantage) from other states also became involved. By
persuading state political leaders to adopt charter schools, policy entrepreneurs in
Minnesota changed the landscape of contemporary education reform and opened the
gateway for charter school laws across the nation (Wong & Langevin, 2005).
As charter schools spread across the nation, an opposing coalition and policy
issue network formed to restrict further charter expansion and impose more state and
local regulations (Kirst, 2007). These pro and con advocacy networks engaged in major
policy disputes and minor skirmishes across the United States (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith,
1999). It is noteworthy, however, that, in many cases, coalitions of charter school
advocates overcame both internal divisions and powerful opponents to achieve significant
policy changes. The resulting conflicts between charter school advocates and opponents
produced intrinsically important changes to American public education that affected how
educators operated and governed public schools and other institutions. Equally important,
these conflicts were complex and fascinating cases that were used to improve the
understanding of policy change, which will be discussed in Chapter II.
Created under an innovative and complex approach to public governance that
must be authorized by state law, charter schools have been extensively debated in state
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legislatures all over the country (Hess, 2002). The positions of various interests and the
arguments they used generally followed similar patterns, but the specifics of the debates
and the policy proposals varied from state to state. The laws themselves addressed several
aspects of how chartering takes place, who can get or grant a charter, and what a school
can or must do once it is chartered, among many other details.
According to some, charter schools were the latest incarnation in a series of
efforts to create new or distinctive types of schools within American public education,
including the alternative school movement of the 1960s and 1970s and the magnet school
movement of the 1970s and 1980s (Nathan & Power, 1996). Others viewed charter
schools as a key element in the educational marketplace that both enhanced competition
and created new opportunities for children (O’Leary & Beales, 1994). Some viewed
charter schools as the natural evolution of the education reform process, linked with
efforts towards decentralization and school restructuring (Hart & Burr, 1996), while
others lambasted false charter schools that carried the name but were really just minor
variations on the theme of site-based management (Vanourek, Manno, Finn, & Bierlein,
1997). These visions reflected different ideas about what charter schools were like in
regards to instructional programs, teacher requirements, and business operations, and
how they affected the system of public education. Supporters believed charter schools
offered school choice to families with the support of public funding without
micromanagement by government bureaucracies (Manno, Finn, Bierlein, & Vanourek,
1998b). Opponents argued that charter schools weakened the public schools and were not
likely to benefit students educationally, because they competed for limited resources and
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were often exempted from traditional public education requirements, such as teacher
licensure (Richards, Shore, & Sawicky, 1996).
All these dimensions, shaped by intense debates, yielded an array of divergent
charter school laws. Although charter school laws varied considerably from state to state,
the basic premise of charter schools was that, in exchange for considerable flexibility in
operation and design of curriculum, pedagogy, and other aspects of running a school, the
school agreed formally to certain standards of accountability through a written contract
with an authorizing authority. Unlike voucher programs, but similar to magnet schools,
charter schools were public schools, supported by public monies. Depending on the state,
private schools might hold charters, and most states allowed public schools to convert to
charter status. At present, religious private schools cannot become charter schools.
Charter schools were allowed flexibility in how they complied with a variety of
regulations and rules that affected traditional public schools in exchange for increased
accountability for results. Their increased autonomy included relief from collective
bargaining contracts, in most cases, and provided the charter schools with control over its
staffing, budget, curriculum, and pedagogy. The charter schools remained accountable for
compliance with health, safety, and civil rights laws, for oversight of the use of public
finances, and for academic results on state assessments. Legally independent of their
authorizers, charter schools were administered under the direction of their board of
directors, and, according to Wolfe (2000), the primary oversight responsibility for a
charter school rested with the charter school’s board of directors. If a charter school
violated its charter, chartering entities reported the violation to the school’s board of
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directors for resolution. The chartering entity was also obligated to report certain
violations of laws and regulations to the governmental entity responsible for
administering and enforcing a particular law or rule (Wolfe, 2000).
Charter schools in many states were schools of choice that received funding based
on the number of students they served (Wohlstetter, Wenning, & Briggs, 1995).
Additionally, charter schools gained autonomy, because parents and students selected
them and they, thus, did not have to be “one-size-fits-all” institutions. The charter school
could not pick and choose students, charge tuition or fees that would not be allowed in a
traditional public school, or be affiliated with a church or operate as a religious
institution. If the school did not comply with remaining rules and regulations, if too few
students enrolled to create a viable budget, or if results were not as good as promised, the
entity that granted the charter closed the school.
This study explored the history of the development and implementation of charter
school legislation in Utah, including a review of Utah’s political environment during the
initial charter school legislation discussion, and will add to the growing pool of state
legislative histories. To better understand the purpose for the introduction of charter
school legislation in Utah, the effects of charter school legislation on the creation of
charter schools, and the effects of changes to charter school legislation on the operation
of Utah’s 81 existing charter schools, I analyzed historical documents and interviewed
several individuals involved in Utah’s charter school movement between 1998 and 2011.
This research might assist states seeking to write new legislation or assist Utah to modify
existing legislation with new ideas that better support its charter school movement.
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Purposes and Objectives
By understanding the evolution of Utah charter school legislation and the
expectations of legislators adopting this legislation is important, those involved in policy
decisions can help modify existing laws, policies, and practices to support the legislative
intent. Because Utah is rarely studied or mentioned in charter school literature, due in
part to its small population and relative late entry to the movement, there is little data
available regarding the relative situation of the state compared to others or the impact of
the legislature’s initiatives over the span of the program. Adding Utah’s charter school
legislative history to the growing body of charter school research may increase the
public’s awareness of the charter school movement, as well as create awareness of the
unique circumstances faced by the state.
Since Utah charter school legislation adoption in 1998, it has gone through a
series of changes as evidenced in the history of the Utah Code. Brian R. Allen, former
Chair of the State Charter School Board and the legislator who sponsored the original
charter school legislation in Utah, has stated on many occasions that the way the law is
written and interpreted now is not how he intended it (personal communication,
September 20, 2009). In his opinion, the law was written to help charter schools be an
innovative means of education while providing them with the support and resources
needed to accomplish that goal. However, other legislators have expressed that they
passed the legislation in expectation that charter schools would accomplish higher
accountability, using less state funding (R. Bigelow, personal communication, August 20,
2008).
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To better identify, understand, and describe the legislative and educational
environment in Utah during the discussion and passage of charter school legislation, I
developed the following research questions.
1. What event(s), either internal or external to the state of Utah, led to the
introduction of charter school legislation?
2. What division(s) occurred among stakeholders concerning legislation?
3. What proposals were introduced to the legislature? What changes did
proposed charter school legislation undergo before members of the Utah Legislature
approved the final legislation for passage and implementation?
4. What event(s) affected the legislature in its decisions?
5. Between 1998 and 2011, what changes to Utah’s charter school legislation
have occurred?
6. What led the legislature to remove the cap on the number of charter schools?
What led the legislature to create the State Charter School Board? What led the
legislature to modify charter school funding? What led the legislature to change charter
school governance?
Theoretical Lenses and Positionality
As a researcher, I bring both personal and professional theoretical lenses to my
study. By explicitly describing those lenses and the experiences that made them up (a) I
was more aware of my theoretical lenses in order to have kept them in check, (b) readers
of my research knew what assumptions and experiences I brought to the research, and, (c)
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particular experiences that made up my theoretical lenses were used as a tool to make the
research richer and more rigorous. Below is a description of the theoretical lens that I
believed was salient to this research and then a description of how I utilized it in this
study.
Charter schools are vehicles for both justice and oppression. The same charter
school law can provide for multiple scenarios. For example, the Ute Indian Tribe applied
for a charter to serve tribal students and increase Utah’s American Indian graduation rate.
There are, however, Utah charter schools that have located in demographically
homogenous neighborhoods and have chosen not to spend significant time or funds to
seek diverse populations. Charter laws are not monolithic in design, however, and some
charter laws are more aligned to meeting the needs of under-represented students than are
others. The AFT came up with some criteria for judging the merits of various charter
school laws.
“Good” charter legislation includes features that allow for experimentation, while
at the same time ensuring quality schooling within a system that protects the
public interest and the integrity of public education. “Bad” legislation encourages
charter schools to become the basis of an alternative school system created for a
few, but operating at the expense of many. “Good” charter legislation ensures
public accountability for student achievement, guarantees the accessibility of all
students to charter schools, empowers the professional educators in those schools,
requires local school district approval of charter schools, and requires charter
schools to conduct their business and issue reports in accordance with public
“sunshine laws.” (AFT, 1998, p. 1)
Henig (1999) argued that school choice can be shaped toward progressive ends, stating
that “when public officials have committed themselves to the task, they have proven they
can design and implement magnet schools and controlled-choice programs that serve the
neediest neighborhoods and facilitate integration.” Such progressive aims require firm
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regulations and aggressive enforcement, however, and may be politically vulnerable in
these times.
But as states pursue charter laws that serve under-represented students,
legislatures must not neglect the traditional public school model, either. Charter and other
choice options have sometimes been sought as a way to replace the traditional public
school, but I do not advocate charters as a means toward the abandonment of the
traditional school model. Charters are a specialized remedy to the injustices that the
traditional school model seemingly cannot fix, offering needed, immediate solutions to
the problems of under-represented students. Charters are not a magic bullet for all of
public education’s ills, nor should the pursuit of charter reform be an excuse to neglect
further those public schools that are not “choice” schools.
My lens looks at whether or not Utah charter school legislation has supported the
creation of charter schools that are accountable to the students it serves. Through the
research process, it became clear that the actors in this history created their own realities
shaped by the state’s cultural, political, religious, and economic values over time. For
example, although legislators thought they had created charter schools that would use
different and innovative teaching methods to improve student learning (and report the
findings to the greater educational community), looking at the data it is apparent that
there are limited models of charter schools and most are located in suburban
neighborhoods serving white students.
From a national view, seven of ten charter schools have a student racial/ethnic
composition that was similar to its surrounding district (U.S. Department of Education,
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1999). However, some studies of charter schooling are also identifying class-based
segregation, finding that the poor remain behind in traditional public schools when school
choice programs are introduced (Levin, 1999). A recent report analyzing school
enrollment patterns in 2007-2008 suggested charter schools were more racially isolated
than traditional public schools, leading opponents to assert that charter schools have not
met the promise to foster integration and equality in American education (Frankenberg,
Siegel-Hawley, & Wang, 2011)
According to Van Dunk and Dickman (2002), it appeared that parents who had
attained a higher level of education were more likely to have chosen to have their
children access educational choices beyond their designated neighborhood school. In
Fuller and Elmore’s (1996) 3-year Harvard study of choice programs around the United
States, the authors concluded that when parents were more involved with their children,
they participated in choice more frequently.
Parents in higher social classes are also more likely to select the school for their
children, as evidenced by interview data Diamond and Gomez (2004) analyzed of
middle-class and working-class African American parents. Holme (2002) likewise
concluded that parental status heavily influenced school choice. Not surprisingly,
wealthier parents had the means to send their children to schools of their choice with
more frequency (Fowler, 2002; Levin, 1997; Payne, 1993). Finally, parents connected
with community networks are more likely to choose to have their children take advantage
of educational choices beyond local schools (Howe, 2002; Smrekar & Goldring, 1999).
Howe concluded that school choice practices tend to “favor parents with savvy, time, and
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resources” (p. 22).
For some families, participating in school choice was a matter of running from a
low performing school. For others, the pull of a better school was the primary motivation
(Howe, 2002; Smrekar & Goldring, 1999; Wronkovich, Robinson, & Hess, 1998). Most
decisions were likely based on a combination of both push and pull forces. Other studies
(Cooper, 2005; Neild, 2005) have tried to discern specific parental motivations such as
school reputations, physically and emotionally safe environments, challenging academic
programs, unique curricular emphasis, athletics or other extracurricular programs,
convenience, distance, and the availability of transportation. However, low-income
parents were seldom asked what kind of schools they would seek, so their perspectives or
expectations were not readily available (Holme, 2002).
Choices were typically made based on available or known information. Quality
information is needed to increase the likelihood of making appropriate choices, and freemarket theories assume that this information was readily available and accessible. Stigler
(1961) analyzed this economics of information and noted how reputation greatly impacts
the purchasing decisions of consumers.
I am an advocate of school choice, for all students, but with a critical eye towards
accountability to its partners—students, parents, chartering entity, and state. I maintain
that charter school legislation should free charter schools from most bureaucratic
processes governing public education that are not essential to providing a high-quality
education for students (e.g., following an orderly termination act compared to at-will
employment, flexibility to seek and appoint governing board members with specific skills
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needed by the school, curriculum selection outside of the state’s approved book list,
opportunity to pilot alternative assessments and be exempt from some or all state
mandated assessments, freedom from being required to follow district policies, etc.) and
in return for the freedom, charter schools should be more accountable for school
performance. Since they are freed from red tape, student achievement should exceed
minimum standards, as well as make annual progress, more money should be put into the
classroom, teachers should be able to function as professional educators, developing
innovative methods of instruction and applying them in the classroom, and charter
schools should meet the purpose for which they were chartered. This lens was important
to the research in that it helped determine whether or not school accountability was a
legitimate impetus for Utah’s charter school legislation.
When freed from bureaucratic processes, I believe school change at the individual
school level will occur more readily and frequently than system wide because it involves
fewer people in decision making and implementation. Wohlstetter, Smyer, and Mohrman
(1994) contend that site-based management is an innovation that has its roots in the
private sector, which encourages self-management and empowers the employees, leading
to improved morale and higher productivity. Site-based management theory was
transferred from the corporate world to the realm of public education, giving schools
authority over budget, personnel, and curriculum. Site-based management operates under
decentralization, the development of internal human resources, and the wide participation
of school members in the decision-making process, which closely accompanies the tenets
of critical theory.
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Researchers contend, however, that even when changes are implemented at the
school level, schools frequently encounter problems after adoption and terminate a short
time later, often within the first two years, without achieving full implementation
(Anyon, 1997; Fullan, 1991; Lipman, 1997; Louis & Miles, 1990; Muncey & McQuillan,
1993). Explanations of failure include: incorrect assumptions about the behavior of
students and teachers by policy makers; planning deficiencies; implementation
difficulties; the culture of the school resisting reform; ideological contradictions that
create destructive conflict; and a variety of social, financial, and political obstacles. When
educational innovation is studied over a long time, however, short-term implementation
failure emerges as central to the process of change and as a critical element in a
comprehensive explanation of educational change (Sarason, 1996). This school-change
lens was considered in the following ways: first, to determine whether or not innovation
was an impetus for Utah’s charter school legislation and, second, to determine if Utah
charter schools have changed the public education landscape over the past 10 years.
Because I believe that charter schools are tied to political, social, and ethical
questions, school accountability becomes more of a challenge to define. Several models
of accountability have been promoted as the best model to measure charter school
performance including the free market or consumer model, professional accountability
model, standards-based performance accountability, and bureaucratic accountability
(Fusarelli & Crawford, 2001). I contend that a combination of the models would be the
best measure of charter school accountability, in addition to a political model, and, in
Chapter IV, I provide a suggested model for Utah charter school accountability.
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I came to this study deeply involved in issues of school choice. This gave me
many insights and advantages in carrying of this research but also required that I
carefully consider how my role and position is implicated in how I carried out the
research. I began my career in education as a teacher in a magnet school, a school-choice
option operated and managed by a school district. After teaching, I was a school
administrator for one year in a traditional district system, but quickly moved to be a
school administrator at an independent charter school. I chose to work in an independent
charter school because site-based management and increased school accountability
mattered to me. Following a few years as a charter school administrator, I took a position
with a state department of education where I first worked as a grant writer and a year
later was appointed as a manager of charter schools. As the head of the organization that
(a) provided oversight and monitoring of school performance to state authorized charter
schools, (b) worked with legislators to strengthen charter school legislation, and (c)
ultimately answered to the a state level school board, I recognized that I had a unique
viewpoint regarding the legislative and educational environment surrounding Utah’s
initial charter school legislation, the strength of Utah’s charter school legislation, and the
state of Utah’s charter school accountability. Due to my position, I also had privileged
access to legislators, charter school leaders, state level data, and state data analyses.
Given my employment history and position, I took care to carefully consider multiple
viewpoints regarding charter schools.
Because I intended my research to explore why there was charter school
legislation in Utah and the political and educational climate at that time, I (a) identified
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and interviewed several individuals who had privileged information, having been
involved with the initial discussions surrounding charter school legislation, (b) coded the
interviews to ensure consistent coding across multiple interviews, and (c) reviewed
multiple printed publications widely circulated in the state that identified the public’s
perception of the charter school discussion.
Procedures
Historical research generates descriptions, and sometimes attempted explanations,
of conditions, situations, and events that have occurred in the past. This method
comprises the techniques and guidelines by which historians use primary sources and
other evidence to research and them to write histories in the form of accounts of the past
(Howell & Prevenier, 2001). It is noted that historical research can illuminate current
problems and act as a tempering influence (Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 2011). There is
a need for historical research to produce a faithful record of events. There is need also for
historical research aimed at suggesting, through a study of previous events,
generalizations for guiding behavior. Three essential processes in using historical
methodology are (a) data collection from documentary primary and secondary sources (b)
criticism of data through assessing the genuineness of information sources, and (c) the
presentation of information in accurate and readable form (Cohen et al., 2011;
McDowell, 2002).
This study was based on a nonemergent qualitative research design with two
steps, namely, standardized, open-ended interviews, and document analysis, because
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these methods best align with the prescribed steps used in historical research
methodology. Maykut and Morehouse (1994) defined a nonemergent, predetermined
research design as study in which the focus of inquiry is pursued using qualitative
methods of data collection and data analysis, but the data is completely collected first and
analyzed afterwards.
In standardized, open-ended interviews, the same open-ended questions were
asked of all interviewees. This approach facilitated faster interviews that were more
easily analyzed and compared. The qualitative research interview seeks to describe and
understand the meaning of what the interviewees say (Kvale, 1996). In other words, it is a
method of learning about a topic by finding out what others feel and think about the
topic. The purpose of interviewing is to generate insights and concepts, expand
understanding, search for exceptions to any perceived rule by charting extreme cases, and
document historical idiosyncratic cases. The result is to understand the major points of
the interviewees’ message and how it compares to our own situation (Rubin & Rubin,
2005). Standardized, open-ended interviews were conducted with a former member of the
Utah legislature and other individuals deemed to be uniquely knowledgeable about
charter school legislative development, such as lobbyists, charter school founders,
Centennial Charter School task force members, state administrators, and local
administrators. The findings were not generalizable for all state legislation, but they
pertained to the context that limited my study.
Oral history, a type of historical research, follows the same general steps as
historical research. McCulloch and Richardson (2000) contend that oral history based on
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interviews has become increasingly popular over the last decade. They assert oral history
offers a different view from the documentary sources’ top-down view of the history of
education, allowing the memories and relationships in education to be considered as part
of the history. Though oral history, occasionally, has been criticized for its interviewing
techniques, research standards for preparation, and questions of historical methodology
(Champion, 2008; Frisch, 1989; Lamont, 1998; Perks & Thompson, 1998; Thompson,
2000), I will lessen these concerns of oral history technique by using an already existent
body of knowledge concerning interviewing and questioning techniques and,
triangulation of data.
Criticisms of historical research interviewing techniques include that interviewees
are often asked about events years after they happened, people tell a story in a way that
reflects well on them, and they have a tendency to telescope events together (Partington,
2010). All of these criticisms equally apply to biographies, autobiographies, newspapers,
and most other forms of evidence relied upon by historians. However, the main criticisms
of histories are the reliability of memory and the societal factors that influence and
manipulate perceived memory. Further, because oral histories are inherently unique to
each individual, their generalizability and power to understand wider social developments
are also questioned (Batty, 2009). Hobsbawn (1997) questioned how far the recollection
of one person can be generalized and suggested that one person is not representative
beyond him or herself.
Additionally, document analysis was used to analyze all legislative documents
pertaining to charter school legislation, including minutes from meetings, draft
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legislation, and enrolled legislation from Utah’s 1998 General Session through the 2011
General Session. Enrolled legislation is an exact, accurate, and official copy of a passed
Senate or House bill. This copy is sent to the governor for executive action. Interviews
and document analyses provided a comprehensive history of the evolution and
implementation of charter school legislation in Utah.
All sources of data were analyzed for the establishment of authenticity (external
criticism), and accuracy (internal criticism). To reduce the chance of bias, I employed
both positive and negative criticism. Positive criticism is a strategy for internal criticism
and it refers to making sure that the researcher understands the meaning conveyed in the
source. Negative criticism refers to establishing the reliability or authenticity and
accuracy of the content of documents and other sources of information. To determine if
the content in the document or source was accurate, I used the following three heuristics
(a) corroboration—comparing documents to each other to see if they provide the same
information and lead to the same conclusions, (b) sourcing—identifying the author, date
of creation, place of creation, or other information that identifies the source, and (c)
contextualization—identifying when and where the event took place and the context in
which it took place.
In addition, triangulation was used. Some see triangulation as a method for
corroborating findings and as a test for validity. This, however, is controversial. This
assumes that a weakness in one method will be compensated for by another method, and
that it is always possible to make sense between differing accounts, but, this is unlikely.
Rather than seeing triangulation as a method for validation or verification, qualitative
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researchers, generally, use this technique to ensure that an account is rich, robust,
comprehensive, and well-developed.
Denzin (1978) and Patton (1999) identified four types of triangulation.
1. Methods triangulation, or checking out the consistency of findings generated
by different data collection methods;
2. Triangulation of sources, or examining the consistency of different data
sources from within the same method, such as comparing people with different
viewpoints;
3. Analyst triangulation, or using multiple analysts to review findings or using
multiple observers and analysts; and
4. Theory/perspective triangulation, or using multiple theoretical perspectives to
examine and interpret the data.
To conduct this research project, I completed the following tasks: (a) devised a
sampling procedure; (b) validated interview questions and identified interviewees; (c)
developed a structured interview protocol using approved open-ended questions; (d)
scheduled and conduct face-to-face interviews; (e) collected and analyzed minutes,
proposed legislation, and enrolled legislation from 1997 to 2011; and (f) transcribed
interviews and analyzed data. These tasks allowed me to determine if the content in the
source was accurate.
The interviews were called “elite interviews” because of the technique of
interviewing small populations of elite or influential people, which in this case included
legislators, state level educational leaders, and charter school founders. In elite
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interviewing, a small number of interviewees are acceptable because it is assumed that
their knowledge and insights are privileged and unique. As mentioned previously, the
recollections of one person are not representative beyond anyone other than himself or
herself (Hobsbawn, 1997). However, the purpose of oral history is to tell a person’s story,
and the rationale is the need to uncover stories from the past so that we can preserve more
than a bureaucratic account of a person’s life (Janesick, 2007).
By concentrating on fewer interviewees, I can acquire an understanding of a
particular phenomenon that is available to only “insiders” and not commonly known. By
limiting the interview process to those individuals who were closest to the charter school
legislative process in Utah, it will be possible to better focus on their perceptions to form
a coherent network of themes or issues without introducing “noise” in the form of
hearsay or anecdotal commentary into the data record. Further, in elite interviewing, it
may be assumed that individuals vary in their proximity to the phenomenon studied and,
thus, are not equally or similarly knowledgeable in every aspect (Dexter, 1970).
For this study, individuals deemed uniquely knowledgeable and involved with
writing charter school legislation were interviewed in depth. Collective oral history finds
many individual stories surround a particular theme or stories in which all people share a
particular experience (Janesick, 2007). Many oral historians prefer to interview a
participant more than one time and as needed in order to get a more detailed and richer
picture. This type of interview relies on what Rubin and Rubin (2005) call hearing the
data or qualitative interviewing.
As is consistent with qualitative interviewing techniques, purposeful sampling
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coupled with some degree of snowball sampling was used to identify possible
respondents and select those who were interviewed to reach a targeted sample quickly
(Trochim, 2006). In research, “sample sizes in qualitative studies can range from one to
as many as the researcher needs” (Padgett, 1998). To increase maximum variation, only
those individuals who had different positions and expert knowledge from the primary
interviewees were considered.
Interview Questions and Identifying
Interviewees
Prior to scheduling interviews, interview questions were designed and
interviewees identified. Once the primary interviewees were identified, I developed an
interview protocol. The initial protocol included initial contact via email to introduce the
interviewer, explain the purpose of the research project, discuss the confidentiality of the
interview, request the interviewee’s participation in the project, secure permission to take
the interview, and confirm the interview date, time, and location.
I submitted interview questions to the interviewees to ensure that they had the
information to provide answers to the questions in advance of our meeting. In addition,
this ensured everyone received the questions in a consistent way, the questions
communicated what the interviewees were supposed to describe, and that the questions
were not so sensitive as to get only socially acceptable answers. Initial interviewees were
selected based on their level and type of participation in the development of Utah’s
charter school legislation and initial charter schools.
Face-to-face interviews were conducted with the seven interviewees. During the
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interviews, 11 preselected, open-ended questions were asked. Open-ended questions did
not give interviewees answers to choose from but rather are phrased so the interviewees
are encouraged to explain their answers and reactions to the question. The value of openended questions is they allow interviewees to include more information, such as feelings,
attitudes, and understanding of the subject (Salant & Dillman, 1994).
Open-ended questions included the following.
1. How would you describe your vision to improve education in Utah?
2. In your role as a parent, educator, or legislator, what experiences have you had
with any school choice options?
3. How would you describe your involvement in the development of charter
school legislation in Utah?
4. What were the main influences or driving forces that supported charter school
legislation being adopted in Utah?
5. What influences can you identify in opposition to the adoption of charter
school legislation in Utah? What debates occurred on the legislative floor, in Centennial
Charter School task force meetings, in caucus meetings, or in private meetings?
6. What impact, if any, do you believe charter schools in Utah will have on
public schools?
7. What were your expectations for charter school legislation?
8. In your opinion, how could the current Utah charter school legislation change
to meet your expectations?
9. In your work with the charter school legislation, did you use or rely on models
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from other states? If not, where did you receive your knowledge on charter schools?
10. If you were doing this study, whom would you recommend I speak with about
the development of Utah charter school legislation?
11. Is there anything else I have not asked you, you would like to say about
charter schools?
When interviews are used in a qualitative study, it is essential to let the voice of
the interviewees speak by not asserting my own views during data analysis and
interpretation (Patton, 2002). However, it is important to determine how much
inconsistency is present among the interviewees in both their recollection of factually
verifiable data and their individual perceptions of the processes (Watson, 2006). To assist
in detecting misinformation in this study, clarifying questions were asked during each
interview to further reconcile, if necessary, perceptions provided by the interviewees.
I employed several methods in this study to establish the trustworthiness and
credibility of the data obtained, including, specifically, looking for nonexamples, using
triangulation, and member checking, a process by which the transcript is provided to
interviewees to amend or to supplement their remarks or content prior to conducting the
final analysis (Creswell, 2002; Guba & Lincoln, 1981). The interviews included
standardized, open-ended questions, which were audio taped to provide primary data
(Hannay, 2002) and later transcribed. Peters (1994) also postulated that “there is
something about thoughts expressed spontaneously in conversation that is different from
the more carefully chosen words put in writing.”
The seven tape recorded and transcribed interviews ranged in length from 0.5 to
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1.5 hours, with an average length of 0.75 hours. The analysis of the interview data
entailed coding of the responses according to the primary topics the Centennial Charter
School Task Force (1997) was tasked to discuss: (a) establishment of charter schools
within public education, administered and staffed by public employees; (b) funding of the
charter schools through weighted pupil units so that no tuition would be charged; (c)
creation of charter schools to provide alternative education; (d) need for strong parental
involvement at the schools; and (e) performance standards for the schools. Analysis also
included the identification of key patterns and anomalies in the responses.
Document Analysis
The second form of data collection included the review of various public state and
national documents. The documents were catalogued chronologically into three-ring
binders to assist in the analysis and to serve as part of the audit trail used to document the
procedures of the study. Each document was reviewed for type, purpose, and significance
to determine if it was central or crucial to a particular activity, event, or individual in the
study. Documents collected for review included: (a) codified legislation; (b) letters,
memoranda, and other communications; (c) agendas, announcements, meeting minutes,
and other written reports; (d) administrative documents; and (e) newspaper clippings and
articles (Yin, 1994).
Once all data was collected, it was analyzed using content analysis. Using this
method, I systematically worked through each transcript assigning codes to specific
characteristics within the text. I did not use a predetermined list of categories, but rather
let the categories emerge from the data. Coding is an interpretive technique that both
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organizes the data and provides a means to introduce the interpretations of it into certain
quantitative methods. Most coding requires the analyst to read the data and demarcate
segments within it. Each segment is labeled with a “code” (usually a word or short
phrase) that suggests how the associated data segments inform the research objectives.
Some qualitative data that is highly structured, such as open-end responses from
interview questions, is typically coded without additional segmenting of the content. In
these cases, codes are often applied as a layer on top of the data.
A frequent criticism of coding method is that it seeks to transform qualitative data
into quantitative data, thereby draining the data of its variety, richness, and individual
character. Analysts respond to this criticism by thoroughly expositing their definitions of
codes and linking those codes soundly to the underlying data, therein bringing back some
of the richness that might be absent from a mere list of codes. Coding and analysis of
these interviews revealed the following potential themes (a) legislative history, (b)
interested party discussions, (c) funding, (d) parental involvement, (e) reasons for choice,
and (f) challenges for charter schools.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter reviews literature on the national charter school movement, states’
charter school legislation, the expansion of charter school policy, evaluation of charter
school legislation, changes in charter school legislation since inception, and describes the
public education landscape in Utah.
Charter School Movement
Since the early 1960s, as a part of the Great Society reforms initiated under
presidents Kennedy and Johnson, the federal government became involved in the funding
and management of education (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Continuing the federal
involvement, in the last eighteen years, Presidents Obama, Bush, and Clinton and
Congress have placed charter schools in a prominent position in federal education reform
efforts. Specifically, they have granted millions of dollars to charter schools nationwide,
and the Race to the Top Fund, President Obama’s major education reform, has special
provisions for charter schools (Krueger & Ziebarth, 2002; U.S. Department of Education,
2009).
A federal public charter schools program, passed into law by President Clinton as
part of the 1994 amendments to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, helped
support charter schools in the states where they were legally allowed. The law authorized
funds for charter school development and for a national study to assess the impact of
charter schools. The federal legislation that gave momentum to the charter school
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movement, however, was the Charter School Expansion Act of 1998, also signed into law
by President Clinton. The purpose of the Act was to “improve and expand charter
schools” (Charter School Expansion Act, 1998). The Act articulates the nation’s efforts to
provide parents and students with better schools, more choice, and higher levels of
accountability in public education.
From a political perspective, the charter school concept is a response to political
pressure for increased site-based control of education policy setting, implementation, and
accountability (McGree & Mutchler, 1998). From an educational perspective, the concept
draws upon an array of values with familiar themes in school reform since the early
1980s, including state mandates to improve instruction, school-based management,
school restructuring, and private/public-choice initiatives. Multiple researchers note the
frequency with which reform advocates, policymakers, and analysts endorse expectation
of educational innovations has been notably consistent over time and is overwhelming (J.
Allen, 2001; Anthes & Ziebarth, 2001; Bierlein & Mulholland, 1994; Brandl, 1998;
Education Commission of the States and the National Conference of State Legislature,
1998; Finn & Manno, 1998; Flake, 1999; Halpern & Culbertson, 1994; Hassel, 1999b;
Hill, 1996; Kolderie, 1990, 1994; Lane, 1999; Little Hoover Commission, 1996; Manno,
Finn, Bierlein, & Vanourek, 1998a; Manno et al., 1998b; Nathan, 1996a, 1996b; Nathan
& Power, 1996; National Governors’ Association, 1986; Rofes, 1996; Vanourek et al.,
1997). The charter school model attempted to merge these often competing values, such
as balancing autonomy with accountability, teacher professionalism with parental choice,
and private-sector principles with public-sector values.
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Still, choice in education is one of the most significant and hotly contested public
policies, with efforts such as charter schools garnering substantial media and policy
attention and often reflecting and defining the broader political debates in the United
States (DeBray-Pelot, Lubienski, & Scott, 2007). Many reformers argue against the “onesize-fits-all” model for education and believe that market-style mechanisms of consumer
choice and competition between autonomous schools will encourage diverse and
innovative approaches for increasing achievement (Finn & Gau, 1998; Nathan, 1996a).
Evaluations of charter school programs, however, found negligible to moderate impact on
achievement (Center for Research on Education Outcomes, 2009; Hoxby, 2002, 2004;
Lubienski & Lubienski, 2006; Nelson, Rosenberg, & Van Meter, 2004). Other predicted
outcomes from choice, such as greater innovations in teaching and learning, are also
somewhat less impactful than originally anticipated (Lubienski, 2003).
Despite these findings, efforts to free schools from burdensome bureaucratic
regulations continued. These efforts are intended to undercut monopolistic political
control of public education and end the “exclusive franchise” long enjoyed by districts,
giving educators in charter schools the opportunity and motivation to experiment with
new instructional strategies (J. Allen, 2001; Hill et al., 1997; Kolderie, 1990).
States’ Charter School Legislation
The charter school movement renewed momentum in, or otherwise altered, a
variety of education reforms, including school choice, deregulation, student-based
funding, accountability, school leadership and teacher professionalism, and whole school
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reform. Some groups in public education looked at the charter movement and saw a
threat to long-established mechanisms of funding, governing, staffing, managing, and
building and maintaining support for public schools. Regardless, a broad group of
educators has pursued this opportunity. Charter schools have been created by parents,
educators, school leaders, community-based groups, advocates for special populations,
and whole new sectors of for-profit and not-for-profit education providers. They have
redefined what public schools are and can do. They have allowed reformers to create the
types of schools that they imagine can succeed (Finn, Manno, & Vanourek, 2000; Nathan
1996a) and are contributing to new ways of thinking about the definition of a public
school (Hess, 2004; Lubienski, 2004; Tyack & Cuban, 1995; Vergari, 2002).
Virtually every description of these schools either asserted or assumed that charter
schools were “public” schools that operated free from some or most of the regulations
that applied to traditional public schools (Kolderie, 1990; Manno et al., 1998a; Peterson,
1997; Rofes, 1998; Vergari, 2007). Diverse coalitions supported charter school
legislation, including conservatives, moderates, and liberals who advocated for increased
school level control “united in their rejection of what they consider to be a stifling
bureaucracy-heavy system of public education embracing conformity over innovation”
(Brown et al., 2004). Since 1991, charter school laws have been adopted across the
United States despite strong opposition. Many charter opponents believe charter schools
threaten current education practices that are crucial to fostering equity and providing
necessary and quality services to children. Alternately, charter advocates argue that what
charter schools really threaten is an unacceptable status quo that fails far too many

33
American children, as well as the interests of the adults defending current practices and
the associated outcomes. As a result, broad and powerful conflicts have erupted almost
everywhere the charter concept has been proposed, debated, and implemented (Medler,
2008).
The conflicts have involved all levels of our government, from three presidents, to
policymakers in state capitals, to mayors or school board members interacting with local
communities. Indeed, politically powerful teachers’ unions have worked to prevent the
charter school reform from achieving legitimacy (AFT, 1998; National Education
Association [NEA], 2006). The charter school laws in place, however, demonstrated that
the power of an idea sometimes prevails over the power of established political interests
(Derthick & Quirk, 1985; Kingdon, 1995). These differing state reactions reflect political
culture, or “the set of acts, beliefs, and sentiments which give order and meaning to a
political process and which provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern
behavior in the political system. It encompasses both the political issues and the operating
norms” (Pye, 1968, p. 218).
The policy process of market-based education reform has been analyzed using
multiple theories, such as the advocacy coalition framework developed by Sabatier
(1988) and Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999), the punctuated equilibrium model
developed by Baumgartner and Jones (1993, 2002), and the policy streams model
developed by Kingdon (1995; Mintrom & Vergari, 1996).
The advocacy coalition framework focused largely on periods of policy stability.
An advocacy coalition consists of people from a variety of positions, including elected
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and agency officials, interest group leaders, researchers, and so forth, who share a
particular belief system and who show a nontrivial degree of coordinated activity over
time (Sabatier, 1988). Coalitions aim to have their shared beliefs translated into public
policies. They operate within a policy subsystem that includes a broad range of interested
parties concerned with a particular policy area, such as public education. Participants in
the subsystem include interest groups, administrative agencies, legislative committees,
journalists, analysts, researchers, others who generate, disseminate, and evaluate policy
ideas, and interested parties in government who are active in the policy formation and
policy implementation processes (Sabatier, 1988). Within the advocacy coalition
framework, significant policy change stems from events outside the policy subsystem.
In the punctuated equilibrium model developed by Baumgartner and Jones (1993,
2002), a policy monopoly creates stable policy outcomes that endure over long periods. A
policy monopoly is supported by particular ideas and institutions. The ideas constrain
how issues are understood and discussed by policy makers, and institutional structures
limit who can participate in policy debates. Outsiders are discredited as being
“uninformed, irresponsible, or dangerous” and, thus, not qualified to engage in decision
making for the policy area (Baumgartner & Jones, 2002, pp. 12-13). Indeed, “Policy
monopolies are often supported by the acceptance of a positive image and the rejection of
possible competing images” (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993, p. 26). This equilibrium is
punctuated by periods of major policy change. When new understandings of problems
take hold and new interests are mobilized, the policy monopoly’s ideas may lose support
and break down. In public education, school districts are the monopoly and have looked
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virtually the same for the past 100 years.
According to Kingdon’s (1995) model of the policymaking process, policy
changes emerge when three streams—problem definition, policy response, and political
process—come together to create a “window of opportunity.” Changes in local and state
leadership, a fiscal crisis, a massive program failure, or creeping incrementalism may
help trigger an opportunity. The tipping point, or whether or not an opportunity translates
into policy change, requires political leadership or a policy entrepreneur. The policy
entrepreneur manages the policy network by anchoring the new agenda to a well-defined
set of problems and solutions (Smrekar, 2011). For any given issue area, once a precedent
is set and a new principle is established in law, public policy in that area is significantly
altered. Because future policies are based on the new principle, people become accepting
of new practices, “and it becomes as difficult to reverse the new direction as it was to
change the old” (Kingdon, 1995, p. 191). As noted by Kingdon, when an old coalition
that was blocking a reform is defeated, “life is never quite the same” (p. 191) because the
coalition can no longer be viewed as invincible or as the dominant interested party in the
policy area.
Table 1 provides a summary of the policy process of market-based education
reform theories discussed above.
Many politicians and policy makers operated under the assumption that free
market forces would naturally encourage good school choices (Chubb & Moe, 1990;
Friedman & Friedman, 1980). The realities of school choice, however, are more complex
and bear closer scrutiny (Cohen-Vogel, 2003; Ridenour, Lasley, & Bainbridge, 2001).
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Table 1
Summary of the Policy Process of Market-Based Education Reform Theories
Advocacy coalition framework

Punctuated equilibrium model

Policy streams model

Periods of policy stability

Policy monopoly

Policy change

Variety of participants that
share a belief system

Ideas and institutions that
constrain discussions

New ideas drive policy changes

Operate in policy subsystem

Relies on insiders

Starts new momentum

Policy change comes from
outside events

Monopoly breaks down when
new ideas take hold

Coalitions are no longer viewed
as invincible

For example, the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 supported this free-market approach
and allows students in low-performing schools to transfer to other schools. However, as
reported by the U.S. Secretary of Education, only “about 1 percent of students eligible to
transfer out of a low-performing school actually exercise their right to do so under the
federal law” (Hoff , 2006, p. 28).
Additionally, Marshall and her colleagues asserted that, within a state’s political
culture, there is an assumptive world involving “the understandings of the rules among
those who participate in state education policy-making” (Marshall, Mitchell, & Wirt,
1989, p. 10). This assumptive world includes issues (e.g., which people have the right to
participate in policy discussions, what are legitimate policy goals, and what problemdefinitions and alternatives are not available for consideration). The multiple streams
literature suggests the specific timing of a decision, particularly in respect to what other
activities are going on at the same time, also has important implications for the decision
that is, or is not, made.
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A significant aspect of that timing is who is involved in a particular policy
discussion. Clearly, not everyone has access to elite policy discussions. The political
culture plays a role in determining who does, or does not, have access to the policy
discourse surrounding charter schools (Mintrom, 1997, 2000). People with access vary in
how much attention they give to a particular policy issue and what resources they choose
to expend on that issue. Those policy issues supported by people with access, attention,
and resources are expected by interested parties to be weighed more heavily than policy
issues supported by less influential people.
Policy entrepreneurs are highly influential actors in motivating state governments
to lead the nation in education reform during the first phase of policy innovation
(Mintrom, 2000). Mintrom amd Vergari (1998) viewed policy entrepreneurs as
interested, primarily, in selling ideas designed to bring about dynamic policy change.
Unlike interest group lobbyists, who, typically, are not considered agents for dynamic
policy change, policy entrepreneurs are not content simply to push for changes at the
margins of current policy settings. Rather, they seek to radically change current ways of
doing things. In thinking about selling their policy ideas, policy entrepreneurs must also
take into account the interests of others. The better able they are to persuade a winning
coalition of people that the idea has merit, the more likely they are to see the policy
innovation adopted. This is not an easy task. North (1990) argued that many political
institutions, such as state legislatures, may function smoothly and yet produce policy
settings that, when judged in terms of achievement of the intended outcomes, are highly
unsatisfactory.
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Charter School Policy Expansion
Despite what some may view as highly unsatisfactory state charter school
policies, charter school policy expansion began with only one state in 1991 but now
includes 41 states and the District of Columbia. Many policy entrepreneurs and
traditional service delivery groups propose different interpretations about the present
condition of school choice, as well as contradictory explanations of the reasons for policy
expansion (Wong & Langevin, 2007). Several accounts have suggested that both
Democrats and Republicans support charter schools (Pipho, 1991; Teske & Schneider,
2001). On the one hand, republicans who support the concept of school choice sometimes
support charter schools because they perceive that a voucher plan will not pass in their
state (Cookson, 1994). In this case, charter schools offer parents public dollars to
facilitate their own decisions about schooling (Teske & Schneider, 2001). On the other
hand, Democrats may see charter schools as a way of leveling the playing field by giving
school choice to all students while avoiding radical market options, such as vouchers
(Cookson, 1994).
Not surprisingly, political partisanship did not seem to lead to better-quality
charter schools, although which party controls state government may affect their
numbers. There is some evidence that the number of Republicans in a state legislature
positively influences the number of charter schools by a small but significant measure,
and the presence of a Republican governor does so substantially (Hassel, 1999a; Mead &
Rotherham, 2007). In general, however, partisan disputes complicate efforts to improve
charter quality and negatively impact the availability of funding and support for charter
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schools (Shober, Manna, & Witte, 2006).
Furthermore, the charter school issue was highly politicized in some states yet
largely consensual in others (Hassel, 1999a). One explanation was that charter advocates
in diverse states understand the concept to mean different things and seek different goals
in passing charter legislation, based on a range of assumptions about what motivates
educational reform. While this explanation seems plausible, with a few important
exceptions (Hassel, 1999a; Mintrom & Vergari, 1997; Wohlstetter et al., 1995), analysts
who have addressed differences among state charter school laws have not probed beyond
the specific components of the laws (Buechler, 1996; Mulholland, 1996). A number of
works on public policy has advocated the need to examine the goals, rationales, and
assumptions that lead to the passage of a particular law in order to better understand the
creation of the law and its implementation (Hill & Celio, 1998; Schneider & Ingram,
1993).
The majority of recent studies have examined state legislative responses to
national government influence in several policy domains where federal statutes dominate
the state regulatory environment and frequently supplant the power of local political
interests (Allen, Pettus, & Haider-Markel, 2004; Balla, 2001). Bulkley (2005) claimed it
is through the national discourse on education, or particular pieces of it, that state
policymakers learn of new ideas. Other reform ideas under discussion nationally, at a
particular time, may also influence the political construction of a new idea and set the
stage for the policy discourse within states, helping to shape the types of problems and
alternatives that policy maker’s debate. National discussions can influence state policy
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discussions in a variety of ways, as state policy makers read pieces by national
organizations or influential educational thinkers, attend conferences about reform ideas,
or talk informally with colleagues in other states.
Bulkley (2005) found that in Arizona, Michigan, and Georgia policymakers
gathered information about charter schools and other reforms from a variety of external
sources. While the most common source of data was the actual laws adopted by other
states, there were also partisan national organizations that provided information. While
policymakers maintained that they had made the charter idea their own, they still strived
to connect their law to the national charter movement, and the state variations reflect the
lack of unity among charter advocates at the national level. National discussions about
more general education reform also provided policy arguments for state-level
construction of charter schools, but which aspects of this national discourse policymakers
attended to most varied based on specific state contexts (Bulkley, 2005).
Mintrom and Vergari (1998) asserted individuals in each state could be identified
as successful policy entrepreneurs and played a more important role than anticipated in
the conceptual framework of charter school legislation. Each individual supported a
particular construction of charter schools, was able to influence the actions of important
policymakers, and obtained, at least, some of what the individual sought in the content of
the bill. Absent these individual advocates, it is unclear whether charter legislation would
have been passed in these states. When necessary, they made compromises to make the
idea more politically viable (Mintrom, 2000; Mintrom & Vergari, 1998). After witnessing
policy entrepreneurs successfully persuade the first state to adopt a new policy measure,
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neighboring states and regional leaders considered passing the same legislative bill in
their home state (Gray, 1973). Political leaders often look to neighboring states, states
with the same population, and states with the same economic makeup for policy ideas
because of the high opportunity costs of comparing the strengths and weaknesses of all
policy alternatives (Walker, 1969).
Political scientists studying state politics have frequently noted how states appear
to borrow policy ideas from one another. The significant policy autonomy that states
enjoy permits ongoing experimentation with approaches to addressing policy decisions.
Thus, the states have often been described as “laboratories of democracy” (Osborne,
2000) and “policy laboratories” (Gray, 2008). However, while states may act
autonomously, they do not act in isolation from one another. Should they desire, it is
relatively easy for state policymakers to observe the experiments of their counterparts and
consider the advantages and disadvantages that such approaches might hold for their own
states (Mintrom & Vergari, 1997).
Renzulli and Roscigno’s (2005) research on charter school policy,
implementation, and diffusion across the United States used event-history analyses,
competing risks, and random-effects negative binomial regression, to examine how
interstate dynamics and intrastate attributes affect the adoption of legislation on and the
creation of charter schools within states. The findings revealed a strong mimetic tendency
among adjacent states to adopt charter school legislation and regional similarities in the
creation of charter schools. The adoption of state-level policy, for example, may be
shaped by both internal attributes of states, such as interest groups and voting
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constituencies, and inter-state processes, in which states look to their neighbors for
legislative blueprints and legitimacy in the adoption process (Renzulli & Roscigno,
2005). Once policy is adopted, however, it is likely that intrastate political structures, the
presence of formal organizations and social movements, and demographic features will
influence educational policy as they do other social policies to various degrees (Meyer,
Ramirez, & Soysal, 1992).
Consistent with the argument Renzulli and Roscigno (2005) made is the core
finding in diffusion research that spatially proximate players influence one another by
increasing their mutual awareness of an innovation (Strang & Soule, 1998). By virtue of
their proximity, these players are likely to “infect” one another with new ideas. Relating
this point to charter schools, one would expect that sharing a border with a state or states
that have already adopted charter school legislation will increase the likelihood that a
state will adopt such legislation itself.
Strong Versus Weak Charter School Legislation
Several reviews attempted to identify the reasons that state legislators have
supported charter school legislation, as well as identify which legislation is strong versus
weak. For the purpose of this dissertation, strong charter school law means legislation
that meets the 20 essential components identified by the National Alliance of Public
Charter Schools and “fosters a development of numerous, genuinely independent charter
schools,” and a weak law is “one that provides few opportunities or incentives for charter
school development” (Center of Education Reform, 2001; Ziebarth, O’Neil, & Lin,
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2010). Nathan (1998) surveyed 50 legislators and policy leaders in several states trying to
identify why they proposed charter school legislation. The major reasons legislators cited
were to help students who had not succeeded in existing schools, to expand the range of
schools available, to increase student achievement, to provide an opportunity for
educational entrepreneurs, and to pressure the existing system to improve. Legislators
also felt charter school legislation could be strengthened by (a) giving charter school
students the same per pupil allocation as district school students; (b) permitting more than
one chartering entity to create charter agreements; (c) eliminating the cap on the number
of charter schools; (d) giving charter schools a great deal of independence; and (e)
providing some start-up funds.
In addition to other reasons, Marshall and colleagues (1989) examined the
influence of cultural values on policy making in six states, using survey, case study, and
statistical methodologies. The authors identified four common values in policy formation.
These values were quality, equity, efficiency, and choice. Marshall and colleagues
identified seven policy mechanisms available to policy makers. These were school
finance, personnel training and certification, student assessment, school program
definition, school organization and governance, curriculum materials, and school
facilities.
In the Marshall and colleagues (1989) study, policy makers ranked the values
according to their relative importance, placing them in the following order: (a) quality,
(b) efficiency, (c) equity, and (d) choice. The researchers found that asking the policy
makers to rank these values did not mean that they rejected others. “When forced to
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choose, however, respondents gave clear priority to quality, efficiency and equity values”
(p. 94), though the authors found receding support for educational equity as evidenced by
no legislative requirement to provide transportation, thus effectively eliminating school
choice for parents who cannot afford to transport their child to school, and minimal
expenditures on special education. This seminal study grounded the competing-values
approach in empirical study. There are related values and policy instruments, especially
when one considers school choice policies, meriting examination as well. Researchers of
charter school reform have teased out these values. Garn (2000) applied the competingvalues framework to a study of Arizona charter schools, finding emphasis on choice
above all other values. Others have proposed criteria for charter schools that emphasize
equity and access (Good & Braden, 2000). Finally, some researchers examined the
tension between autonomy, innovation, and accountability (Fusarelli & Crawford, 2001).
Levin (1999) argued that school choice initiatives, like charter schools, reflect the
importance placed on different values or goals. Often, these goals can complete or
contradict one another, but they are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Rather, he
imagines the possibility of balancing the goals in the formation of school choice
initiatives. Specifically, Levin proposes that four major concerns inform school choice
policies: freedom to choose, productive efficiency, equity, and social cohesion. In
addition, as policy makers craft legislation and policies aimed at achieving these goals,
Levin suggests they use available policy tools such as finance, regulation, and support
services to shape the initiatives.
Although the major reasons for proposing charter school legislation were similar,
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the specifics varied by state, with greater flexibility, freedom from regulations, and ease

of entry defining “strong laws,” according to advocates. These are qualities that shape the
scope, adequacy, quality, innovativeness, and educational value of charter schools
(Bierlein, 1997; Center for Education Reform, 2011; Molnar, 1996; Vanourek et al.,
1997; Viteritti, 1999). For example, Michigan legislators passed laws intended to
encourage the creation of large numbers of charter schools, hoping that large numbers
would create competition with traditional public schools. In Georgia, on the other hand,
policymakers were uninterested in competition and sought methods to deregulate and
decentralize education after a period of increasing centralization. Charter schools were
one method to move toward these goals (Vergari, 2002).
State charter school laws have addressed a wide variety of issues, such as who can
apply to start a charter school, what entities can authorize a charter school, and how
charter schools are funded. In addition, other important areas of state law include what
rules are waived for charter schools, whether charter teachers must be certified, and how
charter schools are held accountable. Some states maintain a regulatory hold on charter
schools by limiting the agencies that have the authority to grant a charter, restricting the
types of organizations that can receive a charter, capping the number of charter schools or
number of students who can attend, and constraining school autonomy in decision
making, such as requiring charter schools to hire certified teachers or requiring charter
schools to administer all state standardized tests (Lubienski, 2004). Others provide a
legislative environment that fosters the development of numerous, genuinely independent
charter schools (Center for Education Reform, 2011).
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Most charter laws invite at least some people from outside the existing public
school system to submit applications. These commonly include individual citizens,
informal groups, and nonprofit organizations (Hassel, 1998). State charter laws also
determine which public bodies have the power to issue charters, and the central issue is
the role local school boards play in the process. In some states, local school boards have
the power by law to veto any charter school proposed in their jurisdictions. In other
states, other entities, such as the state board of education, can approve charter schools,
even if the local school board does not agree. Still other states remain in between,
requiring applicants to approach their local school boards first but allowing rejected
applicants to appeal local decisions to the state board of education. A third way in which
state legislation affects the selection process is by the placement of limits on the number
of charter schools that may open. Some of these provisions cap the number of charter
schools statewide. Others limit the number within a single school district or region of the
state. Some are absolute caps, limiting the number of schools that may be open at any one
time, while others are annual limits, restricting the number of schools that may open in a
given year. A fourth important aspect of state charter laws is the criteria for obtaining a
charter. With these provisions, legislators indicate the factors chartering entities must use
when deciding whether to grant a charter to a specific applicant. Some laws state these
criteria explicitly, while others imply criteria by specifying the information applicants
must provide to chartering entities as part of their petitions.
As followers of the charter school movement have come to realize, not all charter
school laws are created equally (Bierlein & Mulholland, 1995; Millot, 1995). Some state
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laws have spawned dozens of self-governing schools that are operated by a variety of
organizations and individuals, free from most regulations, and legally and financially
autonomous. In other states, years have come and gone since the initial passage of the
legislation without a single charter school having been established, so limited are the
incentives for charter schools and so burdensome is the process of becoming one. Strong
charter school laws are designed to provide for the establishment of high-quality charter
schools (U.S. Department of Education, 2004). In contrast, weak charter school laws
would not provide for the establishment (or accountability) of high-quality charter
schools. Bierlein (1996) found that in the six states with the strongest laws, there were
222 charter schools operating, compared to 14 operating in the six states with the weakest
laws.
To assist states in passing a strong charter school law, several groups and
individuals have proposed components that should be included. The Morrison Institute
for Public Policy at Arizona State University created a list in the early 1990s. These
criteria focused on legal components that best supported the creation of autonomous
public charter schools, such as the number of schools allowed, multiple chartering
authorities, automatic waivers from laws and regulations, and legal and operational
autonomy. Vergari (1999) identified nine components: organization, sponsorship, legal
status, regulations, accountability, admissions, funding, teachers, and number.
Most recently, however, the National Alliance for Public Charter Schools
(NAPCS) identified the 20 essential components of a strong public charter school law: (a)
no caps on the number of charter schools; (b) variety of public charter schools allowed;
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(c) multiple authorizers available; (d) authorizer and overall program accountability
system required; (e) adequate authorizer funding; (f) transparent charter application,
review, and decision-making processes; (g) performance-based charter contracts
required; (h) comprehensive public charter school monitoring and data collection
processes; (i) clear process for renewal, nonrenewal, and revocation decisions; (j)
educational service providers allowed; (k) fiscally and legally autonomous schools with
independent public charter school boards; (l) clear student recruitment, enrollment, and
lottery procedures; (m) automatic exemptions from many state laws; (n) automatic
collective bargaining exemption; (o) multi-school charter contracts allowed; (p) extracurricular and interscholastic activities eligibility and access; (q) clear identification of
special education responsibilities; (r) equitable operational funding and equal access to all
state and federal categorical funding; (s) equitable access to capital funding and facilities;
and (t) access to relevant employee retirement systems (Ziebarth et al., 2010). It is my
contention this evaluation tool is the most comprehensive. As such, I use this tool as my
source of “quality” judgments.
The NAPCS and Center for Education Reform (CER), as well as other groups and
individuals, used these types of standards, with minor revisions, to issue specific grades
or ranks for each state against a set of criteria. The CER, an independent, national, nonprofit advocacy organization providing support and guidance to individuals nationwide
who are working to bring fundamental reforms to their schools, conducted a 5-year study
that evaluated charter school laws in all states where legislation had been passed as of
November 2001 (Center for Education Reform, 2001). The laws were not only judged on
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content but on effect as well. The CER defined a strong law as one that “fosters a
development of numerous, genuinely independent charter schools,” and a weak law as
“one that provides few opportunities or incentives for charter school development.” The
study looked at 32 major components of each state’s law, and these components were
then factored into nine major categories that defined the law’s strength: (a) strong laws
place no limits on the number of charter schools allowed; (b) strong laws allow multiple
charter granting agencies; (c) strong laws allow diverse eligibility in charter applicants;
(d) strong laws allow new, start-up charter schools; (e) strong laws allow schools to start
without evidence of local support; (f) strong laws grant automatic waivers from state and
district laws; (g) strong laws provide legal, fiscal, and operational autonomy; (h) strong
laws guarantee full per-pupil funding; and (i) strong laws provide exemptions from
collective bargaining agreements or school district work rules. The state laws are scored
in each area, on a scale of one through five. States with a total score of 40-50 receive “A”
grades, states with scores of 30-39 receive “B” grades; “A” and “B” states have strong
laws. Because the ranking is based upon the perspective of those who value choice over
other public policy goals, the CER ranking represents a particular political point of view
(Center for Education Reform, 2011; Scott & Barber, 2002).
Since 1996, the CER released an annual state-by-state report card, grading each
state’s charter school legislation on a scale of “strong” to “weak.” These ratings have
been influential. Each year when the grades are released, newspapers publish stories
identifying their home state law as strong or weak. As an example, Education Week’s
“quality counts” has uncritically incorporated CER’s charter law grades into its own state
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rankings (Orlofsky & Olson, 2001). It should be noted that evaluation criteria are not
value free (House & Howe, 1999). Rather, these criteria can arise from such sources as a
client’s request, the evaluator’s own values, or a desire to make the evaluation useful
(Joint Committee on Standards for Educational Evaluation, 1994). In addition to the
CER’s approach, at least six other approaches have been proposed as alternatives for
gauging the value and success of charter school laws (AFT, 1998; Buechler, 1996; Miron,
2005; Scott & Barber, 2002; Witte, Shober, & Manna, 2003; Ziebarth et al., 2010).
The evaluation approach advocated by the AFT penalizes in its ranking system
charter school legislation that tends to create an alternative school system serving a few,
select students; it praises charter school legislation that serves a broader public interest
and facilitates improvement of the public education system (AFT, 1998). Miron (2005)
argues that charter school laws should have key features that lead to anticipated
outcomes. The seven key features he identifies are (a) rigor of approval process, (b) rigor
of oversight, (c) provision of technical assistance, (d) extent of education management
organization involvement, (e) financial support, (f) rate of growth, and (g) bipartisan
support. Scott and Barber (2002) claimed that charter school laws should be analyzed
based on choice, productive efficiency, equity, and social cohesion, defined as “the extent
to which the public school systems promote common educational experiences to diverse
populations of students” (p. 30). Buechler (1996) argued a charter school law will be
strong to the extent that it (a) permits a large or unlimited number of schools to form, (b)
permits a variety of operators to start schools, (c) permits a variety of sponsors, (d)
permits existing schools to convert and new schools to start, (e) establishes an appeals
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process for denied charters, (f) provides a blanket waiver from education laws and
regulations, (g) gives the school complete control over personnel decisions, and (h)
defines the school as a legally and financially autonomous entity, among other criteria.
Witte and colleagues (2003) proposed yet another list of features in sought-after charter
school legislation, including (a) applications and authorization, (b) financial support, (c)
governance, (d) employees, (e) students, (f) performance accountability, and (g) public
accountability.
It does not appear that there exists universal agreement on the reasons that charter
school legislation was written, nor what defines weak and strong state legislation.
Together, these different approaches highlight the arbitrariness of any given ranking
system (Chi & Welner, 2008). Table 2 compares select components of strong charter
school laws according to the researchers discussed above.
In practice, some state laws are more like one set of strong charter school law
components than the others, but each state’s charter law has grown out of its individual
state context, regulatory environment, balance of political forces, and perspectives on
how charter schools might be implemented. Therefore, charter laws vary widely across
states regarding the extent to which they follow model charter law guidelines (RPP
International, 1997).
In addition to ranking charter school legislation, important work has been done
examining social, political, and educational values embodied in charter school laws, with
researchers examining the tension between accountability and autonomy, for example
(Millot, 1994). Others have provided broader, philosophical examinations of the

Number of
schools

Unlimited

Appeal process for
denied charters

Teachers

Complete control
over personnel

Funding

No limit

Collective
bargaining
exemption

Full per-pupil
funding

Waivers from state
and district
laws/policies

Social cohesion

Equity

Regulations

Blanket waiver from
state laws and
regulations

Legal, fiscal, and
operational
autonomy

Admissions

Legal status

Legal and financial
autonomy

Multiple authorizers

Scott & Barber
(2002)

Productive
efficiency

Sponsorship

Variety of sponsors

Allow new, start-up
schools; diverse
applicants

CER (2001)

Accountability

Organization

Vergari (1999)

New, start-up and
conversions; Variety
of operators

Buechler (1996)

Comparison of Select Components for Strong Charter School Laws

Table 2

Employees

Financial support

Students

Performance and
public accountability

Governance

Witte et al. (2003)

Rigorous approval
process

Rate of growth

Financial support

Rigorous oversight

Bipartisan support

Technical assistance

Education management
organizations

Miron (2005)

Transparent application,
review, and decisionmaking

Multi-school contracts;
no caps

Collective bargaining
exemption

Adequate funding

Clear recruitment,
enrollment, and lottery

Authorizer and program
accountability;
Performance-based
contracts

Exempt from many state
laws

Independent and
autonomous

Multiple authorizers

Educational service
providers allowed;
variety of operators

NAPCS (2011)
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competing goals of public education (Labaree, 1997) and the public and private purposes
of education (Levin, 2002). Scott and Barber (2002) contended this work should be
continued, with educational researchers continuing to provide assiduous study of the
legislative and policy conditions that shape charter schools as participants jockey for their
values to be represented in the reform (Keller, 2001; Kemerer & Maloney, 2001; Olson,
1994).
Changes in Charter School Legislation
As charter schools mature, there is conjecture about forthcoming legislation. In a
study surveying education policy experts in 50 states, Mintrom and Vergari (1997) found
that charter legislation is more readily considered in states with a policy entrepreneur,
poor test scores, Republican legislative control, and proximity to other charter-law states.
Legislative enthusiasm, gubernatorial support, interactions with national authorities, and
use of permissive charter-law models increase the chances for adopting stronger laws.
Seeking union support and using restrictive models presage adoption of weaker laws.
Yet, public policies are not frequently replicated with the same rules and
regulations (Wong & Langevin, 2007). In fact, charter school laws differ significantly in
the details, and these details affect the extent to which charter schools are likely to
proliferate in a given state (Hassel, 1998; Mintrom & Vergari, 1997; Wohlstetter et al.,
1995).
Additionally, state charter school laws are not static. They define the parameters
in which a state’s charter sector operates, and the marks of specific state policies are
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visible in state charter sectors. However, state laws are not the only factor shaping a
state’s charter sector. The political, educational, and other climate factors in a state also
have an impact and help determine the provisions of state charter laws and how easy or
difficult it is to change those (Mead & Rotherham, 2007). In fact, as charter school
legislation entered into the eleventh year of existence, state legislators in several key
states revisited their charter school laws (Scott & Barber, 2002). During the 2000-2001
school year, policy makers in Minnesota, California, and Texas reexamined original
charter school laws and proposed measures to readdress loopholes and, in some cases,
abuses (Keller, 2001).
All the states in Mead and Rotherham’s (2007) sample amended their laws
multiple times, some modestly and some substantially. States added authorizers (CO, FL,
MN, OH), created appeals processes (CA), clarified authorizer responsibilities (CA), and
restricted or eliminated some authorizers (AZ, OH). They increased oversight (OH, MI),
added reporting requirements (TX), and strengthened accountability (AZ, TX). They
raised (NY), eliminated (CO, MN), or instituted (MI) caps on the number of charter
schools that can open. They tweaked charter school funding formulas and created new
funding streams for transportation and facilities (AZ, Washington DC), and they enacted
a variety of other regulatory and technical changes.
Taken together, these state law changes seem to point in contradictory directions:
some states adding restrictions and requirements for charter schools, others creating more
openings for charter schools. However, from another perspective, state charter school
laws appear to be converging. States such as Minnesota and Colorado, which started out
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with fairly narrow laws allowing charter schools as an experiment, have opened things up
by raising caps and adding new authorizers. States such as Arizona, where an initially
laissez-faire approach to chartering inevitably led to some poor quality charter schools,
have increased oversight of both charter schools and authorizers (Mead & Rotherham,
2007). Also, the quality of a state’s charter schools can affect the politics around them.
“Blowups” and scandals involving low-performing or corrupt charter schools have
strengthened the hand of charter school opponents in Michigan and Ohio, making it
difficult to change those states’ laws to meet more of the attributes of strong legislation.
The strong performance of the Washington, DC’s, first major class of charter schools in
1998, on the other hand, helped build political support for charter schools among
Washington, DC, leaders who were initially skeptical about the congressionally imposed
reform.
State charter school laws remain incredibly varied. Over time, however, they
appear to be opening up opportunities for establishing charter schools by adding new
authorizers and raising charter school caps. At the same time, they seem to be moving
toward a greater emphasis on quality by strengthening oversight and accountability,
defining authorizer responsibilities more clearly, creating new high-quality authorizers,
and encouraging better authorizing. What follows is the history of Utah charter school
legislation and its transition from initial policy to the seventh highest ranked charter
school legislation in the nation, according to the National Alliance for Public Charter
Schools (Ziebarth et al., 2010).
In summary, the charter school movement started in the early 1990s when

56
Minnesota passed the first charter school law. Charter schools were an education reform
movement intended to provide parents with choice regarding which school their child
would attend, the authority for parents and education leaders to make site-based decisions
for that school, the requirement that the school be accountable to its patrons, and to
improve academic outcomes with increased school flexibility from bureaucracy. Charter
school policy expanded into several states, but not all were strong laws opening highquality schools, holding schools accountable to the promises made in its charter.
Currently, charter school laws have been passed in 41 states and the District of Columbia
by 2011, opening 5,275 charter schools nationwide and enrolling 1.8 million students.
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CHAPTER III
CHARTER SCHOOLS IN UTAH
Utah has 41 school districts, containing 913 schools, serving 542,853 students
statewide. Additionally, it has 81 operational charter schools, serving 44,892 students,
with another seven schools approved to open in 2012 (Utah State Office of Education,
2011d). In the 2011-2012 school year, charter schools served over 7.5% of Utah’s public
school enrollment. Of the 81 charter schools now open, the majority, about 74%, are
along the Wasatch Front, including 28 charter schools in Salt Lake County (Salt Lake,
Jordan, Granite, and Canyons Districts), 20 in Utah County (Alpine, Nebo, and Provo
Districts), 7 in Davis County (Davis District), and 6 in Weber County (Weber and Ogden
Districts). This is consistent with the 75% of the population who live in the same four
counties.
The larger communities along the Wasatch Front are served by ten medium to
large-sized school districts, serving between 13,000 and 68,000 students each. These
communities range from urban environments to affluent communities, with highperforming schools, in the suburbs. Figure 1 shows the charter school distribution and
percent population attending charter schools in the school districts serving the four
counties of the Wasatch Front.
The state also has many rural school districts serving sparsely populated areas
throughout the state. Utah has around 14 districts that basically serve a single “feeder
pattern” (i.e., the entire district contains one high school, one middle school, and one or
two elementary schools; Utah State Office of Education, 2011a). Some of these small
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Figure 1. Number of operational charter schools and percentage of students enrolled in
charter schools along the Wasatch Front in 2011-2012.

districts serve extremely large geographic areas as well as student populations with
extremely high rates of persistent childhood poverty. The remaining eighteen Utah
charter schools are scattered throughout the rest of the state.
While charter schools serve fewer than 8% of the state’s overall public school
students, there are districts where the market share for charter schools is much greater
and clearly being felt. In Carbon School District and Ogden School District, for example,
charter schools now serve approximately 15.2% and 13.5% of the districts’ public school
enrollments, respectively. Utah district leaders have been particularly conscious of the
growing competition from charter schools. Other Utah districts with high concentrations
of charter students include Park City School District, with one charter schools and about
12.2% of district public school enrollment and Nebo School District, with five charter
schools and 11.1% of district public school enrollment.
Racially and ethnically, Utah’s public school districts serve a predominately white
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population. More than 77% of the students in the district are white, 15.3% are Hispanic,
1.8% Asian, 1.4% are Black, 1.5% Pacific Islander, and 1.3% Native American (see
Table 3). Similarly, Utah’s public charter schools serve a predominantly white
population. More than 81% of the students in charter schools are white, 11.0% are
Hispanic, 1.9% Asian, 1.2% are black, 1.3% Pacific Islander, and 0.5% Native American.
Statewide, more than 63% of Utah’s families earn too much to qualify for free or reduced
price lunches (Utah State Office of Education, 2011b).
The differences and distances between Utah’s school districts reinforce a history
of local control that is enshrined in the state’s constitution. Despite the structural
weakness of the state role, Utah has been involved in many of the education reforms that
consolidate state authority, including the creation of state standards, the implementation
of a state-wide testing regime and related accountability structure, and the creation of
policies that allow and facilitate public school choice, including open enrollment and
charter schools.
The state’s K-12 education system is governed by an elected Utah State Board of
Education (USBE), whose members compete in nonpartisan elections. Candidates for the
USBE, vetted through the Governor’s nominating committee, must have outstanding
professional qualifications in areas such as business and industry administration, human
resource management, finance, metrics and evaluation, manufacturing, retailing, natural
resources, information technology, construction, banking, science and engineering,
medicine and healthcare, higher education administration, applied technology education,
public education administration and instruction, economic development, and labor. The
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Table 3
Enrollment Data for Utah Public Schools in 2011-2012 Using Fall Enrollment Race/
Ethnicity Data and Average Daily Membership Data (percentages shown)

School

African
American

American
Indian

AMES

6.2

3.3

8.5

24.8

Alianza Academy

1.1

0.9

2.4

31.0

Asian

Hispanic/
Latino

Multi
race

White

Students
w/
disabilities

8.9

0.2

48.1

4.1

0.9

3.2

60.7

Pacific
Islander

Alpine District

0.7

0.5

1.0

8.7

1.3

0.7

87.1

10.3

American Leadership

2.2

0.8

0.5

12.1

1.2

0.7

82.4

14.9

American Preparatory

3.3

0.3

5.4

32.1

2.5

0.5

55.9

7.2

Bear River Charter

0.0

0.6

5.0

6.1

0.6

1.1

86.7

19.5

Beaver District

0.2

0.6

1.1

11.5

0.1

0.3

86.1

14.7

Beehive Sci. & Tech.

1.4

0.7

5.1

6.5

1.4

0.0

84.8

12.1

Box Elder District

0.6

0.7

0.7

9.2

0.3

0.9

87.6

10.7
11.5

Cache District

0.6

0.4

0.6

8.2

0.5

1.1

88.6

Canyon Rim

1.9

0.4

1.5

7.6

0.8

1.5

86.4

8.4

Canyons District

1.3

1.1

2.6

11.8

1.2

2.5

79.6

11.0

Carbon District

0.4

1.1

0.2

12.1

0.1

0.3

85.8

14.8

Channing Hall

0.6

0.1

4.3

4.8

1.2

0.0

88.9

8.9

City Academy

1.9

0.5

1.0

16.9

0.5

5.8

73.4

22.4

CS Lewis

1.3

0.2

0.2

11.8

1.1

1.3

84.1

23.9

Daggett District

0.0

0.6

0.6

3.0

0.0

0.0

95.9

10.6

DaVinci Academy

1.7

0.3

0.2

7.8

0.4

1.4

88.1

17.0
10.3

Davis District

1.5

0.5

1.6

8.5

1.1

1.3

85.5

Dual Immersion

0.9

0.5

0.0

83.0

1.4

1.4

12.9

8.3

Duchesne District

0.3

4.9

0.2

6.0

0.3

2.1

86.2

15.0

Early Light

0.8

0.3

1.3

5.7

0.9

2.3

88.7

11.6

East Hollywood

0.0

0.0

0.3

27.2

0.0

0.0

72.5

14.8

Edith Bowen

1.4

0.3

3.7

7.8

0.7

2.0

84.1

10.2

Emery District

0.6

0.8

0.3

8.1

0.2

0.6

89.4

16.7

Endeavor Hall

1.0

0.0

0.3

22.1

0.3

0.3

75.9

Entheos Academy

1.0

0.4

0.8

14.1

2.7

2.5

78.6

Excelsior Academy

0.4

1.3

0.7

6.5

0.1

1.3

89.5

10.0

Fast Forward

1.4

2.3

0.5

16.4

0.5

1.8

77.3

23.8

Freedom Academy

0.2

1.5

0.2

6.5

0.1

0.1

91.4

11.7

Garfield District

0.6

1.4

1.4

5.2

1.1

0.9

89.4

14.1

Gateway Preparatory

0.9

0.1

2.9

21.4

2.9

0.6

71.3

11.4

George Washington

1.1

0.4

2.4

5.1

1.6

5.3

84.0

9.2

Good Foundations

1.0

0.0

0.7

9.9

0.0

3.9

84.5

7.2

Grand District

0.8

6.1

1.4

14.8

0.3

0.3

76.3

11.9

Granite District

3.0

1.6

4.3

30.8

3.8

0.4

56.2

10.8

Guadalupe School

1.6

0.0

0.0

94.4

0.0

0.0

4.0

8.6

Hawthorn Academy

1.1

0.1

2.3

8.6

0.7

1.8

85.2

7.7

InTech Collegiate

0.0

0.0

8.1

16.8

0.0

0.0

75.2

9.3

Iron District

0.5

2.7

0.4

9.3

0.5

1.9

84.7

13.7

Itineris Early College

0.8

0.0

5.1

17.7

1.2

2.8

72.4

0.4

11.9

(table continues)
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American
Indian

John Hancock

0.0

0.0

5.9

4.3

2.1

0.5

87.2

10.7

Jordan District

0.9

0.4

1.7

11.8

1.5

2.8

80.9

11.7

Juab District

0.6

0.3

0.6

3.1

0.3

1.1

94.0

12.6

Kane District

0.4

1.5

0.3

3.6

0.3

0.3

93.4

13.0

Karl G Maeser

0.2

0.3

2.7

6.2

1.1

2.4

87.1

4.5

Lakeview Academy

0.6

0.0

0.4

5.2

1.7

0.0

92.2

10.0

Legacy Preparatory

0.5

0.0

1.2

4.3

2.8

3.3

87.8

8.7

Liberty Academy

0.2

0.4

0.2

3.5

0.4

4.8

90.4

6.9

School

Asian

Hispanic/
Latino

Pacific
Islander

Multi
race

Students
w/
disabilities

African
American

White

Lincoln Academy

0.8

0.0

0.9

5.1

0.6

3.9

88.6

13.2

Logan District

1.4

1.2

3.9

25.2

1.0

0.5

66.8

11.5

Maria Montessori

0.0

0.0

1.4

7.3

0.4

1.4

89.4

10.1

Merit College

0.5

0.7

0.5

10.0

0.7

1.5

86.2

14.1

Millard District

0.2

0.9

0.6

16.2

0.4

1.0

80.7

17.3

Moab School

0.0

5.1

2.6

2.6

0.0

0.0

89.7

7.1

Monticello Academy

0.5

0.3

4.5

21.3

5.3

2.8

65.3

8.5

Morgan District

0.4

0.2

0.2

2.4

0.5

0.6

95.7

7.6

Mountainville

1.1

0.4

2.9

4.7

0.5

1.9

88.5

8.8

Murray District

2.4

0.8

2.0

13.2

1.2

1.5

78.9

10.3

Navigator Pointe

0.8

0.8

1.9

6.2

0.6

4.1

85.7

9.8

Nebo District

0.6

0.6

0.5

10.1

0.8

1.0

86.5

13.5

NUAMES

2.0

0.4

3.3

9.4

2.2

1.3

81.3

0.8

Noah Webster

1.2

0.3

6.3

14.7

2.9

0.5

74.1

8.9

North Davis

2.0

0.4

1.3

13.1

0.8

2.0

80.5

6.7
14.0

N. Sanpete District

0.5

0.5

0.3

12.0

0.2

1.1

85.2

North Star

1.2

0.0

0.8

2.9

0.0

0.8

94.3

9.2

N. Summit District

0.3

0.2

0.0

12.0

0.2

1.9

85.4

10.8

Odyssey

0.4

0.0

2.6

7.3

0.8

3.8

85.2

9.0

Ogden District

1.5

1.0

0.8

48.2

0.5

1.1

46.8

11.5

Ogden Preparatory

1.9

0.1

1.7

31.3

0.7

2.2

62.1

9.6

Open Classroom

1.6

0.5

0.3

2.1

0.3

4.2

91.1

9.5

Open High

0.6

0.0

0.3

6.1

0.3

4.0

88.7

3.9

Oquirrh Mountain

1.4

0.1

4.4

3.4

0.3

1.7

88.7

11.3

Paradigm High

0.7

0.0

0.4

5.5

1.1

0.5

91.8

9.1

Park City District

0.4

0.3

1.6

18.9

0.3

2.1

76.4

7.5

Pinnacle Canyon

0.8

0.4

0.2

11.9

0.0

0.4

86.3

32.3
16.6

Piute District

1.9

0.0

0.0

10.1

0.6

0.0

87.4

Providence Hall

0.9

0.0

0.6

3.5

0.6

0.1

94.3

8.7

Provo District

1.0

1.1

2.5

26.6

2.3

1.2

65.2

13.8

Quail Run

1.5

0.7

0.9

9.3

9.9

7.6

70.1

12.2

Quest Academy

0.0

0.8

0.5

8.4

0.3

0.9

89.1

12.2

Ranches Academy

0.3

0.0

0.6

7.2

0.0

5.2

86.7

12.3

Reagan Academy

1.2

1.3

1.3

11.7

0.7

0.0

83.7

14.4

Renaissance

0.9

0.0

3.4

6.2

0.7

1.8

87.0

7.4

Rich District

0.0

0.6

0.0

2.6

0.0

0.2

96.5

11.2
16.0

Rockwell High

0.3

0.3

1.3

3.9

1.2

0.3

92.6

Salt Lake Arts

3.3

0.0

6.0

6.0

1.0

0.3

83.3

5.8

Salt Lake Science

3.6

1.2

3.0

34.0

4.5

1.5

52.2

10.4

(table continues)
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African
American

American
Indian

White

Students
w/
disabilities

Salt Lake District

4.4

1.7

4.4

37.3

4.5

1.9

45.8

12.6

Salt Lake SPA

3.2

0.5

0.9

4.1

1.8

1.8

87.7

6.4

San Juan District

0.3

51.0

0.1

2.9

0.3

0.7

44.7

11.2

Sevier District

0.5

1.6

0.4

4.7

0.4

0.0

92.4

12.3

Soldier Hollow

0.4

0.0

0.0

4.1

0.4

2.4

92.7

11.9

S. Sanpete District

0.8

0.6

0.3

11.3

0.7

1.0

85.4

14.4

S. Summit District

0.3

0.0

0.1

12.3

0.0

1.6

85.6

10.2

Spectrum Academy

0.5

0.2

0.0

3.2

0.2

2.0

93.8

84.1

School

Asian

Hispanic/
Latino

Pacific
Islander

Multi
race

SUCCESS Academy

0.0

0.0

2.0

6.3

0.9

0.9

89.9

0.3

Summit Academy

0.7

0.0

1.5

2.3

0.3

0.5

94.7

9.5

Summit High

0.0

0.4

0.0

4.9

0.0

1.8

93.0

7.4

Syracuse Arts

2.0

0.2

0.7

4.9

2.5

0.5

89.2

12.1

Thomas Edison

0.8

0.7

2.8

12.1

1.7

0.9

80.9

7.6

Timpanogos

0.2

0.0

3.9

9.1

0.0

1.4

85.4

11.6

Tintic District

0.0

0.5

0.0

1.4

0.0

0.0

98.1

8.3

Tooele District

1.1

1.2

0.6

11.5

1.1

1.1

83.5

11.8

Tuacahn High

0.3

0.3

1.5

7.5

0.6

0.0

89.8

2.9

Uintah District

0.5

7.4

0.3

6.4

0.5

1.0

83.9

10.8

Uintah River High

0.0

94.5

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

5.5

8.8

Utah Connections

1.8

0.7

2.9

6.1

1.1

6.1

81.4

26.2

UCAS

0.5

0.5

4.1

9.0

1.5

0.5

83.8

1.3

Utah Virtual

2.0

0.7

1.1

5.1

0.8

0.0

90.4

10.9

Venture Academy

0.8

0.0

0.0

5.1

0.0

2.5

91.6

9.3

Vista at Entrada

0.6

0.6

0.6

5.7

0.9

1.6

90.0

13.2

Walden School

0.9

2.4

1.8

6.8

2.7

1.5

84.0

18.0

Wasatch District

0.3

0.2

0.6

14.8

0.1

0.3

83.6

13.0

Wasatch Peak

2.1

0.5

1.3

6.7

4.8

1.6

82.9

8.4

Washington District

0.9

1.8

0.6

11.9

1.8

0.4

82.5

10.8

Wayne District

0.2

0.6

0.6

2.6

0.6

1.1

94.4

11.6

Weber District

0.9

0.6

1.2

11.5

0.6

2.2

83.0

13.5

Weilenmann School

0.4

0.0

1.9

3.2

0.4

3.0

91.2

12.3

Charters

1.2

0.5

1.9

11.1

1.4

1.6

82.2

10.8

Districts

1.4

1.3

1.8

15.3

1.5

1.3

77.4

11.5

Statewide

1.3

1.2

1.8

15.0

1.5

1.3

77.8

11.5

nominating committee, consisting of 12 members appointed by the governor, represents
diverse business and industry and education sectors (Election Code, 2 Utah Code Ann. §
20A-14-104, 2011). The composition and purpose of the nominating committee remains
a hotly contested topic among legislators and the public (Moss, Nielsen, & Stephenson,
2011).
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The state education agency, the Utah State Office of Education (USOE), is
overseen by a State Superintendent of Public Instruction (superintendent) who is hired by
the elected USBE members. Thus, neither the legislature nor the Governor exercises
direct influence over the personalities or leadership controlling USOE.
Utah Charter School Legislation
As discussed in Chapter II, studies have frequently noted how states appeared to
borrow policy ideas from one another (Gray, 2008; Mintrom & Vergari, 1997; Osborne,
2000). Additionally, studies have revealed a strong tendency among adjacent states to
adopt charter school legislation, and regional similarities in the creation of charter school
laws were shaped by both internal attributes of states and interstate processes (Renzulli &
Roscigno, 2005; Strang & Soule, 1998). Of the six states surrounding Utah, five adopted
charter school legislation prior to Utah. Colorado and New Mexico both passed charter
school legislation in 1993, Arizona in 1994, Wyoming in 1995, and Nevada in 1997.
Idaho, along with Utah, passed charter school legislation in 1998.
Although charter schools had not yet been introduced in Utah, Governor Michael
Leavitt was very interested in supporting their implementation. He believed that school
choice for parents and some competition for school districts was important. As a first
step, he supported the state’s Centennial School initiative. Enacted into law by the 1993
Legislature, through House Bill 100, Centennial Schools Program, the law embodied
Governor Leavitt’s goal to move Utah’s public schools to a new level of performance.
The program commemorated Utah’s 100th birthday, which would occur in 1996. The
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Centennial School Law was scheduled to expire on June 30, 1996, but was extended by
the 1996 Legislature until June 30, 2000.
The Centennial Schools program was designed to foster the following.
1. Implementation of a strategic planning process that (a) defined performance
goals for students and the means for evaluating those goals, (b) established strategies to
involve business and industry with the school, (c) focused on the totality of the student
through the involvement of other local or state agencies, (d) provided for the extensive
involvement of parents in the development of personalized student education/occupation
plans (SEOPs) for each student, and (e) included the basics of education as well as higher
learning skills in new designs to improve learning.
2. Creation and operation of a site-based, decision-making body that consisted of
parents, teachers, classified employees, students, and administrators with delegated
authority to make decisions about the matters that were critical to the achievement of
school goals established by the group. The decision-making authority of each Centennial
School was specifically outlined in the delegation document developed by the school and
approved by the local school district, the Governor’s Office, and the State Board of
Education.
3. Implementation of procedures whereby the school was held accountable,
according to the authority delegated to it through its site-based decision-making body.
4. Integration of technology into curriculum, instruction, and student assessment.
5. Provision of procedures for receiving waivers of those local and state rules,
regulations, and agreements that prohibited or hindered the school from achieving its
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performance goals.
Over 600 Utah schools applied for Centennial School status during the first 5
years of the program. Special committees reviewed the applications and submitted the
names of recommended schools to the Governor’s Office and State Board of Education
for approval. The first group of 98 Centennial Schools was named in 1993; 93 additional
schools were added in 1994; 72 more schools were approved in 1995; 69 schools
received Centennial School status in 1996; and 62 more in 1997. Each designated
Centennial School received special grant funds based on its size.
Governor Leavitt’s next step was to support House Bill 56, Modified Centennial
Schools Program, which passed in the 1996 general legislative session. Although the
term modified implies that they were something less than a Centennial School, in fact this
legislation created a new program that afforded two additional flexibilities to public
schools that participated, which included (a) exemptions from state and local board rules
and policies when required to meet performance goals and (b) provisions for program
funding to flow directly to the school for maximum local control.
As of September, 1996, 10 Utah schools were named as Modified Centennial
Schools. “This takes our Centennial Schools program another important step forward. It
provides maximum local control and flexibility to schools to help students reach their
highest level of performance” (Leavitt, 1996, as cited in Cortez, 1996). To qualify as a
Modified Centennial School, the school had to demonstrate widespread parental and
school staff support. It also had to have completed or be in its third year as a Centennial
School. Each of the selected schools had a team of directors that consisted of an equal
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number of school employees and parents or guardians of students attending that school.
Directors could request and receive waivers from the state or local board of
education for any rule or policy that prevented or inhibited the school from achieving its
performance goals. This allowed the school autonomy to make local decisions for the
students, faculty, staff, and patrons of schools regarding teacher employment, student
performance, school calendars, budgeting practices, and faculty professional
development.
Governor Leavitt introduced Centennial Schools at the beginning of his
administration to increase parent involvement, local control, and student performance.
He indicated the Modified Centennial School program would run at least three years and
would then be evaluated to determine the success of student performance goals. The
Governor was generally perceived by the public education community as a strong
supporter of public education. However, he was also well known for being forward
thinking about education, and it was not unexpected when, in 1997, he proposed the
creation of charter schools, even though most of the public education community did not
support them. In fact, many in Utah had already likened Modified Centennial Schools to
watered-down charter schools, because they provided site-based decision making to the
principal of the school, included parents on the team of directors, and provided for
waivers from rule and policy.
The Governor’s position created an interesting dichotomy. Because the public
education community generally recognized the Governor as a proponent of a strong
public education system, they did not want to oppose the Governor full force regarding
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his charter schools proposal. But, they also did not want charter schools. He was open,
however, to listening to the opinions from all of the stakeholders (Salisbury, 2000).
Despite the verbalized concerns of several public education special interest groups
(e.g., Utah School Superintendent’s Association [USSA], Utah Education Association
[UEA], Utah School Boards Association [USBA], etc.), the Governor listed the creation
of charter schools as one of his education priorities for the 1998 general session of the
legislature. One of the interviewees introduced later in this chapter, a state government
employee, did not think school districts and the public would have opposed charter
schools had they really been a pilot project with research to support their continuation.
She identified:
Instead, it appeared to school districts that legislators were saying that charter
schools were going to be in Utah whether anyone liked them or not, and that
charter schools were going to compete for the limited resources, and that districts
were obligated to like charter schools. A simple change in message could have
changed the charter school movement from one of competition to one of
partnership and innovation. People just got the wrong impression in the very
beginning, and it has taken a long time to get over that.
During the summer of 1997, the Centennial Charter Schools Task Force (task
force) was organized by the legislature and studied the possibility of creating charter
schools in Utah (Centennial Charter Schools Task Force, 1997). The 15-member,
governor-appointed task force consisted of three members of the Senate, Senator David
H. Steele (R), Co-Chair, Senator Joseph L. Hull (D), and Senator Howard A. Stephenson
(R); five members of the House of Representatives, included Representative Brian R.
Allen (R) Co-Chair, Representative Judy Ann Buffmire (D), Representative Brad King
(D), Representative Evan L. Olsen (R), and Representative Bill Wright (R); one member
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from the governor’s office, Dr. Gary Carlston, Governor’s Education Director; one
member from the State Office of Education, Steven Laing, Associate Superintendent at
the USOE; one certified public school teacher, Pat Rusk; one school district
administrator, Superintendent Steven Baugh, Alpine School District; one private school
representative, Margie Coombs; one parent of a student, Sharlene W. Hawkes; and one
representative of the business community, William P. Moore.
As the historical record in Utah specific to precharter school legislation
discussions was found in the task force minutes and recordings, the researcher gained
most information from the review of these documents. In addition to reviewing the task
force minutes and recordings, the researcher also identified and interviewed seven
individuals involved with initial charter school legislation. The interviewees had varied
experiences with education and charter school legislation. Despite Utah’s growing
diverse population, around the time of initial charter school legislation there were only
10.8% minorities (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000) and 28.8% democrats in the Utah
legislature (Utah State Legislature, 2011a). Therefore, the limited diversity in the
interviewees represented the state’s demographics at the time. Below is a brief summary
of each interviewee, including his/her involvement with public education and Utah
charter schools. Throughout this document, each will be referred to by his/her role.
Charter school principal (Republican), white female, was a former teacher and
current administrator. Her involvement with Utah charter schools included writing and
submitting a charter application, participating with a local charter association,
administering currently operational charter school, serving on the board of a chartering
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entity, and advocating for improved charter school legislation.
State government employee (Republican), white female, was a former teacher,
former administrator, and current staff in a government organization. Her involvement
with Utah charter schools included serving on the Centennial Charter Schools Task
Force, working with staff for a chartering entity, and advocating for improved public
education legislation.
Charter school founder (Democrat), white male, was a former teacher and
advocate in Utah’s not-for-profit arena. His involvement with Utah charter schools
included working as business manager of an original charter school, participating and
holding leadership positions with a local charter association, partnering with USOE on
multiple trainings and projects, and developing local governing board capacity.
Former legislator (republican), white male, was a former legislator and current
lobbyist. His involvement with Utah charter schools included serving on the Centennial
Charter Schools Task Force, serving on the board of a chartering entity, lobbying for
improved charter school legislation, and developing local governing board capacity. His
original influence to pursue charter school legislation was because of his experience as a
parent and the lack of accessibility to leadership at the school district, as well as his lack
of ability as a parent to influence change. This situation prompted the idea that the current
public education model in Utah was broken and legislators needed to find a different
model.
District superintendent (Republican), white male, was a former teacher, former
administrator, and current district superintendent. His involvement with Utah charter
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schools included authorizing a former charter school, working with staff for a chartering
entity, and advocating for improved public education legislation.
Parent lobbyist (Republican), white female, was a parent of students in public
education, both charter schools and district schools. Her involvement with Utah charter
schools included writing and submitting charter application, participating and holding
leadership positions with a local charter association, partnering with USOE on multiple
trainings and projects, and lobbying for improved charter school legislation.
Higher education employee (Republican), white male, was a former teacher,
former public school administrator, former state level administrator, and current
administrator in higher education. While at the USOE, he was involved in advising the
USBE regarding charter school applicants and helping operating charter schools by
providing technical support.
As the charter school discussion progressed during the summer of 1997, minutes
from the 10 task force meetings held between June and November, 1997, showed various
challenges to the concept of charter schools, debated among legislators and stakeholders
alike, such as: What entities should be granted authority to authorize and approve charter
school applications? How many charter schools should be authorized? How would
charter schools be funded? Should teachers be certified? What community and parental
involvement should be required? and To whom would the charter schools be
accountable? These questions were very challenging to resolve due to the variance of
charter school laws that had been enacted across the nation and the diverse political views
that existed at the time. Moreover, legislators held very divergent views, although it was
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anticipated there would be sufficient support to enact some sort of charter school
legislation. Public education officials were generally unsupportive or only slightly
supportive as charter school legislation was considered. Through all the debate, Governor
Leavitt remained committed to gaining legislative approval for charter schools.
In the remainder of this chapter, I address the commonalities and differences
between discussions of the legislature’s task force and individuals I interviewed
regarding charter schools and school choice. A topical history of these discussions
follows.
Purpose of the Centennial Charter School Task Force
June 19, 1997, was the inaugural meeting. The task force met and reviewed the
legislation that created the task force and the statutory duties of the task force, which
included reviewing existing charter school legislation and programs in other states and, if
applicable, other countries, as well as ultimately making recommendations regarding (a)
the establishment of charter schools within the state, either administered and staffed by
public employees or private providers, (b) the funding method through weighted pupil
units (i.e., no tuition), (c) the need for strong parental involvement, (d) the modification
of open enrollment policies, including the possibility of dual enrollment for home school
students, and (e) the creation of charter school performance standards.
Public educators in Utah felt that school districts already offered school choice
through the Centennial Schools and Modified Centennial Schools programs and, at the
inaugural meeting of the task force, members of the USOE and principals of Centennial
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Schools spoke passionately about the effectiveness of these programs already in place
(Centennial Charter School Task Force, 1997).
Early task force meetings began with listening to experiences and observations of
different individuals within Utah public education regarding the Centennial Schools
program. Ms. Pam Hallam, principal of Orem Junior High School, reported that the
answer to a better education system was not to recreate schools but to help them become
better. Ray Morgan, principal of Canyon Crest Elementary, stated his school was
permitted to waive policies and procedures that stood in the way of reaching goals and
objectives. Both administrators noted that being able to make decisions regarding what
was best for their schools and students allowed them to achieve school goals (Centennial
Charter School Task Force, 1997). Mary Voelker, Granite School District administrator
and former principal of Olympus Junior High School, and Paul Sagers, principal of
Olympus Junior High School, addressed the committee on their Centennial School
experiences. They answered questions regarding why, as principals, they chose the
Centennial Schools program and indicated they desired to establish a democratic system
and greater accountability at their school. They also stated that while waivers from
district policies were, indeed, necessary, the waiver requests were perceived as not
politically acceptable by district leaders and boards of education (Centennial Charter
School Task Force, 1997).
The Utah PTA also reported parents’ frustration with the increased legislative
efforts to innovate public schools. Ms. Paula Plant conveyed the PTA’s concern that the
task force was promoting yet another innovation when the Centennial Schools idea had
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not been given ample opportunity to prove itself as effective (Centennial Charter School
Task Force, 1997). Despite the apparent lack of support for the charter school concept by
agencies and associations that represented public education, the governor and legislators
felt there could be more autonomy and choice in education through charter schools.
James L. Wilson, Associate General Counsel assigned to the task force, reported
that it was difficult for him to find a standard legislative model, as charter school
legislation was unique to each state (Centennial Charter School Task Force, 1997). The
Education Commission of the States and the National Conference of State Legislatures
paper entitled, “The Charter School Road Map” identified the common components of
charter schools. These common components included that all states grant exclusive
powers to charter schools, including charter schools sponsored by local districts, which
operated independently under a non-profit corporate status. Similarities in state laws led
to the conclusion that they were public schools that adhered to the following conditions:
(a) charged no tuition, (b) were nonsectarian, (c) subjected to state and federal laws
prohibiting discrimination, (d) complied with all state and federal health and safety laws,
(e) instructed students the required minimum number of days, and (f) followed
compulsory attendance regulations. Differences in components of state charter school
laws included: (a) some states required charter schools to serve a specific percentage of
at-risk students, (b) requirements found in performance agreements, (c) funding, (d)
freedom from district and state regulations, and (e) teacher certification requirements
(Centennial Charter School Task Force, 1997).
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Chartering Entity
Shortly after the task force met for the first time, the question as to what entity
(e.g., government, public, private) should be granted authority to authorize and approve
charter school applications surfaced as the first discussion point. Across the states and the
District of Columbia, legislatures at that time permitted four different types of public
entities to serve as chartering entities: (a) school districts, (b) state boards of education,
(c) other existing public entities (e.g., cities, counties, universities), and (d) public boards
created for the specific purpose of serving as chartering entities (Vergari, 2001). Looking
to the surrounding states with enacted charter school legislation (i.e., CO, NM, AZ, and
WY), the task force found that most states either legislated school districts (i.e., local
education agencies) or state organizations (e.g., State Boards of Education or independent
charter boards) as chartering entities.
Each type of chartering entity presented pros and cons in terms of the growth of
the charter school movement and the quality of charter school accountability process.
Among the chartering entities in existence, school districts had the most direct experience
with the actual day-to-day operation of public schools and all that this entails. This
expertise seemed to be a real asset for a chartering entity, whether in reviewing
applications for new schools or in the oversight of charter schools. However, school
districts that embraced charter school reform were uncommon (Hassel & Vergari, 1999).
Administrators of the traditional public school system frequently viewed charter schools
as a distraction from other reform initiatives and as an unreasonable burden on school
district budgets and personnel.
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School districts also placed implicit or explicit conditions on charter approval that
were unappealing to charter school applicants. Thus, charter school advocates favored
permitting an entity other than the school district to authorize charter schools. However,
most state boards of education are less than enthusiastic about charter schools on the
basis of philosophical, political, and logistical reasons. Charter schools are often viewed
with a skeptical eye by administrators and staff who have long been faithfully devoted to
the institution of the traditional public school (Vergari, 2001). Moreover, charter schools
placed new burdens on state departments of education, frequently without a
commensurate increase in capacity for meeting the new obligations. In some cases, this
was a deliberate attempt on the part of state legislatures to discourage the development of
robust regulatory regimes for an education reform rooted in deregulation.
Publicly funded entities have faced political pressures from the governor or state
legislature to assume an active role in the charter school arena or a different set of
political pressures from formal or informal partnerships with local school districts to not
become involved with charter schools (Vergari, 2001). Finally, public boards created for
the specific purpose of serving as chartering entities were not immune from bias. The
Utah State Charter School Board was recognized as being decidedly sympathetic to the
aims and interests of the charter school movement.
Chartering entities fulfilled three key roles. First, they reviewed applications for
new charter schools and determined whether the proposed schools were likely to be
sound educational entities. Second, after a charter was issued, the chartering entity
monitored the school’s performance under its charter and applicable laws and regulations.
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The charter included provisions pertaining to matters such as governance, curriculum,
student achievement, fiscal management, and personnel. Third, the chartering entity made
decisions about whether and how to intervene in lagging charter schools and whether to
terminate charters.
Successful fulfillment of each of these roles was made more complicated by four
features of the institutional arrangements within which chartering entities operated. First,
many of the most significant tasks performed by chartering entities were technically
complex. Second, chartering entities determined the appropriate balance between charter
school autonomy and accountability. Third, chartering entities operated in a politically
charged arena. Finally, successful implementation of an accountability system was a
complex task that required adequate capacity not only on the part of the charter school
being held accountable but also on the part of the chartering entity charged with oversight
(Cohen, 1996; Elmore, Abelmann, & Fuhrman, 1996). Yet, chartering entities often
operated under resource constraints (Hassel & Vergari, 1999).
Although most interviewees discussed both local education agencies and state
organizations as authorizing entities, interviewees almost singularly preferred a state
organization as the chartering entity due to the perceived objectivity of the state to see the
merit of school choice and the state’s willingness to listen to parents’ concerns.
Experiences of two interviewees included statements that they attempted to work with
their school district regarding specific instances of frustration but felt that they were not
heard. The charter school principal went to her local school district when her son had a
panic episode at school and no one at the school responded to his needs. She recalled:
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When my son stood in the hallway at his school for over an hour in a state of
panic, and no one at the school tried to help him, I decided to go to the district to
see what could be done. The administrator I met with told me “if you people
would stop having babies then you wouldn’t have these problems.” I knew then
and there that I had to find an educational alternative for my son, but the only
others available at the time were private schools and home schooling, neither of
which was acceptable to me as a public school educator.
Parent lobbyist also knew that she needed to find an alternative for her third son
who was in an overcrowded class in an overcrowded school. When he was in the first
grade, he wrote a Thanksgiving story about the lonely turkey and his Christmas story was
the sad Christmas mouse. Parent lobbyist recognized that her son was not enjoying his
school experience, even at that young age, and wanted to provide an educational
environment for him that would make him happy, and, subsequently, flourish.
Following the review of several other charter school legislative models,
Representative Brian R. Allen (R) distributed to the task force some tentative charter
school language describing three autonomy models: full autonomy model, discretionary
autonomy model, and permitted autonomy model (Centennial Charter School Task Force,
1997). The full autonomy model allowed the USOE to be the sole authorizer of charter
schools. Applicants were public or private organizations, or nonprofit groups. The statesupported weighted pupil unit and school district money flowed directly to the charter
school. Authority was granted from the state to the school and accountability was
directed to the USOE. The school was responsible for all aspects of management,
including academic decisions and school operations, would contract with employees
directly, and was required to meet additional charter-specific criteria outlined in
legislation.
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The discretionary autonomy model allowed the USOE or school districts to be the
authorizers of charter schools, but required that the authorizers provide oversight and
monitor school performance. The state-supported weighted pupil unit and school district
money flowed directly to the charter school, and it could contract with the district for
various services (e.g., transportation, human resources, reporting). The school was
responsible for all aspects of management, including academic decisions and school
operations, would contract with employees directly, and was required to meet additional
charter-specific criteria outlined in legislation. The main difference between the full
autonomy and discretionary autonomy models was the right and responsibility of the
chartering entity to provide direct oversight.
The permitted autonomy model looked similar to the Modified Centennial
Schools program in that the school district authorized charter schools and funding flowed
to the chartering entity for distribution to the charter school as they saw fit. The local
school board worked with the charter school to determine the amount of authority and
money available to the applicant. The school’s governing board oversaw various services
at the school level (e.g., building, supplies, curriculum, auxiliary services, etc.) based on
what the authorizer allowed.
Senator Howard A. Stephenson (R) recommended that the task force look into the
New Zealand model, which relied on a parent council that determined how funding was
spent (Centennial Charter School Task Force, 1997). Research revealed that the New
Zealand education model offered many of the same characteristics as charter schools in
that the model included a site-based board of trustees that was elected by the parents, had
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full responsibility for what happened at the school, and made all spending decisions
(Centennial Charter School Task Force, 1997).
Senator Joseph L. Hull (D) moved that the task force recommend the
discretionary autonomy model in its the proposed legislation, and that the legislation
provided for the establishment of new charter schools and included language that
permitted existing public schools to convert their status to charter school. The motion
passed unanimously (Centennial Charter School Task Force, 1997). At a subsequent task
force meeting, Senator David H. Steele (R) proposed that “charter schools be established
with local boards with an appeal to the State Board of Education, and charters may be
granted by the State Board of Education.” Discussion ensued and ended with the motion
being divided into two parts: “Charter schools may be established through local boards
with an appeal to the State Board of Education” and “Charter schools may be sponsored
by the State Board of Education.” The second motion caused great debate among task
force members about the merits of requiring the State Board of Education to grant
charters to applicants denied by their school district. Much of the discussion centered on
restricting the number of charter schools the State Board of Education could create. A
substitute motion was proposed by Superintendent Baugh permitting the State Board of
Education to grant a total of ten charters to applicants appealing or referred by local
boards. Both motions passed with Reps. Bill Wright (R) and Evan L. Olsen (R) voting
against the first motion and Senator Howard A. Stephenson (R), Reps. Brian R. Allen
(R), Evan L. Olsen (R), and Bill Wright (R), Dr. Carlston, and Ms. Hawkes voting
against the second (Centennial Charter School Task Force, 1997).
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Charter School Funding
Once the chartering entities were determined, the task force moved on to charter
school funding. The task force reviewed fiscal roadblocks encountered by other states in
the establishment and maintenance of charter schools. They also noted that the U.S.
Department of Education’s evaluation of charter schools indicated the top three concerns
on establishing charter schools included start-up costs, capital facilities, and
transportation (Centennial Charter School Task Force, 1997). Representative Brian R.
Allen (R) challenged task force members to propose language that addressed the concerns
expressed in the U.S. Department of Education’s evaluation while still providing a great
amount of autonomy for charter schools in determining how funds were spent.
As expected, funding was a topic of great debate among task force members,
interviewees, and public educators alike. Senator David H. Steele’s (R) initial funding
methodology proposed each charter school students received the fiscal year’s state
weighted pupil unit and 50% of the weighted pupil unit from districts. A spirited
discussion followed regarding the use of the local contribution to help finance students
attending charter schools. On one hand, task force members argued that public dollars
should not be spent on what may be conceived as private education (Centennial Charter
School Task Force, 1997). On the other hand, Senator Howard A. Stephenson (R)
expressed concern that 50% of the local contribution was not sufficient. He argued that a
laboratory of innovation required an infusion of funds to support its mission, which may
be more expensive than a traditional school. The Utah School Boards Association asked
if the proposed dollars to fund charter schools represented a legislative allocation of new
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monies or increased competition for tax dollars now used to fund district schools
(Centennial Charter School Task Force, 1997).
The funding discussion continued over 2 months. Representative Brian R. Allen
(R) brought five funding options to the task force for consideration. In November,
Senator Joseph L. Hull (D) moved that applicants might apply for start-up costs in the
form of a grant through state funding identified by the legislature but which would not be
part of current education funding. The motion passed with Representatives Evan L. Olsen
(R) and Bill Wright (R) voting against the motion. Subsequently, Senator Joseph L. Hull
(D) moved that the State Superintendent of Public Instruction might allocate grants for
start-up costs based on the size, scope, and special circumstances of the charter school
applicants. The motion passed and Ms. Rusk and Superintendent Baugh voted against the
motion (Centennial Charter School Task Force, 1997).
General funding of charter school students, however, was not as simple. Five
options were considered, but only three were found in the meeting minutes. Option 1
provided for a full weighted pupil unit (WPU) and 50% of local contributions. Concerns
were voiced regarding Option 1, especially by Senator Howard A. Stephenson (R) who
felt the proposal’s idea to permit charter schools to receive only 50% of the local
contribution was too little, considering the charter school’s fiscal needs at start-up,
including facilities. He suggested that it be increased to 75% of the local contribution.
Option 2 funded charter school students the same as district students, including funds
received through taxes levied. Concerns voiced regarding Option 2 included the feeling
that the overall funding for districts would be reduced, if charter school students were
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funded as if they were in a regular program. Option 5 funded charter school students at a
full WPU and additionally required that the school districts provide transportation for
charter school students and offer any unused facilities to charter schools for first right of
refusal. This caused considerable discussion around the concepts of student transportation
and capital facilities (Centennial Charter School Task Force, 1997).
Dr. Carlston moved that the task force endorse funding options not
disadvantageous to charter schools and yet causing no financial harm to district bonded
indebtedness already in place. School districts should be held harmless in their debt
service funding. Senator Howard A. Stephenson (R) offered a substitute motion and the
task force adopted the language of Option 2, with the additional language that “debt
service and similar school district obligations be excluded.” The motion passed
unanimously (Centennial Charter School Task Force, 1997).
Although the motion passed, there were remaining concerns regarding the details
of charter school funding (Centennial Charter School Task Force, 1997). Representative
Brian R. Allen (R) recommended that an ad hoc committee be created to meet during the
1998 legislative session to help review charter school funding and help prepare “a general
philosophical bill and allow all entities involved in chartering to work out the details.”
However, since the task force was able to align on the proposed legislation, this
committee was unnecessary and was never created (B. Allen, personal communication,
July 20, 2011).
During 2003-2011, public schools in Utah received revenue from three main
sources: (a) the federal government (12.4%), (b) the state government (64.9%), and (c)
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local revenues generated by their own property tax levies (22.7%; Utah State Office of
Education, 2011c). Despite passing legislation intended to fund charter school students
equitably, charter schools remained unable to capture local revenues in the same way
districts can (i.e., levy property taxes). Most federal money in Utah public schools came
in the form of grants and No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) funds, as well as Individuals
with Disability Education Act (IDEA) special education funding. Additionally, from
2003 through 2011, Utah received grants from the Public Charter Schools Program
(PCSP; 2003-2011) and State Charter School Facilities Incentive Grants Program (20052009). Under these grant programs, 83 Utah charter schools received an average of
$157,607 with the PCSP and 66 of the same Utah charter schools received an average of
$125,219 with the State Charter School Facilities Incentive Grants Program (USOE Grant
documents in charter school office).
The PCSP was designed to increase the number of quality charter schools. Charter
schools were eligible to receive PCSP grant monies for three years to offset start-up costs
incurred during their first years of operations. The grant money was used to offset costs
incurred for obtaining education materials and supplies, developing curriculum, and other
limited operational costs. According to a study by the Utah Foundation in 2005, more
than two-thirds of the PCSP grant money received by Utah charter schools was spent on
property (school equipment) and supplies. New charter schools also spent some of the
grant funds for personnel costs, professional services, and other services related to the
opening of a new school.
Utah charter schools were also able to receive grant monies under the State
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Charter School Facilities Incentive Grants Program (2005-2009). Implemented under the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act and amended by the NCLB Act of 2001, the
Facilities Incentive Grants Program was designed to encourage states to expand facilities
and to help share in the costs associated with charter school facilities. For states to be
eligible to compete for grants, they were required to have a program currently in place
and specify in state law a provision for per-pupil funding on an annual basis for charter
school facilities. To be eligible for this grant opportunity, Utah amended its charter
school funding law in 2004 to include language stating that at least 10% of the local
replacement funds must be used for charter school facilities (S.B. 3; Utah State
Legislature, 2004b).
Several school districts looked to these grant programs as a way to fund needed
projects under the guise of a charter school umbrella. District Superintendent, former
superintendent of a rural Utah school district, sponsored one of the original eight charter
schools and recalled:
The main reason behind starting a charter school was financial. The district had
need for an alternative high school, but didn’t have the funding to support it. As a
charter school, however, we were eligible for federal startup money, as well as
state startup money. That provided enough money for us to develop a charter
school campus. The difficulty I saw, even within the district, was at the other side
of the district - about a 35 minute drive. A lot of the students had the same need
for an alternative school, but didn’t have the means to drive across district to
attend, as charter schools do not receive funding for transportation.
The largest portion of revenue for Utah public education was derived from state
sources, mainly the Uniform School Fund, which was funded primarily through personal
and corporate income taxes. Governed by the Minimum School Program Act (MSP), the
state distributed funds to districts and charter schools using a myriad of formulas based
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on enrollment, student characteristics, and school location. The MSP was designed in part
to equalize funding capacity between poorer and richer districts (Minimum School
Program Act, 2 Utah Code Ann. §53A-17a, 2011). The basic program provided support
to all public schools for students in grades K-12. The basis for distribution of this
program was the WPU.
WPU, a measurement unit calculated according to program specific formulas,
usually involved prior year average daily membership (ADM) plus growth. The
Legislature determined the dollar value of the WPU annually during the General Session.
How many WPUs a district or charter school generated was contingent upon various
student characteristics. For charter schools, Kindergarten students generated 0.55 WPUs,
students in grades 1-6 generated 0.9 WPUs, grades 7-8 generated 0.99 WPUs, and grades
9-12 generated 1.2 WPUs (The Utah Charter Schools Act, 2 Utah Code Ann. §53A-1a513, 2011). One WPU for FY 2011 was $2,577; for FY 2012 it was valued at $2,816
(H.B. 2; Utah State Legislature, 2011b).
Under the MSP, every district in the state was required to levy the basic minimum
property tax rate in order to qualify for funding from the state’s Uniform School Fund.
The basic levy rate was applied uniformly to all districts statewide. The more revenues an
individual district received from the levy, the less revenue that district received from the
state. School districts were also then able to impose levies in addition to the basic rate. As
discussed below, charter schools did not have the ability to levy taxes.
School districts could levy 13 different property taxes. Utah charter schools did
not have boundaries or taxing authority and so were unable to levy property taxes for
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these programs. Until 2003, districts provided to charter schools 50% of their per-pupil
local property tax revenue for the number of pupils enrolled in charter schools (H.B. 145;
Utah State Legislature, 1998). In 2003, the Legislature enacted changes that allowed
districts to retain all local revenues derived from property tax collection and created
‘local replacement funding’ for charter schools (H.B. 3; Utah State Legislature, 2003). In
the opinions of charter school founder and parent lobbyist, however, the formula used in
law to calculate the amount of local replacement funding for charter school students was
flawed as it only included a few of the 13 allowable levies, leaving charter school
students underfunded.
Parent lobbyist would often attend dinners and meetings with legislators that
spouses were invited to, and as she got more into the finances of the charter schools, she
found that “charter schools were under-funded by a thousand dollars per student as
compared to a district student.” That frustrated her and she soon began asking her
legislator friends “how can you justify taking a student that left a traditional school and
chose to go to a charter school, how can you justify underfunding them to that degree”
(Parent Lobbyist, personal communication, October 8, 2010)? Eventually she helped
form the Utah Association of Public Charter Schools (UAPCS), a group who’s job was to
educate legislators on what was happening and why we needed to change the funding
formula so that charter school students could be funded equally.
Ensuring funding parity between charter schools and districts has been a concern
for many legislators, educational professionals, and the charter school community since
the inception of charter schools in Utah. A study by the Utah Foundation (2005)
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calculated that Utah charter schools received $4,955 per pupil in ongoing funds in FY
2004, while districts received $5,756 per pupil. This placed charter school funding at
about 86% of traditional public schools’ funding. The study identified that the $801 per
pupil gap in funding between charter schools and district schools was the result of three
primary forces: (a) differences in student populations served (e.g., Title I, economically
disadvantaged, ethnic minorities, etc.), (b) ineligibility for some funds (e.g.,
transportation funding), and (c) a local replacement funding formula which did not fully
compensate charter schools for the lack of property tax revenues.
According to the study, local replacement funding issues included several
shortfalls in the formula for replacing local property tax revenues (Utah Foundation,
2005). For example, the formula created by 2003 legislation attempted to provide state
funds equal in per-pupil amount to the property taxes levied by districts. However, at the
time, debt services revenue, state guarantees used to supplement local property taxes in
districts with low property values, and capital outlay foundation funds were excluded in
the formula. Utah Foundation calculated that had these revenues been included, it would
have accounted for an additional $552 per charter school student. It became clear since
that legislation passed that bond proceeds were not included in debt service fund
revenues, state guarantees used to supplement local property taxes in districts with low
property values might have been considered a “quasi-property tax,” and that capital
outlay foundations funds also should have been added.
Nevertheless, charter school advocates, parent lobbyist and charter school founder
recognized that unless changes were made to the local replacement funding formula,
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charter schools would be at a perpetual disadvantage financially. Since the time the local
replacement formula originated in 2003, it changed multiple times and eventually
included a more comprehensive list of districts levies (The Utah Charter Schools Act, 2
Utah Code Ann. §53A-1a-513, 2011). In FY 2012, the average local replacement funding
rate for charter schools was $1,687 per student, an increase of $80 per student from FY
2011, leaving only a $170 gap in funding disparity between charter school students and
district school students (C. Bleak, personal communication, August 10, 2011).
Parental Involvement in Charter Schools
Another highly discussed topic of the task force was the level and type of parental
involvement at their child’s charter school. Decades of research pointed to the numerous
benefits of parent involvement in education for not only students but also for the parents
involved, the school, and the wider community (Epstein, 2001; Fan & Chen, 2001;
Jeynes, 2003, 2007). Despite the challenges in establishing a causal link between parent
involvement and student achievement, studies utilizing large databases showed positive
and significant effects of parent involvement on both academic and behavioral outcomes
(Fan & Chen, 2001; Jeynes, 2003, 2007). Research also found that parent involvement
was related to a host of student achievement indicators, including grades, attendance,
attitudes, expectations, homework completion, and state test results (Dearing, McCartney,
Weiss, Kreider, & Simpkins, 2004; Sheldon, 2003).
The rise of the charter school movement was seen as an opportunity for parents to
play a more central role in the education of their children. Charter schools were touted as
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a setting in which the traditional barriers to involvement could be alleviated, since charter
schools were typically small “community schools” that were schools of choice with
missions tailored to their student populations. In 15 states, the opportunity for parent
participation was one purpose written into the charter school law. Tennessee’s law stated,
“The purpose of this chapter is to…afford parents substantial meaningful opportunities to
participate in the education of their children” (Tennessee Public Charter Schools Act of
2002, Tenn. Code Ann. §49-13-102(a)(6)) and Utah’s law said, “The purposes of charter
schools are to…provide opportunities for greater parental involvement in management
decisions at the school level” (The Utah Charter Schools Act, 2 Utah Code Ann. §53A1a-503, 2011). In addition, parent contracts were a common approach for charter schools
to encourage parent involvement once the school is operational (Corwin & Becker,
1995).
Not surprisingly, there was an underlying assumption that charter schools
involved more parents both quantitatively and qualitatively. Theory posited that charter
school parents, because they actively chose to send their child to a charter school, were
more involved than parents whose children were automatically assigned to a district-run
school (Goldring & Shapira, 1993). Due to the greater autonomy enjoyed by charter
schools, researchers found that these schools tended to adopt stronger and more specific
parent involvement policies than traditional public schools (Bulkley & Wohlstetter, 2004;
Finn et al., 2000). An early study of charter schools that compared charter school parent
involvement to that of traditional public schools in the same neighborhood reported
greater parent involvement in charter schools (Becker, Nakagawa, & Corwin, 1997).
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Other researchers also found that parents were more involved in charter schools and most
importantly, they were involved in more significant ways: for example, serving on
charter-school governing boards (Finn et al., 2000). While charter school laws varied a
great deal across the nation, many states emphasized the role of parents in the creation as
well as the governance of a charter school, as noted above.
Murphy and Shiffman (2002) noted that parent involvement was the “cornerstone
of many charter school visions” (p. 97). Despite lofty goals and good intentions, charter
schools varied greatly in how they involved parents. A 2007 survey of charter leaders in
three states found that parent involvement was one area in which charter school leaders
struggled to translate intent into practice (Gross & Pochop, 2007). Becker and colleagues
(1997) discovered that despite a greater level of involvement, charter schools did not
necessarily take a more active role in trying to involve parents. Parent contracts were the
only notable outreach method. The researchers also voiced concerns that parent contracts
excluded minority and working-class parents from enrolling their children in the school,
afraid they would be unable to fulfill the requirements of such contracts. Fuller’s (2002)
case studies suggested that charter schools did not necessarily escape the issues that
plagued parent involvement in traditional public schools. Issues like social class
differences, language and culture barriers, and the intimidating role teachers presented to
some parents who did not experience success in school themselves created obstacles for
meaningful involvement and communication in charter schools as they did in traditional
schools.
At the July 2, 1997, meeting, several individuals mentioned the importance of
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parent participation in a child’s education. Mrs. Susan Lawrence, parent, commented on
the value of parental involvement in a child’s education. Mrs. Gayle Ruzika, president of
the Eagle Forum in Utah, indicated that the Eagle Forum supported tax credits for
education costs and did not support the charter school concept. She believed that parental
involvement was the key to resolving most problems in public education. Mrs. Jana Rae
Shaw, parent, also raised concerns of a district board not being well informed on critical
issues and the lack of responsiveness and intimidation exhibited by board members and
administrators towards parents (Centennial Charter School Task Force, 1997).
The task force discussed the need for more community involvement in public
schools, the changing mind set of educators and families regarding better partnerships
and relationships with schools, giving more flexibility and power at the school sites,
providing necessary training for educators, and increasing accountability (Centennial
Charter School Task Force, 1997). To this end, Senator David H. Steele (R)
recommended that a charter school governing board should include the principal and
equal numbers of educators of the school and interested citizens, and the governing board
should have site-based authority to operate in lieu of the district board of education. The
task force discussion regarding Senator David H. Steele’s (R) recommendations focused
on charter school governance issues and concerns over gridlock and stagnation between
parents and staff when issues come to a vote (Centennial Charter School Task Force,
1997).
However, there was still discussion as to who determined the type and amount of
parental involvement. It was clear to the task force that charter schools would provide
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opportunities for substantial parental involvement, but they found it difficult to conclude
if parents should be allowed to participate in the development of school policies. Senator
David H. Steele (R) felt the charter school application should describe how parents would
be involved and participate in the school. Senator Howard A. Stephenson (R) suggested
that specific charter schools may not even require parental involvement, but this concept
was met with disagreement by most task force members. Senator David H. Steele’s (R)
proposal established a site-based authority and governance model that was completely
defined by each charter applicant, with the exception of basic health and safety standards.
Superintendent Baugh noted that the chartering entity typically accepted, rejected, or
modified a proposal to become a charter school. Dr. Laing moved that a site-based
governance model be completely defined by the charter applicant, except for basic
standards of health and safety. The motion passed unanimously (Centennial Charter
School Task Force, 1997).
The task force also discussed whether or not parental involvement could be a
condition of enrollment. Some members felt that it was a key component in the entire
charter school movement and should be required, but others felt it was up to the parent to
decide their level of involvement. Ms. Rusk moved that charter school legislation ensure
an opportunity for parental involvement with the plan identifying and describing their
involvement. The motion passed. Representative Brad King (D) voted against the motion
(Centennial Charter School Task Force, 1997).
In addition to the discussion of the importance of parental involvement by the task
force, all interviewees also mentioned the importance of parental involvement in the
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education of children. The charter school principal stated, “It makes all the difference in
the world. I think one of the best things we can do to improve education is to be receptive
to parental input and allow for more parental involvement in whatever facet each school
wants to make available.”
Most Utah charter schools were started by passionate groups of parents, not forprofit companies, which were not allowed to apply for or operate charter schools
according to state law (The Utah Charter Schools Act, 2 Utah Code Ann. §53A-1a504(1), 2011). Following a frustrating episode with her school district, Charter School
Principal turned to charter schools as a possible alternative in the public education arena.
I felt that the general education population at the time was nonresponsive to
parental input or parental needs. So, my motivation in working within public
education was to improve the mechanism for parental input and parental
involvement in the schools.
One expectation of the 1998 legislature was increased parental involvement.
Former Legislator was pleased at the level of parental involvement, “and the sense that
parents have that they can actually influence school policy and direction and things that
are happening at the school level.” He has long believed and held:
The best way to improve education in Utah is to increase local community
involvement, increase parental involvement, and make the parents more
responsible for the education that is being delivered to their children, and more
engaged in the process. I think having the parents and the community involved,
would by very nature, increase the school’s accountability.
Waivers from Laws and Rules
By very definition, charter schools were supposed to be created through a contract
between a chartering entity and an applicant. In theory, that contract contained several
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waivers from state laws that mainly by-passed bureaucratic red tape and hampered the
charter school’s ability to be innovative, as well as provided greater accountability to the
school’s stakeholders. One of the legislatively assigned questions tackled by the task
force centered on whether or not charter school teachers should be licensed (Centennial
Charter School Task Force, 1997). Representative Brian R. Allen (R) stated charter
schools needed to be part of the state’s education system, but waivers could be included
in the legislation that would provide the flexibility that was needed for charter schools.
The motion passed unanimously (Centennial Charter School Task Force, 1997).
The task force debated whether or not Utah charter schools would be waived from
any laws or Board Administrative Rules. Some state legislators wanted charter schools to
be free of many rules and regulations imposed on regular public schools, including the
certification of charter school teachers and principals, but others argued that all educators
in a public school should be appropriately licensed and endorsed for their assignments.
Flexibility in teacher certification was the first issue discussed.
Senator Joseph L. Hull (D) argued that there was not a need for flexibility from
teacher certification because state law and board administrative rule already made
provisions for some certification flexibility. Alternately, Representative Brad King (D)
felt that employing uncertified teachers would be an acceptable consideration for charter
schools, if they met the same standards and requirements as certified teachers.
Representative Bill Wright (R) offered a third opinion in that he felt individuals with
subject matter expertise should be allowed to teach. To help educate the task force
regarding options already available, Dr. Laing, USOE Associate Superintendent,

95
summarized the four ways for a noncertified person to teach and expressed his opinion
that, on a day-to-day basis, university prepared teachers learn instructional and
presentation expertise that often is subtle but extremely important to student learning.
Senator Howard A. Stephenson (R) felt that an orthodox teaching methodology may not
be essential in a charter school setting. Senator Joseph L. Hull (D) moved that each
charter school plan allowed for flexibility in employing noncertificated personnel. The
motion passed. Representative Brad King (D) and Ms. Pat Rusk abstained and Dr. Steven
Laing voted against the motion (Centennial Charter School Task Force, 1997).
Senator David H. Steele (R) suggested the task force reconsider adopting
language that would state the charter plan should allow teacher licensure flexibility.
Superintendent Baugh proposed they begin with certification as a requirement and, then,
provide for specific elements of flexibility. He felt for the good of the child, teachers
should be certified. He explained that high-quality teaching would not be attained without
some kind of certification requirement. Some committee members contended, however,
that if charter schools are to enjoy freedom, there should be very limited stipulations on
teacher qualifications. Others pointed out that every other professional field has
requirements and standards, and a process is typically required through which a
professional learns and qualifies himself or herself to be part of that profession
(Centennial Charter School Task Force, 1997). No action was taken on this topic at this
meeting.
The final task force discussion at this meeting contemplated the merits of the idea
that waivers from rules and regulations were necessary to provide flexibility to charter
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schools so they could focus on educational results rather than process. Representative
Brad King (D) moved that applications for waivers from “rules and regulations” were to
be heard by the waiver granting authority. The motion passed with all present voting in
favor (Centennial Charter School Task Force, 1997).
As of early 2011, there were four states that enacted charter school legislation that
did not require teachers to be licensed and 20 states that required licensure, but with
exceptions (Education Commission of the States, 2011). Utah was one of the seventeen
states requiring charter school teachers to be licensed the same as any other teacher in
public education. There was an entire section of Utah code dedicated to the requirements
of educator licensing and professional practices (Educator Licensing and Professional
Practices Act, 2 Utah Code Ann. § 53A-6, 2011).
District Superintendent agreed that charter school teachers should be licensed. He
stated that when working with legislators to determine which waivers charter schools
should receive from Board Administrative Rule, he felt his role was to:
help legislators understand why some State Board of Education rules were in
place, such as why administrators needed to be licensed, why teachers needed to
have licensure and background checks, why school buildings needed inspections,
etc. and why it would hurt public education if the legislature completely did away
with those kinds of requirements.
Recruiting, paying, and retaining qualified teachers ranked high on the list of
challenges facing charter school operators (Utah Foundation, 2005). Of the 574 teachers
who transferred teaching assignments in Utah public schools between the 2008-2009 and
2009-2010 school years, 7.7% (44 teachers) transferred from a charter school to a district,
15.2% (87 teachers) transferred from a district to a charter school, and 10.1% (58
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teachers) transferred between charter schools (Utah State Office of Education, 2010).
With the annual charter school teacher turnover rate reported as 33.0%, there was
concern over the ability of charter schools to attract and retain quality teachers.
There was speculation that due to the lower pay and benefits, charter schools
could only attract teachers with qualifications lower than those employed in districts
(Utah Foundation, 2005). While it was possible to comment on the overall teacher
compensation reported by charter schools, it was difficult to correlate this with the quality
of teachers working at charter schools. Individual, highly qualified teachers may have
been willing to sacrifice pay or benefits in exchange for working in a school that
encouraged creativity or had adopted a curriculum they found favorable.
State government employee also alluded to the importance of hiring quality
teachers, but did not go as far as to say they must be licensed to be high quality, when she
said:
While we have shifted from education being a teaching profession to being a
student-oriented classroom, I still think that we have a long way to go to make
sure that every child has a great teacher, every child has every opportunity in the
classroom to succeed, and every child has the opportunity to reach their highest
potential.
The requirement for all charter school teachers to be licensed was detrimental to
the state when applying for CSP grants. In July 2011, Utah received feedback on a CSP
grant application that identified a weakness in state statute regarding the requirement for
teacher licensure stating “Utah charter schools must still hire licensed teachers. This
requirement can handcuff flexibility for charter schools to hire the most qualified
individual” (U.S. Department of Education, personal communication, July 21, 2011).
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Open Enrollment
Some districts provided open enrollment as an option to students to bring about
choice options within district boundaries. District Superintendent, while a principal at a
district laboratory school, tried to promote open enrollment within the district. “Families
had the option between my elementary school and the one across town. It was probably
one of the first schools that convinced the district that it wasn’t a bad thing to have open
enrollment.” Former Legislator, however, indicated that:
The legislature tried to expand that notion so that more kids could choose between
schools within a school district, or schools between school districts. However,
what was found is that changing schools within the district really wasn’t much of
a choice because they were all so similar. And, from district to district, there
wasn’t much difference in the culture of the schools.
Charter schools were seen as the next open enrollment experiment (District
Superintendent, personal communication, September 23, 2010).
Senator David H. Steele’s (R) first proposal required that charter schools accepted
all students who applied, with no admissions requirements, and, if oversubscribed, held a
lottery to determine which students could enroll. Discussion around this issue included
several concerns. For example, if a student applied at a charter school established to
pursue a physical or intellectual goal beyond his capability, would the charter school be
required to change its mission to meet the student’s needs? Representative Bill Wright
(R) felt most parents directed their children to a charter school that emphasized the kind
of training they desired. Discussion alluded to the idea that open enrollment and
specialization tended to be incompatible ideas that often were overridden by
discrimination. Representative Brad King (D) moved that charter school legislation not
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permit discrimination expect for limitations in available space. The motion passed.
Senator Howard A. Stephenson (R) and Representative Evan L. Olsen (R) voted against
the motion (Centennial Charter School Task Force, 1997).
During the time of the task force meetings, many special interest groups attended
and then met and discussed their concerns regarding the direction of possible charter
school legislation. As it appeared that the Representative Brian R. Allen (R) would move
forward with charter school legislation in the 1998 legislative session, the Utah School
Boards Association (USBA) and Utah School Superintendents Association (USSA)
argued that charter schools diverted focus from the current public school system and
weakened it. In fact, Kent Sadler, president of the USBA, presented the formal position
of the USBA and USSA on charter schools, which suggested: (a) charter schools should
be chartered by, governed by, and accountable to local school boards; (b) funding should
not exceed allocations for districts; (c) charter schools should comply with all state and
federal laws that protected the health, safety, and welfare of students, prohibited
discrimination, and insured access to all students; (d) charter schools should demonstrate
fiscal responsibility and accountability; (e) professional staff must be certified; (f)
waivers from state law and Board Administrative Rule should be made available to
charter schools and districts; and (g) student demographics should reflect the district
schools in the same attendance area. Kent Sadler also said that both associations believed
charter school legislation should not include provisions that allowed them to have a
negative impact on district schools (Centennial Charter School Task Force, 1997).
On February 18, 1998, House Bill 145, Schools for the 21st Century, was
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introduced by Representative Brian R. Allen (R) to the House Education Committee. The
bill provided for 3-year schools for the 21st Century program of continuous improvement
and the creation of up to eight charter schools. Specific requirements of charter schools
included defining the charter process, designating the State Board of Education as the
sponsor, providing requirements, identifying issues to be addressed in the application,
outlining the accountability report, allowing for termination, and providing some
exemptions and waivers.
Considerable discussion among House Education Committee members occurred
on February 24, 1998, requiring Representative Brian R. Allen (R) to “defend” the bill
for two hours. At the end, it “squeaked out of Committee” by a vote of 5 yes, 4 no, and 3
absent, resulting in a favorable committee report and a substitute bill, House Bill 145 1st
Substitute. The Committee Chair, Representative Lloyd W. Frandsen (R), sent the
recommendation that House Bill 145, Schools for the 21st Century, be replaced with a
favorable recommendation that House Bill 145 1st Substitute, Schools for the 21st
Century, should include the allowance for charter schools to participate in the Risk
Management Fund.
The bill came before the House of Representatives on February 26, 1998, but was
circled (i.e., to temporarily postpone action on a measure without removing it from its
place on the calendar) and was not discussed by the House until the following day,
February 27, 1998, day 40 of the 1998 General Legislative Session, where it was
uncircled and discussion on the bill ensued. Representative Brian R. Allen (R) proposed
the first set of amendments, including several technical changes and two substantive
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changes. The first substantive change included adding a “protection clause for teachers,”
who did not want to stay at a converted charter school, to allow them to receive
preference to transfer to an open teaching position within the district, and the second
substantive change was to provide permissive language regarding the State Board of
Education’s decisions about requested waivers from Board Administrative Rule. The
chair determined, on vocal vote, that House floor amendment number three passed.
Representative Brian R. Allen (R), as the House sponsor of the bill, led the
discussion. He indicated that the task force “agonized” over the topic of charter schools
but came to a consensus that a very controlled, 3-year pilot study, with a limit of eight
charter schools would be an appropriate way to see if charter schools had a place in Utah
public education. Representative Brian R. Allen (R) also reported that the bill’s proposal
that the State Board of Education authorize charter schools, with local governing board
input, was a “bone of contention” with the school districts. However, he indicated that the
larger school districts would not oppose the bill because they wanted to see how charter
schools would work.
Representative Brian R. Allen highlighted to House members that the State Board
of Education would be tasked with developing rules regarding the distribution of funding
to charter schools, which would include that the money went to the district for
distribution to charter schools, so the district and state would know the financial status of
charter schools. Additionally, charter school students would be required to take the same
assessments and the school should submit the same performance reports to the state that
are required of all public schools. Charter schools, however, would have an additional
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report to the legislature and USOE regarding its attainment of the performance goals
listed in its individual Charter Agreement.
Representative Susan J. Kohen (R) proposed House floor amendment number
four, a substantial amendment to the bill that transferred authorizer authority exclusively
to school districts following the pilot period. In response, Representative Brian R. Allen
(R) indicated he felt it was unwise to “presuppose outcomes” and grant exclusive
authorizer authority to school districts. He argued that some districts won’t want to
authorize charter schools within their boundaries, but that shouldn’t preclude parents
from being able to have a charter school in their district. He also indicated that he had
worked with districts throughout the summer and had given them “everything they’ve
asked for” in regard to the bill, “save this one thing.” Representative Brian R. Allen (R)
opposed the amendment, as did Representatives Bill Wright (R), John W. Hickman (R),
and Lloyd W. Frandsen (R). Other Representatives, including Ronnie Bigelow (R),
supported the amendment. The chair determined, on a vocal vote, that the amendment
failed.
After researching and weighing the roles and responsibilities of chartering
entities, ultimately, the Utah legislature decided to designate the USBE as the chartering
entity for the eight pilot charter schools. Chartering entities in Utah were responsible for
reviewing applications from eligible applicants, seeking input from the local education
agency in which the school will be located, and providing monitoring and oversight to
any schools that it provided a charter (The Utah Charter Schools Act, 2 Utah Code Ann. §
53A-1a-501.6, 2011).
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Representative Nathan C. Tanner (R) applauded the part of House Bill 145 1st
Substitute that converted Centennial Schools to Schools for the 21st Century but indicated
frustration that the part of the bill pertaining to charter schools was not a separate piece of
legislation. To dump them together “is kind of forcing the issue, so to speak, and it’s
really loading it so that 21st Century can carry the charter school program.” He argued
that this bill is unconstitutional in that it removes the “general control and supervision” of
public education from the State Board of Education. His amendment, House floor
amendment number five, included removing all mention of charter schools from the bill.
Representative Brian R. Allen (R) was offended that he was being portrayed as an
opponent of public education and as trying to circumvent the constitution and he opposed
the amendment, as did Representatives Tammy J. Rowan (R), John E. Swallow (R), and
Brad King (D). Representative Richard M. Siddoway proposed a substitute motion
reducing the number of pilot charter schools to four. The substitute motion failed. No
other Representatives spoke in support of the original amendment. The chair determined,
on a vocal vote, that the amendment failed.
Representative Bill Wright (R) proposed two amendments in House floor
amendment number six, the first being that charter schools should have school
performance “at least equal to that of similar public schools within the district in which
the charter school is located, unless the uniqueness of the school prevents making such
comparisons,” and the second being that charter schools could not accept any federal
funds that would “compromise the integrity of the pilot program.” Representative Brian
R. Allen (R) was not opposed to these amendments. The chair determined, on a vocal
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vote, that the amendment passed, which amended the bill.
Representative Lloyd W. Frandsen (R), House Education Committee Chair, spoke
in favor of the bill, but wanted to make a suggestion that some of the public education
problems could be solved in a more fundamental way, such as providing money for
quality in-service training and classroom size reduction, rather than continuing to fund
education reforms such as Centennial Schools, Modified Centennial Schools, Charter
Schools, Schools for the 21st Century, and so forth. Representative Ronnie Bigelow (R)
spoke in overall support of the bill.
In summation, Representative Brian R. Allen (R) indicated the biggest concerns
about House Bill 145 1st Substitute included the school districts’ concern over not being
in control. Representative Brian R. Allen (R) asked that the legislature allow the 3-year
pilot program, with rigorous evaluation, and, then, decide how charter schools could
better be implemented on a broader scope, if it “actually bears the fruit I hope it bears.”
The amended bill, House Bill 145 1st Substitute passed with a vote of 48 yes, 24 no, and 3
absent, and House Bill 145 1st Substitute went to the Senate for consideration.
The Senate received the bill on February 27, 1998, suspended its rules, and placed
it on the bottom of the 2nd reading calendar, as it had generated a great deal of interest
from the public. The bill was discussed and the Senate voted on March 2, 1998, with a
favorable vote of 15 yes, 9 no, and 5 absent. House Bill 145 1st Substitute was forwarded
for enrolling on March 9, 1998, and was signed into law by Governor Leavitt on March
20, 1998, signaling a significant change in the landscape of Utah public education.
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CHAPTER IV
POLICY CHANGE AND CHARTER SCHOOL ACCOUNTABILITY IN UTAH
House Bill 145 1st Substitute effectively challenged the monopoly of local control
by school districts. School district monopolies had gone unchallenged by a new education
movement since the passage of the Utah Constitution in 1895. Because private schools
existed concurrently in Utah prior to the passage of the Utah Constitution, they were also
perceived as an acceptable alternative to public education and were not viewed as a
challenge to the system.
As discussed in Chapter II, alternative options to public schools sprang up in the
United States during the 1960s, including schools in protest against racially segregated
schools and “open classroom” schools modeled after the British experience (Cuban,
2004). In 1970, with the assistance of $6 million from the federal government,
Minneapolis, Minnesota, mounted an alternative education experiment and opened four
elementary schools and one high school with different organizational designs. Following
Minneapolis’ success, other cities and states opened specialized schools, some of which
were called “magnet” to describe how the school worked in attracting students. However,
by 1975, the term was being used to describe types of schools and fiscal assistance to the
school choice movement contemplated by the federal government. By 1980 most major
cities had systems of magnets (Colorado Parent Information and Resource Center, 2011).
Utah, however, did not join the magnet school movement because:
the prevailing wisdom at the time was that, with the open enrollment law, districts
could create magnet schools if they wanted to. Since one hadn’t been created, and
the districts seemed lukewarm on the idea when it was discussed, the legislature
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assumed they simply didn’t want to go to the extra work to create one. (Former
Legislator, personal communication, December 23, 2011)
Therefore, community loyalty remained with school districts. In addition, the
topic of school choice generated opposition within both political parties among
members who felt loyalty to school districts and were moved by arguments
emphasizing Utah’s tradition of local control.
House Bill 145 1st Substitute provided a means whereby an individual or groups
of individuals, including teachers and parents of students who would attend the school,
might establish a public school that would be subject to a performance based contract,
called a charter. As discussed in Chapter III, this bill caused several heated debates
among legislators and public education officials.
Eventually it passed in the House, 48 to 24, and in the Senate, 15 to nine, despite
Utah’s opposition from mainline education interest groups, such as the teachers union
(UEA), schools boards (USBA), and administrators associations (USSA). Utah officially
joined the charter school movement in 1998, the 34th state to join, led by Utah State
Representative Brian R. Allen (R) and Senator Howard A. Stephenson (R). Immediately
after adoption, the USBA filed a lawsuit against the Utah State Board of Education
(USBE) challenging the constitutionality of the Utah Charter Schools Act, claiming that
the Act violated the Utah Constitution because the constitution granted the USBE only
general rather than specific “control and supervision” over the Utah public education
system (Utah School Boards Association v. Utah State Board of Education, 2001). The
“friendly lawsuit” began when USBA disagreed with the legislature that the USBE
should hold the supervisory position over charter schools. The USBA believed that the
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local school boards were better suited to monitor the charter schools in their districts,
given that they use mostly local funds.
In Utah School Boards Association v. Utah State Board of Education (2001) the
Utah Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, held that it was constitutional for the
USBE to have authority to supervise the charter school program in accordance with the
Utah Charter Schools Act. The Utah Supreme Court held that because the charter school
program was part of the state’s public education system, the legislature had plenary
authority to decide whether the state or local school board had authority to supervise the
charter school program.
Following the legal decision regarding USBE’s authority to supervise charter
schools, the Center for Education Reform deemed the Utah Charter Schools Act (1998)
as relatively weak compared to charter school laws passed in other states. The law was
considered weak because, originally, charter schools were a pilot program, limited to
eight schools for a 3-year period, there was a single authorizer, and schools were forced
to apply to the USBE for waivers from state rules rather than receiving some waivers
automatically (The Utah Charter Schools Act, 2 Utah Code Ann. §53A-1a-511, 2011).
Local and state education codes traditionally dictated nearly every aspect of school
operations, everything from class size, to curriculum, to student assessment. Ideally,
charter schools operated unconstrained by external rules and regulations (except those
related to health, safety, and civil rights) and were free to make any or all changes to
traditional school policy and practice that might enhance students’ performance.
According to Wohlstetter and colleagues (1995), charter schools’ autonomy was highest
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when schools were granted an automatic and “blanket” waiver from all local and state
rules and regulations, freeing the schools to make all critical decisions at the school site.
Autonomy was lowest when the law required charter schools to apply for waivers on a
“rule-by-rule” basis, as found in Utah.
The limitations on sponsorship, the eight school cap, and the lack of automatic
waivers from state laws were particularly discouraging to Utah’s charter school
advocates, but charter supporters immediately went to work developing school proposals.
Within one year, the USBE received and considered multiple charter school applications
from various groups around the state, which included the Ute Indian Tribe, educators
from the University of Utah, educators within the Utah School for the Deaf and Blind,
and others. One of the first applicant groups, consisting of Charter School Founder’s wife
and three other professors at the University of Utah, regularly met over lunch to discuss
what the ideal school would look like. The only problem they faced was finding a way to
make their vision of the perfect school a reality. Charter school legislation opened that
door and within months of the legislation passing, they, along with 15 other applicant
groups submitted the required documents to the USBE to start charter schools (J. Schmitt,
personal communication, August 10, 2011).
The first approved was Jean Massieu School in Salt Lake City in September,
1998, and the first opened was Tuacahn High School for the Performing Arts in St.
George in the fall of 1999. Other charter schools were soon approved in rural Wasatch
County, Ft. Duchesne, Price, and Salt Lake City. In 1999, six charter schools opened,
serving 390 students, and by 2000 all eight allowable pilot charter schools were open,
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serving 537 students. The charter school movement started small and former legislator
believed that districts went along with the original bill thinking the charter school pilot
program would be a failure and would go away after 3 years, nevertheless, he and a few
supportive legislators envisioned a larger movement (personal communication,
September 20, 2009). However, not many members of the general public or public
education community were aware of the pilot program.
Originally known as the “fat ladies in the park,” charter school principal and some
friends, frustrated with overcrowding in schools and the school district’s newly adopted
math curriculum, joined efforts in the summer of 2000 to see what they could do to
change the public education system. This is when charter school principal and parent
lobbyist learned that the state had first attempted to offer school choice through open
enrollment, inter- and intradistrict transfers for students opting for a school other than
their neighborhood school, and then passed legislation allowing for a charter school pilot
program. But, by the time they learned of the charter school pilot program, all of the pilot
charter schools had opened and the cap of eight had been reached.
So, Parent Lobbyist went up to the (capitol) Hill and “just started asking
questions, and asked for the cap to be removed. We worked with a handful of other
schools to find a legislator that was willing to listen to us and try to remove the cap.”
Although her initial goal was to lobby for legislation allowing ten additional autonomous
charter schools statewide, there was the thought in the back of her mind, similar to
Former Legislator, that charter schools could become a statewide movement, allowing
more parents and more districts to become involved.
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Charter school principal’s original expectation was to, first, extend the pilot
program, but she too quickly realized that there was more demand for charter schools and
her tactic changed to one of proposing a graduated growth plan to legislators. The first
year of the charter school lobbying effort and parental demand led to four additional
charter schools, increasing the statewide total to 12, with another set number of charter
schools approved annually until parent demand for school choice was met (S.B. 169;
Utah State Legislature, 2001).
Despite the addition of four charter schools in 2001, parent groups wanted to open
more charter schools, and they continued to lobby for legislative change. However, the
lobbying group realized it was imperative that they prove the charter school movement
was successful by providing legislators with parent surveys and academic data, and then,
hopefully, they could lobby for more flexibility with things like required curriculum and
required hours and days of instruction. The ability for the USBE to authorize 16 charter
schools and six New Century High Schools (magnet schools focused on math, science,
and technology) was legislated in 2002 (S.B. 138; Utah State Legislature, 2002), and in
2003 the number of students attending charter schools grew to 3,253, a 113% increase in
student enrollment over 2002 (Utah State Office of Education, 2011d).
At this point the USBE was spending a significant amount of time reviewing
applications and approving more schools. The USBE authorized the first twenty-eight
charter schools during the period of regulated growth, but “once the cap was removed
and more charter schools could open, it became an overwhelming task. The Board
[USBE] found itself in a situation where it had more on its plate than it could deal with”
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(state government employee). To this end they worked with legislators to create an
independent charter board called the Utah State Charter School Board (SCSB). Utah
experienced significant policy change in 2004 when the legislature established a charter
granting authority that was independent of local school districts, called the Utah State
Charter School Board (SCSB; H.B. 152; Utah State Legislature, 2004a). The creation of
the SCSB expanded the power of Utah’s charter school sector in several ways, and it
dramatically decreased the power of local school districts to block charter schools within
their boundaries (G. Hughes, personal communication, February 22, 2011). Additionally,
it relieved the USBE from spending all of its time on the growing demand of charter
schools and allowed them to focus on other aspects of public education impacting both
district and charter schools.
The State Charter School Board originally consisted of seven individuals,
appointed by the Governor, with expertise in finance or small business management and
education (The Utah Charter Schools Act, 2 Utah Code Ann. §53A-1a-501.5, 2011).
District Superintendent participated in recommending individuals to serve on the
inaugural SCSB and when recommending people, he “wanted to ensure there was
balance between charter advocates and those that would hold charter schools
accountable.” As new appointments to the SCSB occurred over the years, debate among
stakeholders ensued regarding the role of the SCSB (e.g., advocacy at any cost vs.
authorizing only the most innovative and accountable applicants). Former Legislator, an
original SCSB member, maintained that the Board’s purpose was to promote charter
schools and that the school’s stakeholders would hold it accountable by “parents voting
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with their feet” (personal communication, September 20, 2010). To this end, the
legislature changed the law to require that two members of the SCSB have expertise or
experience in developing or administering a charter school and that these individuals
would be nominated to the Governor by “an organization that represents Utah’s charter
schools” (S.B. 140; Utah State Legislature, 2011a).
In 2005, following the creation of the SCSB and seven years of charter school
operation, caps were lifted from the maximum number of schools and charter schools
began to proliferate throughout the state (S.B. 178; Utah State Legislature, 2005). By fall
2011, the SCSB authorized 47 new schools, in addition to taking over the oversight and
monitoring responsibility for the existing 28 charter schools authorized by the USBE
between 1999 and 2003, making them ultimately responsible for 75 schools, located in 21
school districts, serving 44,892 students. The SCSB helped grow the charter school
movement from serving slightly over 1% (1.26%) of the public school population to
almost 8% (7.64%) over the past seven years. Figure 2 shows the number of charter
schools opened by school year over time and the number of public school students
attending charter schools over time.
However, not all educators were thrilled by the number of charter schools being
approved. District Superintendent understood the following.
There would be a study done during the pilot period with eight charter schools
and then their effectiveness would be reviewed and future decisions would be
made with evidence. The legislature, however, did not stick to that original three
year study and determine the impact of choice in public education.
District Superintendent now sees charter schools as “Having created a dual
system that the State can’t afford” and “They are not anything new or innovative, and not
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Figure 2. Number of operational charter schools and students enrolled in charter
schools (on October 1 of the school year indicated) as approved by chartering entities
(i.e., Utah State Board of Education, Utah State Charter School Board, and local school
districts). Six schools began operations in 1999 with 390 students. By 2011, 81 schools
were in operation with a total enrollment of 44,892 students.

held to higher accountability, they are just, you know, schools that just didn’t want to be
part of a district.”
Utah Legislative Changes Over Time
The Utah legislature continues to modify charter school laws in almost every
session, as do most states. State charter school amendments have expanded the number of
permissible charter schools, eased entry of schools into becoming charter schools,
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increased the flexibility of charter schools, and increased fiscal support. Utah’s charter
school program exemplifies this evolution. Following is a summary of significant charter
school policy changes in Utah since inception.
In 1998, House Bill 145 provided a relatively weak charter school law stipulating
that, to qualify for conversion to a charter school, a public school must show evidence of
support from two-thirds of its parents and teachers. The law instituted a cap of eight
charters and required that teachers in charter schools must be certified
In 2001, Senate Bill 169 gave school districts the authority to approve new charter
schools and allowed schools whose charters were rejected to appeal to the State Board of
Education. The cap for state-issued charters rose to 16 for the 2002-2003 school year.
In 2002, Senate Bill 138 allowed the USBE to sponsor up to six New Century
High Schools (magnet charter schools focused on math, technology, and science),
allowed local school districts to sponsor an unlimited number of conversion schools and
start-up charter schools, as long as they enrolled no more than 4% of a district’s student
population, and authorized the state superintendent to allocate grants for both start-up
costs and ongoing expenses of charter schools.
In 2004, House Bill 152 created the State Charter School Board to authorize
charter schools subject to the approval of the State Board of Education and expanded the
number of charter schools the board may sponsor to 24. The bill also required the State
Charter School Board to study existing state law and administrative rules for the purpose
of determining which ones are burdensome to charter schools.
In 2005, Senate Bill 178 removed the cap on the number of charter schools that
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the State Charter School Board may authorize, prohibited charter schools from being
denied due to certain impacts on public schools, allowed a chartering entity to take
certain actions if a charter school failed to remedy deficiencies within an established
timeline, allowed a private management company to operate a charter school, if the
school was terminated during a school year, and provided that rules governing licensing
of administrative and supervisory personnel did not apply to charter schools. In addition,
House Bill 36 exempted charter schools from certain municipal land use regulations.
In 2006, House Bill 172 modified local land use provisions relating to charter
schools. In 2007, House Bill 318 created the State Charter School Financing Authority to
issue obligations under the Utah Industrial Facilities and Development Act.
In 2009, Senate Bill 188 expanded the membership of the State Board of
Education by including a member of the State Charter School Board as a nonvoting
member and removed a statutory enrollment cap on charter schools. In addition, Senate
Bill 55 allowed a board of trustees of a higher education institution to enter into an
agreement with certain individuals or entities to establish and operate a charter school
(subject to approval by the USBE).
In 2011, House Bill 388 provided that a chartering entity may use certain data to
measure the performance of a charter school and prohibited a chartering entity from
imposing performance standards, except as permitted by statute. In addition, Senate Bill
140 provided that of the seven members appointed by the governor to the State Charter
School Board, three members shall be nominated by an organization that represents
Utah’s charter schools and have expertise or experience in developing or administering a
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charter school.
Charter advocates in states initially passing laws often have to make a hard choice
between accepting a relatively weak law or postponing their fight for another day. In
Utah, a law with serious weaknesses was incrementally strengthened over time, as the
constituency for the idea grew and made itself felt in the legislative process, as hard
evidence of problems with certain provisions of the law emerged, and as myths and
concerns raised earlier were dispelled (C. Bleak, personal communication, March 11,
2011). While many of the changes were seemingly small, it made charter school
accountability a moving target.
As discussed in Chapter II, chartering entities sponsored charter schools and
entered into an agreement that provided certain flexibility from rules and regulations in
return for increased accountability found in its Charter Agreement, the terms and
conditions for the operation of an approved charter school. Based on the increased
number of charter schools and students attending charter schools, it appeared that Utah’s
charter schools were successful. However, Utah’s charter school legislation passed with
the promise that charter schools would make a difference in the state’s public education
system. But, have they?
Models of Charter Schools
Researchers contended the theory of charter schools had five core components,
four of which dealt directly with autonomy, innovation, and accountability.
1. The adoption of a charter school law would lead to the creation of new
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schools or the reinvention of existing ones, expanding both the variety of schools
available and the choices offered to parents (Kolderie, 1990; Nathan, 1996a).
2. Charter schools would have more autonomy and flexibility than traditional
public schools through their independence from school districts, waivers from state laws
and regulations, and parental choice (Wohlstetter et al., 1995).
3. The interplay of autonomy and market forces would make charter schools
more innovative and of higher quality than traditional public schools in such areas as
instruction and curriculum, school organization and governance, and, in some cases,
teacher qualifications and union involvement in schools (Arsen, Plank, & Sykes, 1999).
4. Charter schools would be more accountable than traditional schools because
they would have to meet the demands of their parent and student “consumers” and
because they have short-term performance contracts with government agencies that
provide public funding (Kolderie, 1990).
5. The combination of autonomy, innovation, and accountability would lead to
improved student achievement, high parental and student satisfaction, high teacher/
employee satisfaction and empowerment, positive effects on the broader system of public
education, and positive or neutral effects on educational equity (Bulkley & Fisler, 2003).
Charter school accountability was the legislatively assigned topic that received the
most discussion in the 1997 task force committee meetings, as well as on the floor during
the 1998 General Session of the Utah legislature. Once the State Charter School Board
(SCSB) became the chartering, oversight, and monitoring entity for state-chartered
schools in 2004, it began the process of defining its role as an authorizer and its
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procedures for determining charter school accountability (SCSB, July 15, 2004).
Typically, chartering entities enjoyed a good deal of discretion in defining their roles and
each developed their own procedures for determining how to hold charter schools
accountable and whether to terminate or renew a charter (Vergari, 2001). A number of
studies suggested that authorizers often focused their oversight on the familiar, such as
compliance and financial stability, rather than on performance (Bulkley, 2005; Henig,
Moser, Holyoke, & Lacireno-Paquet, 1999; Hill et al., 2001). In a SRI International study
(2000), chartering agencies surveyed reported that they focused on curriculum, finances,
and assessment during the charter-granting process and on student achievement, financial
record keeping, and compliance with federal and state regulations once schools were
operating. So, the SCSB sought to focus on multiple aspects of accountability, including
performance (State Charter School Board, August 11, 2011).
Several models of accountability have been promoted as the best model to
measure charter school performance including the free market or consumer model,
professional accountability model, standards-based performance accountability model,
bureaucratic accountability model, and political accountability model (Fusarelli &
Crawford, 2001; Garn & Cobb, 2001). The assumption was that charter schools would be
accountable to all models, which included that consumers would demand, among other
things, high-quality education and that the accountability to all models would be mutually
reinforcing.
The free market model assumed good schools achieve success through freedom of
choice by families, educators, and school operators. It assumed that competition results in
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schools providing good instruction for students and a positive working environment for
teachers, and that competition rewarded schools that use money efficiently (Education
Commission of the States, 2011). Under free market accountability, schools were not
subordinate to bureaucracies, such as the SCSB, but rather were enterprises that succeed
or fail solely on whether they could attract families and teachers.
The theory of market-based accountability in education focused resources on
family-school connections instead of community-school linkages resulting in greater
efficiencies in achieving educational goals. By pushing decision making down to families
and allowing schools to respond independently to the variety of family interests, market
approaches claimed to be more responsive and therefore produced greater accountability
and public satisfaction (Education Commission of the States, 2011).
While a pure market model argued for competition without regulation, authors of
market-based accountability models advocated for a mix of markets and government,
termed a regulated market (Fusarelli & Crawford, 2001). A regulated market put a few
rules and barriers into effect to protect children and parents, such as ensuring equality for
students with disabilities and monitoring the legitimacy and credibility of school
management. The scope of regulation was broad enough to ensure the legitimacy of
market results, but was constrained enough to allow the market to function in the
competitive framework that was intended.
As for state academic standards under regulated market arrangements, the
standards served as thresholds for school licensure. Schools that failed to teach certain
core skills effectively did not receive public funds. While all schools were required to
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meet threshold standards, rigorous standards were set to trigger competition among
schools.
The professional accountability model suggested that if teachers were freed from
the rules and regulations of the educational bureaucracy, they would function as
professional educators, developing innovative methods of instruction and applying them
in the classroom (Fusarelli & Crawford, 2001). The goal of improving student learning
through the improvement of teaching was at the heart of a professional model of
accountability. Such a model regulated the qualifications and performance of teachers
and school leaders. It relied on professional and state quality-assurance mechanisms that
worked for other professions in America, such as professional accreditation and
meaningful state licensing (Education Commission of the States, 2011). The professional
model also included regular peer and administrator evaluation to ensure that teachers
engaged in appropriate professional practice.
The professional accountability model relied on both state and the profession’s
involvement in developing standards and assessments for teacher preparation, teacher
licensing, and teaching performance through coalitions of educators and education
stakeholders, including national, state, and local policymakers, and members of the
public (Fusarelli & Crawford, 2001). While a professional model of accountability for
teaching coexisted with state-level accountability mechanisms and integrated state and
professional expectations, eventually it worked better in a system of national expectations
for teachers (Education Commission of the States, 2011).
Standards-based performance accountability was contingent on achievement gains
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made by students in the classroom (Fusarelli & Crawford, 2001). A standards-based
vision was enacted in federal law under the Clinton administration with the 1994
reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) and carried
forward under the Bush administration with the NCLB of 2001. In a recent survey of
policy makers, standards were acknowledged as the central framework guiding state
education policy (Massell, 2008). If charter schools and those who operate them
demonstrated that their students were performing and meeting standards as set forth by
the state, then the school met the criteria for accountability.
In a standards-based accountability system, state academic content standards
provided descriptions of the domains that were formally endorsed by policymakers,
educators, and the public. Standards writing committees consulted scientists, researchers,
teachers, and others, and crafted descriptions of the content domain that served as the
basis for curriculum and assessments. One might think that educators long ago reached
agreement on the content of the public school curriculum, but, despite many efforts to
codify content in the disciplines (e.g., National Research Council, National Council of
Teachers of Mathematics), state standards still varied considerably in terms of breadth,
depth, coverage, and format (Stecher, 2010).
The fourth model, bureaucratic accountability, referred to the accountability of
schools to various levels of administration for student performance. Bureaucratic
accountability was the basis for the vast majority of formal accountability systems. It was
top down and held schools accountable to the district, state, or federal government for
student performance on standardized tests. Rewards and sanctions served as external
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motivators for improving student achievement. Because failure to improve test scores had
significant consequences, these tests were often referred to as “high stakes” (Fuhrman,
1999). In the charter school movement, bureaucratic accountability was based on the
superior-subordinate relationship and depended upon the formal definition of the
responsibilities of positions within an organization. The chartering entity assigned
responsibilities to charter school governing boards where bureaucratic accountability
dominated (Adams & Kirst, 1999).
Political accountability in its purest form was between an elected official and the
voters. As with professional accountability, the performances expected could be quite
variable and hard to specify (Bulkley & Fisler, 2003). They might have also changed
radically over time so that what the voters wanted at one point, they rejected at another.
Political accountability facilitated the lobbying of elected officials to ensure that they
acted on one’s preferences, and it might have included rewarding them by helping them
get reelected. Political accountability extended to officers appointed by elected
representatives, especially superintendents appointed by elected school boards.
Historically, American schools have primarily used a mix of political,
bureaucratic, and professional accountability (Hill, Lake, & Celio, 2002). The elected
school board set policy and appointed the superintendent, who held the highest position
in the formal bureaucracy. Still, teachers had considerable autonomy to choose
instructional methods, even if licensure standards were rarely challenging and peer
accountability was the exception, not the rule.
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Charter School Accountability Framework
Initially the SCSB enjoyed the same discretion in defining the performance
measures by which an individual charter school’s accountability was determined and
placed them in the contents of its charter agreement. Utah Administrative Rule R277-481
defined a charter agreement as “the terms and conditions for the operation of an approved
charter school.” Rules and procedures were specified in advance, and criteria for good
performance were established in the charter agreement. And, according to state law, a
charter agreement “may be modified by mutual agreement of the chartering entity and the
governing body of the school” (The Utah Charter Schools Act, 2 Utah Code Ann. §53A1a-508(4), 2011). Once the charter agreement was signed, the chartering entity then
observed the process and evaluated both the process and the results (Newmann, King, &
Rigdon, 1997).
Because the SCSB desired to promote and authorize high quality charter schools
in Utah, it began the process of creating a performance accountability framework in late
2009 as a way to objectively measure charter school accountability. The accountability
framework incorporated aspects of all four models described above. In creating the
performance accountability framework, the SCSB took a two‐tiered approach in forming
the list of metrics for charter school quality that could be considered for inclusion in a
performance accountability framework. First, they looked nationally at what others in the
charter school sector were doing. The SCSB hired the Center for Research and
Educational Outcomes (CREDO) to look across the country to gather input into
suggested metrics to be included in the performance accountability framework.
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CREDO’s starting point for creating a list of proposed metrics was the Building Charter
School Quality Initiative (BCSQ), a national project focused on creating common
performance measures for quality charter schools. This project itself sought input from a
broad set of charter school constituents, including schools, authorizers, charter school
support organizations and funders of charter schools. In addition to the BCSQ metrics,
CREDO gathered current performance accountability materials from state charter support
organizations, state departments of education and authorizers in Arizona, California,
Colorado, Florida, New Mexico and Texas. CREDO combined the metrics to create a
consolidated list that was used as the knowledge base to survey the Utah charter school
community.
Second, the SCSB sought the input of the Utah charter school community. The
survey distributed throughout the Utah charter school community focused on metrics, the
precise computations associated with school performance, because metrics were both
granular and specific, characteristics necessary for a successful performance
accountability framework. Metrics were grouped by measure and there was opportunity
under each measure for respondents to add their own suggestions. There were two
purposes to the survey. The first was to build an understanding of the views of each of the
stakeholders concerning a “formula” for charter school performance accountability, as
revealed by their responses to a set of structured questions. The second was to provide an
opportunity for engagement with the stakeholder groups at an important stage of the
development cycle of the performance accountability framework.
For each metric the SCSB asked participants to give their thoughts on four
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dimensions.
1. Do you already use this metric to monitor charter school accountability?
2. How valuable to do you find this metric for managing charter school
accountability?
3. How feasible is it to track and monitor this metric?
4. How frequently do you feel this metric should be monitored and reported
(e.g., never, weekly, monthly, quarterly, biannually, annually)?
Surveys were sent to all school principals and charter school governing board
chairs for the operational Utah charter schools, as well as the SCSB, USOE Charter
School Office staff, and the leadership of the Utah Association of Public Charter Schools.
The survey results revealed significantly different views on the importance of key areas
of performance (e.g., academic status, academic growth, student engagement, board
performance, and parent and community engagement) across the groups of respondents.
This divergence had clear implications for the feasibility and ease of creating a
performance accountability framework that enjoyed widespread and enduring support
(Center for Research on Educational Outcomes, 2011).
According to the survey, the SCSB and the USOE Charter School Section staff
considered academic performance to be the most important area of accountability, with
school‐based respondents giving it less importance. The extent of the divergence between
school principals and charter school governing board members was slight, but is
significantly different from the SCSB and the USOE Charter School Section staff. The
difference in perception between the SCSB and the USOE Charter School Section staff
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was noteworthy and presented challenges as the details of the performance accountability
framework moved towards finalization.
During the 2011 legislative session, however, legislation passed prohibiting the
State Charter School Board from “imposing performance standards, except as permitted
by statute, that would limit a charter school from accomplishing the purposes of charter
schools” (The Utah Charter Schools Act, 2 Utah Code Ann. § 53A-1a-507, 2011). While
the language could be interpreted as somewhat permissive, considering that the
performance accountability framework does not limit charter schools from accomplishing
their purpose, the Utah Association of Public Charter Schools published that the intent of
the legislation was to “Ensure that the charter school board cannot increase regulations
and rules on charters unless in statute” (C. Bleak, personal communication, March 11,
2011). Alternately, the State Charter School Board would like to see legislation holding
the charter schools to a higher standard of quality and does not see performance
accountability as an antithesis of autonomy and innovation (T. Morgan, personal
communication, July 14, 2011).
Autonomy and Innovation
Autonomy has a variety of meanings, and autonomy for charter schools varied
considerably across states and authorizers. Autonomy meant freedom from state
regulation, autonomy with respect to a district or authorizer, and autonomy for parents
and students through school choice (Wohlstetter et al., 1995). Parent lobbyist thought
parents and choice were the keys because any parent knew that each child learned in
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different ways. For her, that was the impetus of getting involved in charter schools.
So I think choice in education is imperative, not every district school is a bad
school; not every charter school is a great school. But, it is a parent’s
responsibility to find the school that best suits, or fits, the needs of their kids and
make an informed choice regarding where the child attends school.
Half of the states with charter school laws in 2000 allowed charter schools to
waive many state laws, rules, and regulations, and waivers were uncommon in such areas
as fiscal requirements and student assessment policies but more common in collective
bargaining and teacher certification (SRI International, 2000). District superintendent,
who believed charter schools should be held accountable to high quality education in
return for greater flexibility, said, “It was frustrating to districts that the legislature was
spending money on charter schools in Utah without having any research behind it.”
Drawing a lesson from the business world, many educators and policymakers,
including those in Utah, decided that to do their best work, schools also needed the
luxury of freedom (Dillon, 2011). Just as autonomous cultures in the business world have
improved employee morale and increased innovation (e.g., Google), greater autonomy
could free charter schools to try new approaches with instruction, staffing, and schedules,
so they could respond quickly and more effectively to student needs. With expanded
autonomy, Utah charter schools made big decisions like how to spend the budget, what
curriculum to use, and how to hire and train teachers. In theory, those who knew students
best were best able to direct resources and took actions on students’ behalf (Ouchi, 2003;
Schmerler, 2002).
Experience with charter schools showed that granting charter schools more
flexibility yielded more innovation in management, staffing, and instruction, bringing
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high-quality schools to neighborhoods that greatly needed them (Dillon, 2011). But
research also showed that not all charter schools had the capacity to fill the space created
by autonomy with actions that held them accountable to actually improving student
learning. Unlike many Fortune 500 companies, which hired employees specifically for
their ability to thrive on their own, and which could easily fire those who could not,
charter schools often didn’t have the leaders, the staff, or the vision to make good
independent decisions, and they just as often lacked the ability to build that capacity.
Decades of research on school autonomy showed that without those tools, autonomy was
unlikely to improve student achievement.
One review of 77 studies on site-based management found virtually no firm,
research based evidence of either direct or indirect effects of site-based management on
students (Leithwood & Menzies, 1998). Researchers in England also found no evidence
that status as an autonomous school led to higher student performance (R. Allen, 2010;
Levacic & Hardman, 1999). And research on charter schools here in the United States
failed to show a direct connection between autonomy and achievement (Zimmer &
Buddin, 2005). Indeed, the uneven performance of charter schools across the country, and
even within districts, indicated that success demands far more than just regulatory
freedom (Center for Research on Educational Outcomes, 2009).
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CHAPTER V
RECOMMENDATIONS
Since adoption of Utah charter school legislation in 1998, multiple changes
occurred, as evidenced in the history of the Utah Code. Former Legislator stated on many
occasions, however, the way the law is currently written and interpreted now is not how
he intended it (personal communication, September 20, 2009). In his opinion, the law’s
intention was to help charter schools be an innovative means of education while
providing them with the support and resources needed to accomplish that goal. Other
interviewees felt that Utah’s charter schools were supported, but that not many chose to
be innovative and a few did not add positive value to the educational landscape.
In addition to researching available evaluations of Utah’s charter school
environment, I asked the interviewees what impact charter schools had on Utah’s public
education system and what recommendations, if any, they had to improve the charter
school landscape. Chapter V is an account of the interviewees’ perceptions about charter
school impacts and legislative and policy recommendations.
Charter School Impact
Overall, Utah charter schools show promising achievement, and there are clearly
numerous examples of high performing, successful charter schools. But some charter
schools are better than others and, as in every state with a charter school law, not every
Utah charter school is effective. Researchers argue that the effectiveness of charter
schools depends on many factors, including different features of charter school policy, as
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well as the local contexts in which the policies are implemented (Levin, 2002).
Literature Recommendations
Recent literature reviews on the issue of relative effectiveness of charter schools,
however, revealed the challenges of studying charter school effects. Of those literature
reviews that met the standards of methodological rigor, most were longitudinal studentlevel studies in a handful of states and large cities (Betts & Tang, 2008; Evergreen,
Miron, & Urschel, 2008; Teasley, 2009). Evidence from those studies regarding the
effectiveness of charter schools for increased student performance was mixed. That is,
depending on the student population served, operational years, and other factors, charter
schools had produced negative, positive, and no effect on student achievement in these
different studies.
National and multi-state studies provided a representative picture of charter
schools, although they were generally limited by their study design (Center for Research
on Educational Outcomes, 2009; Lubienski & Lubienski, 2006). State-specific studies,
however, could use consistent measures of student achievement over a number of years
(Ni & Rorrer, 2011). The evidence of state-specific studies was important to more fully
understand the variations of charter school effectiveness in different policy environments.
However, only a few states provided comprehensive longitudinal student level data for
rigorous state-wide studies. Ni and Rorrer evaluated Utah’s charter school effectiveness,
based on longitudinal student-level data from 2004 to 2009, using (a) hierarchical linear
growth models with matched sample and (b) student-fixed effects regression. Both
methods yielded consistent results that charter schools on average performed slightly
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worse as compared to traditional public schools, a result that was primarily affected by
the low effectiveness and high student mobility of newly-established charter schools. Ni
and Rorrer reported when charter schools gained more experience they became as
effective as traditional public schools, and in some cases more effective than traditional
public schools.
Conversely, CREDO did not find that Utah charter schools became more effective
over time. As reported to the SCSB in 2011;
1. Overall Utah charter school performance was slightly worse in both reading
and math compared to traditional public schools.
2. One third of Utah charter schools outperformed traditional public schools in
reading and math.
3. Urban Utah charter schools performed better in both math and reading
compared to traditional public schools.
4. Utah charter students performed better than their peers in traditional public
schools after the first year of enrollment.
5. Utah charters were performing better with Hispanic students but worse with
ELL students than traditional public schools in reading.
CREDO found virtual control records, determined by finding matched schools
based on demographic variables such as race/ethnicity, gender, English proficiency,
socioeconomic status, special education status, and grade level, and compared their
performance to Utah charter school students’ performance. In CREDO’s earlier report,
Multiple choice: Charter school performance in 16 states, they found that 17% provide

132
superior education opportunities for their students and 37% deliver educational results
that are significantly worse than their student would have realized had they remained in
traditional public school (Center for Research on Educational Outcomes, 2009).
These two reports, Ni and Rorrer (2011) and CREDO (2011), led to two
implications for the SCSB. First, that quality focus begins at the authorizing stage.
Second, that the SCSB should have a plan for dealing with low-performing charters.
Therefore, policy change is warranted to ensure both the strength of Utah’s charter school
movement in the application and authorizing process and the monitoring and oversight
process.
Interviewee Recommendations
All interviewees believed charter schools had an impact on Utah’s public
education system. The extent and importance of the impact varied, but all recognized
system wide changes. According to Charter School Founder, “charter schools create new
models of public education that, if successful, can be adapted by districts. In fact, there
are five districts in Utah that sponsor their own charter schools to try innovative
instructional methods and curricula.” He viewed charter schools as laboratories of
experimentation where quality programs producing good results could be implemented
system wide.
Former Legislator indicated that charter schools had definitely offered an
alternative to parents and students that were not successful in the traditional public
education system. He also thought, to a certain extent, charter schools “keep the
traditional system honest.” Because the traditional system had to respond to students
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leaving the district to go to charter schools, the districts had to self-assess and ask “why
are people choosing the charter school over us?” His hope was the self-assessment would
help districts improve offerings to their stakeholders. The system also kept the charter
schools honest because “[the charters] know they must offer a high-quality program,
which is responsive to stakeholders, as it is more convenient to go to the neighborhood
school and they could lose the revenue if they don’t meet students’ needs.”
State government employee’s perception of charter schools is that, in the
beginning, charter schools were started either for the very best or the very worst reasons.
If created for the very best reasons, such as to create a different vision or mission of
public school, they were the “best schools in the state.” Alternately, if they were started
for the very worst reasons, such as to settle a score or a personal vendetta, then the
charter school really struggled. “The charter school movement has evolved over time and
authorizers have learned that they create a thoughtful application process that gets people
thinking about all the right reasons to start a charter school.” State government employee
applauded the USBE and SCSB for putting those mechanisms in place, as evidenced by
the quality applications she now sees coming forward. “Charter applicants are very strong
people. They have a vision of what they want to accomplish. They are in it for kids.”
Some charter schools were very effective schools, according to District
Superintendent. During his tenure at the USOE, he visited several charter schools and
found some to be excellent schools. Those excellent schools helped shape public
education in Utah. Similar to former legislator’s statement that charter schools kept the
system honest, as a district administrator district superintendent asked himself “what is it
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that we are not doing, what are we not providing our patrons, so that they want to reach
out and go to another school?” He thought the self-assessment was probably the biggest
benefit of the new charter schools.
“I think (charter schools) have had a huge impact and I think that parents now
know (a) that they have a voice, and (b) that they can do something with that voice, that
there is an outlet for that voice,” says parent lobbyist. Parent lobbyist’s district, recently
identified by the National Alliance of Public Charter Schools as “among the top ten
nationally when it comes to the highest annual growth in the percentage of public charter
school students,” did not respond to parents’ dislike of its newly adopted math program
and, as a result, has nearly 9% of its student population attend charter schools (Warnock,
2011). Also, because parent lobbyist knew the local district was watching the charter
schools within its boundaries, it caused the charter schools to “work harder to do what’s
best for kids.” Instead of teaching to the lowest common denominator, charter schools
differentiated and individualized their instruction to each student who chose to attend.
Charter School Principal, also located in the same school district as parent
lobbyist, “thinks (charter schools) have proved the school district wrong.” Her perception
was the district thought she would go away once they finally relented to meet with her
and she was able to share her concerns regarding curriculum with them. Instead she
opened the first charter school in the district. As new charter schools opened within the
same district, the school district began to recognize that they were not meeting all of their
stakeholder’s needs. The charter schools organized, made sure they were providing
quality education and running quality schools, and provided accountability to their
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stakeholders. “We weren’t afraid to open our doors and let people come in. We wanted
the transparency. We wanted the parental involvement. We wanted the districts to come
and look too.”
Researcher Recommendations
Today, parents’ choice of schools is largely predicted by the student racial and
socioeconomic composition of choice schools (Holme & Richards, 2009; Schneider,
Teske, & Marshall, 2000; Weiher & Tedin, 2002). Consequently, when choice was
available, most parents preferred to send their child to a school where most students were
similar to their child (Lacireno-Paquet & Brantley, 2008). While students benefited from
attending schools with higher-achieving classmates, racially and socially isolated learning
environments tended to negatively influence students’ opportunities for success in
academic achievement and later in the labor market (Cobb & Glass, 2009; Ladd, 2002).
Although the population in Utah was increasingly diverse, charter school enrollment in
fall 2010 reflected a significantly lower portion of minority and economical
disadvantaged students (Ni & Rorrer, 2011).
Utah charter schools continue to expand into school districts and communities
currently not offering school choice. Currently, each school district in Utah has at least
one student attending a charter school. Figure 3 shows the Utah school districts with
more than 5.0% of its students choosing to attend a charter school.
Authorizing Environment
As mentioned in Chapter II, the authorizing environment is very important and
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Figure 3. Percentage of students attending a charter school by district of residence for
those districts with more than 5.0% of students choosing to attend a charter school in
2011-2012.

should ensure that only high-quality charter schools open and continue to operate. I have
focused the next section on the SCSB as the predominant charter school authorizer in
Utah, authorizing over 90% of Utah charter schools.
Literature Recommendations
In 2007, the Utah Legislature asked for a study to be completed of charter school
issues by the Office of the Legislative Auditor General (LAG) due to the increased
growth and cost of charter schools (State of Utah Office of the Legislative Auditor
General, 2007). Several findings and recommendations came from the study.
1. Inconsistent data made it difficult to analyze charter school expenditures,
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therefore the SCSB should review the guidance and training available to charter schools
to identify ways to help ensure expenditures are reported accurately.
2. Most charter schools appear financially viable but more oversight is
necessary, thus the SCSB should formalize their financial oversight process by
establishing written policies and procedures, enhance their financial monitoring to
include regular review and follow-up of problems addressed in audited financial reports,
and establish a protocol for actions to be taken for failure to comply with reporting or
state requirements.
3. Authorization process for charter schools can be enhanced, consequently the
SCSB should improve the application process, improve the methods used to evaluate
charter school applications, and identify critical benchmark dates that schools must meet
during the preopening year.
4. Charter school accountability mechanisms should be strengthened,
subsequently the SCSB should ensure reports are submitted, make certain site visits
occur, adopt a clear and comprehensive site visit protocol, and ensure that the
accountability of charter schools becomes a higher priority.
In the closing sections of the audit, the auditors found that there was a “concern
that the dual role of facilitator and overseer are inherently conflicted” (State of Utah
Office of the Legislative Auditor General, 2007, p. 95). This statement served as a
philosophical summary for many of the findings in the report. It was fair to say that the
rapid growth of charter schools, as well as the new experience that such growth provided,
were the root cause of some of the concerns noted in the audit (P. Harrington, personal
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communication, January 11, 2007). It was important to understand that the same inherent
conflict of facilitator and overseer was applied over and over again in daily decisions and
policy formation to provide support, ensure accountability, and yet respect freedom for
each entity. The SCSB worked to minimize the conflict noted above by building a
cohesive state leadership team, having frequent and ongoing dialogue with members of
the USOE and USBE, and providing a roadmap of expectations to the staff director.
A follow-up LAG audit of the SCSB in 2010 determined the SCSB addressed the
LAG findings of 2007 and effectively implemented Board-determined processes and
policies. Recent evaluation of Utah’s authorizer environment, by National Association of
Charter School Authorizers (NACSA), CREDO, and LAG, revealed that the SCSB’s key
competencies included its (a) strong commitment to continuous improvement, (b) strong
work relationship between the board and staff, characterized by trust and effective
communication, (c) effective process for hearing complaints from charter school parents
that respected school autonomy, and (d) clear and reasonable timelines for all stages of
the charter application process (Center for Research on Educational Outcomes, 2011;
State of Utah Office of the Legislative Auditor General, 2010; National Association of
Charter School Authorizers, 2011).
Interviewee Recommendations
When asked about recommended changes to current legislation, former legislator
indicated he would put some component in law that would give charter schools more
flexibility in getting waivers from State Board Rule. He would go so far as to “give
(charter schools) sort of a caveat that if they asked for a waiver, they would get it, unless
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there was a compelling reason not to give it to them,” demonstrated by specific criteria.
Some examples of waivers requested by charter schools that were denied by the SBE
include teaching career and technical education introductions standards and objectives
integrated in other classes rather than as a stand-alone class, holding four extended-days
in a school week (144 school days) rather than five days (180 days as required in Board
Rule R277-419, Pupil Accounting), and issuing course credit based on student
proficiency in lieu of requiring students to attend classes a set number of seat hours.
Former Legislator thought waivers should be easily secured for requests such as such as
single-gender schools, schools serving specific high-risk students (e.g., teen mothers),
and eliminating some required courses (e.g., P.E., art, CTE) to make room for more target
classes geared towards the mission of the charter school (e.g., advanced science, foreign
languages, American history) so students could graduate with specialized knowledge or
skills.
Charter School Principal also advocated for more flexibility, including flexibility
from reporting and teacher certification. In Utah, public schools have over 100 annual
reports to submit to the USOE due to federal, legislative, and internal reporting
requirements. She feels that all public schools should be able to determine which reports
best capture the purpose of the school, along with the required reports for specific state
and federal funding, and that should be all of the reports required. Additionally, although
intended as an area for flexibility in the original charter school legislation, all teachers at
charter schools must be licensed and endorsed for their assignments. This “dampens
some of the innovation charter schools could have” by not allowing them to hire
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individuals who could demonstrate the qualities necessary to be a good charter school
teacher. Charter School Principal does not advocate that anyone can or should teach, but
rather sometimes an individual with a specialized skill or knowledge brought something
to the classroom. And, if the fact that they did not major in education was the only thing
keeping them from sharing with others, it was unfortunate that this opportunity was
missed due to a technicality. Despite the USBE’s multiple avenues for teacher licensure,
all of the routes are costly and require additional classes or examinations, along with
approval from USOE.
State Government Employee thought it would be better to have the New Century
High Schools, the six magnet charter schools focused on math, science, and technology
authorized in 2002, to be authorized by institutions of higher education rather than local
school boards or the SCSB due to their specific focus. Concerns, however, regarding the
accountability of the New Century High Schools, if authorized by universities, would
need to be addressed.
Charter school funding parity is an ongoing issue in Utah, as indicated by Charter
School Founder and Parent Lobbyist, but because it has been a legislative discussion for
several years, “I think the timeframe for making any meaningful funding changes is just
about up,” Charter School Founder stated. His solution to ensuring funding parity is for
every Utah school district to raise money for all of their resident children, and then send
the funding for each resident student to the school they attend, whether district or charter.
“The devil in the detail is how would you do that, on what basis?” Arguments from
higher education employee, who did not favor charter school founder’s solution, included
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that (a) if school districts raise taxes for charter school students too, then it is responsible
to ensure the funds are spent appropriately, which would disallow charter school fiscal
autonomy, (b) since school districts have not been collecting taxes for charter school
resident students in the past, then districts should be allowed to create a separate “charter
school levy” so parents know that they are paying for charter school students, and (c) the
sponsoring legislators promised the education for charter school students would cost less,
but now charter schools want the same funding.
Chris Bleak, Executive Director of the Utah Association of Public Charter
Schools, indicated charter schools also had arguments regarding the way that school
districts proposed to solve the financial problem, including (a) charter schools wanted
autonomy from district rules and policies and did not want the district to have control of
the charter school’s funds, (b) since charter schools received a state average of taxes
collected for several years, to move to a district value would cause about half of the
charter schools to receive less funds per student than before, and (c) charter schools
wanted all allowable funds included in the formula for how the Legislature calculates the
local replacement fund (LRF), a different formula than districts wanted (C. Bleak,
personal communication, March 11, 2011). “Since Utah didn’t do it right from the
beginning, [charter school funding] will be an ongoing issue that will eventually go away
with no resolution” (personal communication, Charter School Founder, September 30,
2010).
Parent Lobbyist wanted to see improved legislation for charter school funding,
including a corrected formula for determining the LRF.
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[She] would love to see what is called backpack funding. The idea is that you look
at the funding for students, and most kids get “X” amount of dollars. If a student
had additional needs, such as special education or ELL, they would receive
additional dollars in their backpack. The money for each student follows the
student to the public school of their choice.
Former Legislator agrees:
The ability to make spending decisions at the local school level, rather than at the
district office, would change the emphasis on how the money is spent at each
local school. And each school would be able to tailor their educational program
to better fit the needs of their community.
Researcher Recommendations
That being said, there were several notable recommended priorities for continued
improvement. CREDO’s report led to two implications for the SCSB. First, that quality
focus began at the authorizing stage. Second, that the SCSB should have a plan for
dealing with low-performing charters. Therefore, policy change was warranted to ensure
both the strength of Utah’s charter school movement in the application and authorizing
process and the monitoring and oversight process (Center for Research on Educational
Outcomes, 2011). The LAG’s report stressed that financial monitoring of charter schools
by SCSB needed to be enhanced (State of Utah Office of the Legislative Auditor General,
2010). Finally, NACSA’s report recommended the SCSB must establish clear and
meaningful expectations for school performance, including the development of a
performance framework with clear, measureable outcomes for academics, finance, and
operations. Additionally the SCSB must monitor school performance in relation to the
established performance expectations (National Association of Charter School
Authorizers, 2011).
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As the SCSB made efforts to develop a performance framework for Utah charter
schools, several roadblocks threatened to stop its desire to improve charter school
accountability in these areas. The Utah Legislature, for one, seemed uncertain as to which
side of the argument of charter school accountability it took. For example, the LAG’s
office issued a legislative report that recommended the SCSB define generally accepted
standards of fiscal management and follow-up on school performance compared to those
standards (State of Utah Office of the Legislative Auditor General, 2010). This report
was accepted by the 2010 Legislature. The Legislature’s Administrative Rules Review
Committee, however, told the SCSB that such legislative audit recommendations did not
need to be followed and should not be followed if the standards limited, infringed, or
prohibited a charter school’s ability to be innovative (M. Madsen, personal
communication, December 15, 2010). Instead, the Committee recommended that the
SCSB not set any financial, academic, or operational requirements of charter schools
other than what is currently in statute, or the school’s charter agreement. This
recommendation emerged in House Bill 388 (2011), which stated:
A chartering entity may not impose performance standards, except as permitted
by statute, that limit, infringe, or prohibit a charter school’s ability to successfully
accomplish the purposes of charter schools as provided in Section 53A-1a-503 or
as otherwise provided in law. (The Utah Charter Schools Act, 2 Utah Code Ann.
§53A-1a-507, 2011)
NACSA recommended the SCSB also establish and implement a process for
making high stakes decisions, be prepared to manage orderly school closure, revise the
contract amendment process, and improve its ability to assess applicant capacity
(National Association of Charter School Authorizers, 2011). Each of these
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recommendations required strong SCSB processes and procedures that addressed
everything from the application to the charter agreement to monitoring and oversight.
Monitoring and Oversight
When asked what the SCSB could do to ensure charter schools were accountable,
repeatedly Utah charter school leaders asked that they be held accountable to their charter
agreement. To this end, Board Rule R277-481, Charter School Oversight, Monitoring
and Appeals, passed the USBE in October 2011, which established procedures for
oversight and monitoring of charter agreements and charter schools to encourage
compliance with minimum standards. The rule required that the SCSB provided direct
oversight to its authorized charter schools by requiring that they (a) complied with their
charter agreement, (b) be accredited by the Northwest Accreditation Commission, (c)
annually reviewed their charter agreements, (d) regularly reviewed their operations, and
(e) audited and investigated claims of fraud or misuse of public assets or funds.
A streamlined oversight process was the goal, and charter school leaders were
involved in continual assessments of how to achieve that goal. The group of charter
school leaders determined that five minimum standards were warranted in addition to the
school’s charter agreement, which were (a) not having any unresolved findings in
required independent audits, (b) maintaining a minimum of 30 days cash on hand, (c) not
having violations of federal or state law or regulation, board rules or board directives, (d)
having all teachers properly licensed and endorsed, and (e) ensuring all employees and
board members have criminal background checks on file. A charter school that fails to
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meet minimum standards may be placed on warning, probation, or, eventually, closed.
Literature Recommendations
Whether this is too much oversight for charter schools in Utah is a matter of
judgment. According to the National Alliance for Public Charter Schools (2011), Utah’s
charter school law does not include any of the model law’s authorizer and overall
program accountability system, indicating that the SCSB does not provide any oversight.
NACSA (2011) and CREDO (2011) also agree that state law should be strengthened and
the SCSB should provide more oversight as to whether or not its charter schools meet the
agreed upon performance measures in the charter agreement. Board Rule R277-481 is the
first step (T. Morgan, personal communication, February 1, 2010). Most interviewees
also agreed that changes to legislation were warranted to strengthen the support and
quality of the charter school movement.
Interviewee Recommendations
Greater accountability is also a concern to District Superintendent, who believes
that the 3-year pilot was never realized because the cap was lifted off the number of
charter schools prior to a report of their success. He would want legislation holding
charter schools more accountable to improved student achievement. “Despite the USOE’s
effort to monitor and hold charter schools accountable, it does not happen.” A change to
legislation is needed to give the SCSB and local school district’s greater authority to
close underperforming charter schools.
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Researcher Recommendations
Through researching and writing this dissertation, I learned a great deal about the
genesis of the Utah charter school movement. Specifically, I learned the reason charter
school legislation passed in 1998 as compared to other school choice options (e.g.,
vouchers, tuition tax credits, magnet schools, etc.), I met the political actors involved in
writing and lobbying for and against charter school legislation, and I gained a greater
appreciation for the long and laborious process for making legislative change. As such, I
gave some thought to important process and policy changes that could be implemented
internally and later institutionalized in law.
“Charter friendliness” is important, but not good enough. Utah must make deeper
changes to truly integrate charters with other district schools. It cannot continue to be us
versus them. Utah has gone further than most states to embrace charter schools, but
history has proven that school districts have a knack for knocking the wind out of
reformers’ sails (National Association of Charter School Authorizers, 2011). Old habits,
cultures, and interest group politics play a part, but much more mundane central office
structural realities also need to be reconfigured to better support entrepreneurialism,
equity, and autonomy. The USOE is designed for a centralized school system. The USOE
needs to orient and challenge staff to serve both districts and charter schools effectively.
But even with nearly 8% of its students attending charter schools, the USOE still
treats charter schools largely as a distinct and, for the most part, separate system of
schools. For this to change, the Superintendent and USOE need to begin to truly integrate
charter schools with other public schools. The USOE has begun that work by inviting
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charter schools to attend the same statewide training as school districts. Charter school
accountability requirements have also begun to influence conversations about
accountability for other schools but not in any significant way to date.
Utah must update the first wave of state charter laws to allow for widespread
access to charter schools. The Utah charter initiative demonstrates the potential impact of
using chartering to improve all schools in a community. Most state charter laws,
including Utah’s, were not designed to support or promote system-wide chartering; they
were crafted as compromises among interest groups primarily to get a number of charter
schools up and running to demonstrate their potential. Now that the potential is clear, the
next wave of state charter laws should (a) promote systemic change by allowing
chartering entities to charter enough schools to reach all students in need of alternatives
to traditional district schools and (b) increase the capacity for charter schools to be
successful with the most challenging student populations by providing equitable funding
and access to facilities or facilities funding.
Conclusion
The original concept behind Utah charter schools was to provide maximum
flexibility for improved student achievement, an education reform that epitomized the
theory of school-based management and promised to offer quality educational
opportunities to traditionally under-represented students. In Utah, charter school
legislation does not provide much, if any, flexibility to its charter schools, as evidenced
by a minimal number of waivers from state laws found in statute (The Utah Charter
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Schools Act, 2 Utah Code Ann. §53A-1a-511, 2011) and the limited waivers from board
rule approved by the USBE. Whether or not this lack of flexibility plays into Utah charter
schools not having a significant impact on the education of its students was outside the
scope of this dissertation, but is an area for additional research.
Charter schools are de facto school-based management schools in that they have a
representative decision-making body at the school. Utah charter schools are required by
state law to have independent governing boards, constituted of volunteers, which enter
into an agreement with a chartering entity to run a charter school (The Utah Charter
Schools Act, 2 Utah Code Ann. §53A-1a-508, 2011). The governing board focuses on
policy governance while the administration focuses on day-to-day management. For
school-based management decisions to be sound, attention must be paid to who decides
what. Sound decisions are best made by those who are informed about and care about the
issues and who know the context in which the decision will be carried out. Otherwise,
there is no guarantee that these decisions will be any better than those made by
policymakers many steps removed. Participatory management does not mean that
everyone decides everything. Some decisions are best left to the professionals in the
school (David, 1995).
Charter schools are unlikely to improve unless community members, particularly
parents, participate meaningfully. And in secondary charter schools, students should be
involved as well. Charter schools are also unlikely to improve unless teachers, the main
implementers of management decisions, shape the direction of change. In general, those
who have the strongest personal stake in and the most immediate connection to the school
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are the ones who should tackle the issues. The challenge is to maximize the likelihood
that decisions will be appropriately participatory, informed, and sensitive to the context.
Unfortunately, some charter schools have turned from being school-based to relying on
for-profit companies to make some decisions.
In a recent conversation with parent lobbyist about a bill being considered in the
Utah Legislature’s 2012 General Session, she said, “charter schools can no longer survive
without management companies” (March 5, 2012). She was referring to the charter
schools’ ongoing concern that they cannot keep up with providing both a quality
education and successfully running a medium to large-size nonprofit corporation with the
multitude of reporting requirements. In response to the reporting requirements, charter
management organizations (CMOs) in Utah emerged around 2003, when there was an
explosion of charter schools that opened, offering mainly business and human resource
services for a fee. More recently, however, CMOs have begun hiring executive directors,
administrative leadership, and, sometimes, teachers for charter schools, thereby creating a
corporate environment in schools.
Preliminary data from CREDO found that only 31% of Utah’s charter schools had
a positive impact on student achievement in math and a 33% positive impact in reading
when compared to student achievement in district schools (see Table 4). Alternately, 39%
of Utah charter schools had a negative impact in math and 47% had a negative impact in
reading, meaning that the students would have been better served in their district school.
This means 30% of charter schools in math and 20% of charter schools in reading make
no difference on a student’s education (Center for Research on Educational Outcomes,
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Table 4
Distribution of Charter School Academic Impacts
Academic area

Positive

No Difference

Negative

Mathematics

31%

30%

39%

Reading

33%

20%

47%

National

17%

46%

37%

2011). The national average is charter schools have a 17% positive impact, 46% no
difference, and 37% negative impact.
Table 4 shows the distribution of Utah charter school academic impacts in the
areas of mathematics and reading. Overall, charter school performance is slightly worse
in both reading and mathematics compared to district schools. One third of charter
schools outperform district schools in reading and math but a higher percentage of charter
schools underperform district schools in reading and math, 39% and 47%, respectively.
CREDO found that Utah’s urban charter schools perform better in both math and
reading compared to district schools, giving hope that, perhaps, social justice might be
served through school choice. School choice has addressed some problems in urban Utah,
but in doing so it has created others. Typically, school choice benefits students with the
means to choose but works to the disadvantage of students without the means to choose.
For instance, Utah charter schools do not receive transportation dollars so most do not
offer transportation, thereby limiting student attendance to those that can afford to
provide their own transportation. Fall enrollment data for 2011-2012 indicates that
charter schools serve 29.2% economically disadvantaged compared to school districts,
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which serve 37.7%. Additionally, charter schools only serve 9.2% disadvantaged
minorities compared to school districts serving 15.3%.
Based on CREDO’s preliminary data, it appears that Utah charter schools do not
serve the purpose of improved public education. Instead, it appears that the values of the
actors involved in charter school legislation created their own realities, shaped by their
cultural, political, religious, and economic values, and charter schools continue to open
and serve predominantly higher socioeconomic students. Also, it is clear that
underperforming charter schools are not closed by their chartering entity.
I contend that if the actors involved in writing and lobbying for legislation were
concerned with social justice and creating opportunities for underserved students to
receive a high-quality education, legislation would be passed that would correct funding
inequities for charter schools so they could provide a higher-quality education, would
hold charter schools accountable for what they said they would do, including improved
test scores, and would use the school-choice movement as a mechanism to provide
educational equity for all students in the state.
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educational communities among diverse constituencies, strategic planning, and program implementation.
Proven ability to work professionally with State Charter School Board, State Board of Education, State
Office of Education, State Associations, and school leaders to design and implement Utah’s highly
functioning and responsible charter school program. Respected leader with particular expertise in
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Utah State Office of Education
Salt Lake City, UT
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academic performance, and rising number of parents seeking the charter school option
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•
•
•

•

Chief executive officer for the State Charter School Board promoting charter schools, training, and
informing the Charter Board of pertinent changes and information
Successfully crafted and proposed legislative elements that resulted in charter school
accountability program (U.C.A. 53A-1a-519) and processes for closing a charter school (U.C.A.
53A-1a-510.5)
Effectively formulated, interpreted, and implemented policy and programs specific to charter
school accountability which resulted in improving the quality of education for charter schools
Productively coaches, trains, and supervises Education Specialists, Auditor, Finance Analyst, and
IT Analyst, as well as provides direct guidance to 78 LEA heads, improving the rate of on-time
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the number of complaints and concerns received by the State Charter School Board and USOE
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Efficiently builds high-functioning and cohesive teams through supervised autonomy resulting in
the development of staff into respected and sought after leaders in the education community

Utah State Office of Education
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Education Specialist administering federal Charter School Program grants including determining program
goals, setting objectives, defining measurable outcomes, and supporting the program. Applies USOE
policies and procedures, State Charter School Board practices, and federal or state laws and regulations to
charter school grant and subgrants.
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M.Ed. Educational Leadership, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, Las Vegas, NV, 2001
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•
•
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•
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Administrative Certification, Utah, renewed 2007
Teaching Certification, Utah, renewed 2007
Vice-President, American Association of University Women, Salt Lake City, 2007-2008
Member, Executive Board, Utah NAME, 2006-present
Member, National Association of Charter School Authorizers, 2006-present
Member, National Alliance for Public Charter Schools, 2003-present
Member, Utah Association of Secondary School Principals, 2003-2006
Member, Utah Association of Public Charter Schools, 2003-2006
Member, Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 2002-present
Member, Wyoming Association of Secondary School Principals, 2002-2003
Member, Wyoming Association of Elementary School Principals, 2002-2003
Chair, Fundraising Committee, American Association of University Women, 2000-2001
Member, National Science Teachers Association, 1996-2002
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Utah Charter School Accountability Handbook, Salt Lake City, UT, 2008
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